[1] "(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2021 1\n\n Syllabus\n\n NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is\n being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.\n The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been\n prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.\n See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.\n\n\nSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES\n\n Syllabus\n\n DOBBS, STATE HEALTH OFFICER OF THE\n MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL. v.\n JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION ET AL.\n\nCERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR\n THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n\n No. 19–1392. Argued December 1, 2021—Decided June 24, 2022\nMississippi’s Gestational Age Act provides that “[e]xcept in a medical\n emergency or in the case of a severe fetal abnormality, a person shall\n not intentionally or knowingly perform . . . or induce an abortion of an\n unborn human being if the probable gestational age of the unborn hu-\n man being has been determined to be greater than fifteen (15) weeks.”\n Miss. Code Ann. §41–41–191. Respondents—Jackson Women’s Health\n Organization, an abortion clinic, and one of its doctors—challenged the\n Act in Federal District Court, alleging that it violated this Court’s prec-\n edents establishing a constitutional right to abortion, in particular Roe\n v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa.\n v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833. The District Court granted summary judg-\n ment in favor of respondents and permanently enjoined enforcement\n of the Act, reasoning that Mississippi’s 15-week restriction on abortion\n violates this Court’s cases forbidding States to ban abortion pre-viabil-\n ity. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Before this Court, petitioners defend\n the Act on the grounds that Roe and Casey were wrongly decided and\n that the Act is constitutional because it satisfies rational-basis review.\nHeld: The Constitution does not confer a right to abortion; Roe and Casey\n are overruled; and the authority to regulate abortion is returned to the\n people and their elected representatives. Pp. 8–79.\n (a) The critical question is whether the Constitution, properly un-\n derstood, confers a right to obtain an abortion. Casey’s controlling\n opinion skipped over that question and reaffirmed Roe solely on the\n basis of stare decisis. A proper application of stare decisis, however,\n requires an assessment of the strength of the grounds on which Roe\n"
[2] "2 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Syllabus\n\n was based. The Court therefore turns to the question that the Casey\n plurality did not consider. Pp. 8–32.\n (1) First, the Court reviews the standard that the Court’s cases\n have used to determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s refer-\n ence to “liberty” protects a particular right. The Constitution makes\n no express reference to a right to obtain an abortion, but several con-\n stitutional provisions have been offered as potential homes for an im-\n plicit constitutional right. Roe held that the abortion right is part of a\n right to privacy that springs from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and\n Fourteenth Amendments. See 410 U. S., at 152–153. The Casey Court\n grounded its decision solely on the theory that the right to obtain an\n abortion is part of the “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amend-\n ment’s Due Process Clause. Others have suggested that support can\n be found in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, but\n that theory is squarely foreclosed by the Court’s precedents, which es-\n tablish that a State’s regulation of abortion is not a sex-based classifi-\n cation and is thus not subject to the heightened scrutiny that applies\n to such classifications. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U. S. 484, 496,\n n. 20; Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U. S. 263, 273–\n 274. Rather, regulations and prohibitions of abortion are governed by\n the same standard of review as other health and safety measures.\n Pp. 9–11.\n (2) Next, the Court examines whether the right to obtain an abor-\n tion is rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition and whether it is an\n essential component of “ordered liberty.” The Court finds that the\n right to abortion is not deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradi-\n tion. The underlying theory on which Casey rested—that the Four-\n teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides substantive, as well\n as procedural, protection for “liberty”—has long been controversial.\n The Court’s decisions have held that the Due Process Clause pro-\n tects two categories of substantive rights—those rights guaranteed by\n the first eight Amendments to the Constitution and those rights\n deemed fundamental that are not mentioned anywhere in the Consti-\n tution. In deciding whether a right falls into either of these categories,\n the question is whether the right is “deeply rooted in [our] history and\n tradition” and whether it is essential to this Nation’s “scheme of or-\n dered liberty.” Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U. S. ___, ___ (internal quotation\n marks omitted). The term “liberty” alone provides little guidance.\n Thus, historical inquiries are essential whenever the Court is asked to\n recognize a new component of the “liberty” interest protected by the\n Due Process Clause. In interpreting what is meant by “liberty,” the\n Court must guard against the natural human tendency to confuse\n what the Fourteenth Amendment protects with the Court’s own ardent\n views about the liberty that Americans should enjoy. For this reason,\n"
[3] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 3\n\n Syllabus\n\nthe Court has been “reluctant” to recognize rights that are not men-\ntioned in the Constitution. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125.\n Guided by the history and tradition that map the essential compo-\nnents of the Nation’s concept of ordered liberty, the Court finds the\nFourteenth Amendment clearly does not protect the right to an abor-\ntion. Until the latter part of the 20th century, there was no support in\nAmerican law for a constitutional right to obtain an abortion. No state\nconstitutional provision had recognized such a right. Until a few years\nbefore Roe, no federal or state court had recognized such a right. Nor\nhad any scholarly treatise. Indeed, abortion had long been a crime in\nevery single State. At common law, abortion was criminal in at least\nsome stages of pregnancy and was regarded as unlawful and could\nhave very serious consequences at all stages. American law followed\nthe common law until a wave of statutory restrictions in the 1800s ex-\npanded criminal liability for abortions. By the time the Fourteenth\nAmendment was adopted, three-quarters of the States had made abor-\ntion a crime at any stage of pregnancy. This consensus endured until\nthe day Roe was decided. Roe either ignored or misstated this history,\nand Casey declined to reconsider Roe’s faulty historical analysis.\n Respondents’ argument that this history does not matter flies in the\nface of the standard the Court has applied in determining whether an\nasserted right that is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution is never-\ntheless protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Solicitor Gen-\neral repeats Roe’s claim that it is “doubtful . . . abortion was ever firmly\nestablished as a common-law crime even with respect to the destruc-\ntion of a quick fetus,” 410 U. S., at 136, but the great common-law au-\nthorities—Bracton, Coke, Hale, and Blackstone—all wrote that a post-\nquickening abortion was a crime. Moreover, many authorities as-\nserted that even a pre-quickening abortion was “unlawful” and that,\nas a result, an abortionist was guilty of murder if the woman died from\nthe attempt. The Solicitor General suggests that history supports an\nabortion right because of the common law’s failure to criminalize abor-\ntion before quickening, but the insistence on quickening was not uni-\nversal, see Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 631, 633; State v. Slagle, 83\nN. C. 630, 632, and regardless, the fact that many States in the late\n18th and early 19th century did not criminalize pre-quickening abor-\ntions does not mean that anyone thought the States lacked the author-\nity to do so.\n Instead of seriously pressing the argument that the abortion right\nitself has deep roots, supporters of Roe and Casey contend that the\nabortion right is an integral part of a broader entrenched right. Roe\ntermed this a right to privacy, 410 U. S., at 154, and Casey described\nit as the freedom to make “intimate and personal choices” that are\n“central to personal dignity and autonomy,” 505 U. S., at 851. Ordered\n"
[4] "4 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Syllabus\n\n liberty sets limits and defines the boundary between competing inter-\n ests. Roe and Casey each struck a particular balance between the in-\n terests of a woman who wants an abortion and the interests of what\n they termed “potential life.” Roe, 410 U. S., at 150; Casey, 505 U. S.,\n at 852. But the people of the various States may evaluate those inter-\n ests differently. The Nation’s historical understanding of ordered lib-\n erty does not prevent the people’s elected representatives from decid-\n ing how abortion should be regulated. Pp. 11–30.\n (3) Finally, the Court considers whether a right to obtain an abor-\n tion is part of a broader entrenched right that is supported by other\n precedents. The Court concludes the right to obtain an abortion cannot\n be justified as a component of such a right. Attempts to justify abor-\n tion through appeals to a broader right to autonomy and to define one’s\n “concept of existence” prove too much. Casey, 505 U. S., at 851. Those\n criteria, at a high level of generality, could license fundamental rights\n to illicit drug use, prostitution, and the like. What sharply distin-\n guishes the abortion right from the rights recognized in the cases on\n which Roe and Casey rely is something that both those decisions\n acknowledged: Abortion is different because it destroys what Roe\n termed “potential life” and what the law challenged in this case calls\n an “unborn human being.” None of the other decisions cited by Roe\n and Casey involved the critical moral question posed by abortion. Ac-\n cordingly, those cases do not support the right to obtain an abortion,\n and the Court’s conclusion that the Constitution does not confer such\n a right does not undermine them in any way. Pp. 30–32.\n (b) The doctrine of stare decisis does not counsel continued ac-\n ceptance of Roe and Casey. Stare decisis plays an important role and\n protects the interests of those who have taken action in reliance on a\n past decision. It “reduces incentives for challenging settled prece-\n dents, saving parties and courts the expense of endless relitigation.”\n Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 455. It “contrib-\n utes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”\n Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827. And it restrains judicial hubris\n by respecting the judgment of those who grappled with important\n questions in the past. But stare decisis is not an inexorable command,\n Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 233, and “is at its weakest when\n [the Court] interpret[s] the Constitution,” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S.\n 203, 235. Some of the Court’s most important constitutional decisions\n have overruled prior precedents. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educa-\n tion, 347 U. S. 483, 491 (overruling the infamous decision in Plessy v.\n Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, and its progeny).\n The Court’s cases have identified factors that should be considered\n in deciding when a precedent should be overruled. Janus v. State,\n County, and Municipal Employees, 585 U. S. ___, ___–___. Five factors\n"
[5] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 5\n\n Syllabus\n\ndiscussed below weigh strongly in favor of overruling Roe and Casey.\nPp. 39–66.\n (1) The nature of the Court’s error. Like the infamous decision in\nPlessy v. Ferguson, Roe was also egregiously wrong and on a collision\ncourse with the Constitution from the day it was decided. Casey per-\npetuated its errors, calling both sides of the national controversy to\nresolve their debate, but in doing so, Casey necessarily declared a win-\nning side. Those on the losing side—those who sought to advance the\nState’s interest in fetal life—could no longer seek to persuade their\nelected representatives to adopt policies consistent with their views.\nThe Court short-circuited the democratic process by closing it to the\nlarge number of Americans who disagreed with Roe. Pp. 43–45.\n (2) The quality of the reasoning. Without any grounding in the\nconstitutional text, history, or precedent, Roe imposed on the entire\ncountry a detailed set of rules for pregnancy divided into trimesters\nmuch like those that one might expect to find in a statute or regulation.\nSee 410 U. S., at 163–164. Roe’s failure even to note the overwhelming\nconsensus of state laws in effect in 1868 is striking, and what it said\nabout the common law was simply wrong. Then, after surveying his-\ntory, the opinion spent many paragraphs conducting the sort of fact-\nfinding that might be undertaken by a legislative committee, and did\nnot explain why the sources on which it relied shed light on the mean-\ning of the Constitution. As to precedent, citing a broad array of cases,\nthe Court found support for a constitutional “right of personal privacy.”\nId., at 152. But Roe conflated the right to shield information from dis-\nclosure and the right to make and implement important personal de-\ncisions without governmental interference. See Whalen v. Roe, 429\nU. S. 589, 599–600. None of these decisions involved what is distinc-\ntive about abortion: its effect on what Roe termed “potential life.”\nWhen the Court summarized the basis for the scheme it imposed on\nthe country, it asserted that its rules were “consistent with,” among\nother things, “the relative weights of the respective interests involved”\nand “the demands of the profound problems of the present day.” Roe,\n410 U. S., at 165. These are precisely the sort of considerations that\nlegislative bodies often take into account when they draw lines that\naccommodate competing interests. The scheme Roe produced looked\nlike legislation, and the Court provided the sort of explanation that\nmight be expected from a legislative body. An even more glaring defi-\nciency was Roe’s failure to justify the critical distinction it drew be-\ntween pre- and post-viability abortions. See id., at 163. The arbitrary\nviability line, which Casey termed Roe’s central rule, has not found\nmuch support among philosophers and ethicists who have attempted\nto justify a right to abortion. The most obvious problem with any such\n"
[6] "6 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Syllabus\n\n argument is that viability has changed over time and is heavily de-\n pendent on factors—such as medical advances and the availability of\n quality medical care—that have nothing to do with the characteristics\n of a fetus.\n When Casey revisited Roe almost 20 years later, it reaffirmed Roe’s\n central holding, but pointedly refrained from endorsing most of its rea-\n soning. The Court abandoned any reliance on a privacy right and in-\n stead grounded the abortion right entirely on the Fourteenth Amend-\n ment’s Due Process Clause. 505 U. S., at 846. The controlling opinion\n criticized and rejected Roe’s trimester scheme, 505 U. S., at 872, and\n substituted a new and obscure “undue burden” test. Casey, in short,\n either refused to reaffirm or rejected important aspects of Roe’s analy-\n sis, failed to remedy glaring deficiencies in Roe’s reasoning, endorsed\n what it termed Roe’s central holding while suggesting that a majority\n might not have thought it was correct, provided no new support for the\n abortion right other than Roe’s status as precedent, and imposed a new\n test with no firm grounding in constitutional text, history, or prece-\n dent. Pp. 45–56.\n (3) Workability. Deciding whether a precedent should be over-\n ruled depends in part on whether the rule it imposes is workable—that\n is, whether it can be understood and applied in a consistent and pre-\n dictable manner. Casey’s “undue burden” test has scored poorly on the\n workability scale. The Casey plurality tried to put meaning into the\n “undue burden” test by setting out three subsidiary rules, but these\n rules created their own problems. And the difficulty of applying Ca-\n sey’s new rules surfaced in that very case. Compare 505 U. S., at 881–\n 887, with id., at 920–922 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-\n ing in part). The experience of the Courts of Appeals provides further\n evidence that Casey’s “line between” permissible and unconstitutional\n restrictions “has proved to be impossible to draw with precision.” Ja-\n nus, 585 U. S., at ___. Casey has generated a long list of Circuit con-\n flicts. Continued adherence to Casey’s unworkable “undue burden”\n test would undermine, not advance, the “evenhanded, predictable, and\n consistent development of legal principles.” Payne, 501 U. S., at 827.\n Pp. 56–62.\n (4) Effect on other areas of law. Roe and Casey have led to the\n distortion of many important but unrelated legal doctrines, and that\n effect provides further support for overruling those decisions. See Ra-\n mos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in\n part). Pp. 62–63.\n (5) Reliance interests. Overruling Roe and Casey will not upend\n concrete reliance interests like those that develop in “cases involving\n property and contract rights.” Payne, 501 U. S., at 828. In Casey, the\n controlling opinion conceded that traditional reliance interests were\n"
[7] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 7\n\n Syllabus\n\nnot implicated because getting an abortion is generally “unplanned ac-\ntivity,” and “reproductive planning could take virtually immediate ac-\ncount of any sudden restoration of state authority to ban abortions.”\n505 U. S., at 856. Instead, the opinion perceived a more intangible\nform of reliance, namely, that “people [had] organized intimate rela-\ntionships and made choices that define their views of themselves and\ntheir places in society . . . in reliance on the availability of abortion in\nthe event that contraception should fail” and that “[t]he ability of\nwomen to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Na-\ntion has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive\nlives.” Ibid. The contending sides in this case make impassioned and\nconflicting arguments about the effects of the abortion right on the\nlives of women as well as the status of the fetus. The Casey plurality’s\nspeculative attempt to weigh the relative importance of the interests\nof the fetus and the mother represent a departure from the “original\nconstitutional proposition” that “courts do not substitute their social\nand economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies.” Ferguson\nv. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 729–730.\n The Solicitor General suggests that overruling Roe and Casey would\nthreaten the protection of other rights under the Due Process Clause.\nThe Court emphasizes that this decision concerns the constitutional\nright to abortion and no other right. Nothing in this opinion should be\nunderstood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.\nPp. 63–66.\n (c) Casey identified another concern, namely, the danger that the\npublic will perceive a decision overruling a controversial “watershed”\ndecision, such as Roe, as influenced by political considerations or pub-\nlic opinion. 505 U. S., at 866–867. But the Court cannot allow its de-\ncisions to be affected by such extraneous concerns. A precedent of this\nCourt is subject to the usual principles of stare decisis under which\nadherence to precedent is the norm but not an inexorable command. If\nthe rule were otherwise, erroneous decisions like Plessy would still be\nthe law. The Court’s job is to interpret the law, apply longstanding\nprinciples of stare decisis, and decide this case accordingly. Pp. 66–69.\n (d) Under the Court’s precedents, rational-basis review is the appro-\npriate standard to apply when state abortion regulations undergo con-\nstitutional challenge. Given that procuring an abortion is not a funda-\nmental constitutional right, it follows that the States may regulate\nabortion for legitimate reasons, and when such regulations are chal-\nlenged under the Constitution, courts cannot “substitute their social\nand economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies.” Ferguson,\n372 U. S., at 729–730. That applies even when the laws at issue con-\ncern matters of great social significance and moral substance. A law\nregulating abortion, like other health and welfare laws, is entitled to a\n"
[8] "8 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Syllabus\n\n “strong presumption of validity.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312, 319. It\n must be sustained if there is a rational basis on which the legislature\n could have thought that it would serve legitimate state interests. Id.,\n at 320.\n Mississippi’s Gestational Age Act is supported by the Mississippi\n Legislature’s specific findings, which include the State’s asserted in-\n terest in “protecting the life of the unborn.” §2(b)(i). These legitimate\n interests provide a rational basis for the Gestational Age Act, and it\n follows that respondents’ constitutional challenge must fail. Pp. 76–\n 78.\n (e) Abortion presents a profound moral question. The Constitution\n does not prohibit the citizens of each State from regulating or prohib-\n iting abortion. Roe and Casey arrogated that authority. The Court\n overrules those decisions and returns that authority to the people and\n their elected representatives. Pp. 78–79.\n945 F. 3d 265, reversed and remanded.\n\n ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, GOR-\nSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., and KA-\nVANAUGH, J., filed concurring opinions. ROBERTS, C. J., filed an opinion\nconcurring in the judgment. BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., filed\na dissenting opinion.\n"
[9] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 1\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\n NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the\n preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to\n notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-\n ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that\n corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.\n\n\nSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES\n _________________\n\n No. 19–1392\n _________________\n\n\n THOMAS E. DOBBS, STATE HEALTH OFFICER OF\n THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,\n ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S\n HEALTH ORGANIZATION, ET AL.\n ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF\n APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n [June 24, 2022]\n\n JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.\n Abortion presents a profound moral issue on which Amer-\nicans hold sharply conflicting views. Some believe fervently\nthat a human person comes into being at conception and\nthat abortion ends an innocent life. Others feel just as\nstrongly that any regulation of abortion invades a woman’s\nright to control her own body and prevents women from\nachieving full equality. Still others in a third group think\nthat abortion should be allowed under some but not all cir-\ncumstances, and those within this group hold a variety of\nviews about the particular restrictions that should be im-\nposed.\n For the first 185 years after the adoption of the Constitu-\ntion, each State was permitted to address this issue in ac-\ncordance with the views of its citizens. Then, in 1973, this\nCourt decided Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113. Even though the\nConstitution makes no mention of abortion, the Court held\nthat it confers a broad right to obtain one. It did not claim\nthat American law or the common law had ever recognized\n"
[10] "2 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nsuch a right, and its survey of history ranged from the con-\nstitutionally irrelevant (e.g., its discussion of abortion in an-\ntiquity) to the plainly incorrect (e.g., its assertion that abor-\ntion was probably never a crime under the common law).\nAfter cataloging a wealth of other information having no\nbearing on the meaning of the Constitution, the opinion\nconcluded with a numbered set of rules much like those that\nmight be found in a statute enacted by a legislature.\n Under this scheme, each trimester of pregnancy was reg-\nulated differently, but the most critical line was drawn at\nroughly the end of the second trimester, which, at the time,\ncorresponded to the point at which a fetus was thought to\nachieve “viability,” i.e., the ability to survive outside the\nwomb. Although the Court acknowledged that States had\na legitimate interest in protecting “potential life,”1 it found\nthat this interest could not justify any restriction on pre-\nviability abortions. The Court did not explain the basis for\nthis line, and even abortion supporters have found it hard\nto defend Roe’s reasoning. One prominent constitutional\nscholar wrote that he “would vote for a statute very much\nlike the one the Court end[ed] up drafting” if he were “a\nlegislator,” but his assessment of Roe was memorable and\nbrutal: Roe was “not constitutional law” at all and gave “al-\nmost no sense of an obligation to try to be.”2\n At the time of Roe, 30 States still prohibited abortion at\nall stages. In the years prior to that decision, about a third\nof the States had liberalized their laws, but Roe abruptly\nended that political process. It imposed the same highly\nrestrictive regime on the entire Nation, and it effectively\nstruck down the abortion laws of every single State.3 As\n\n——————\n 1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 163 (1973).\n 2 J. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82\n\nYale L. J. 920, 926, 947 (1973) (Ely) (emphasis deleted).\n 3 L. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of\n\nLife and Law, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1973) (Tribe).\n"
[11] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 3\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nJustice Byron White aptly put it in his dissent, the decision\nrepresented the “exercise of raw judicial power,” 410 U. S.,\nat 222, and it sparked a national controversy that has em-\nbittered our political culture for a half century.4\n Eventually, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.\nCasey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992), the Court revisited Roe, but the\nMembers of the Court split three ways. Two Justices ex-\npressed no desire to change Roe in any way.5 Four others\nwanted to overrule the decision in its entirety.6 And the\nthree remaining Justices, who jointly signed the controlling\nopinion, took a third position.7 Their opinion did not en-\ndorse Roe’s reasoning, and it even hinted that one or more\nof its authors might have “reservations” about whether the\nConstitution protects a right to abortion.8 But the opinion\nconcluded that stare decisis, which calls for prior decisions\nto be followed in most instances, required adherence to\nwhat it called Roe’s “central holding”—that a State may not\nconstitutionally protect fetal life before “viability”—even if\nthat holding was wrong.9 Anything less, the opinion\nclaimed, would undermine respect for this Court and the\nrule of law.\n Paradoxically, the judgment in Casey did a fair amount\nof overruling. Several important abortion decisions were\n\n\n——————\n 4 See R. Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N. Y. U. L. Rev.\n\n1185, 1208 (1992) (“Roe . . . halted a political process that was moving in\na reform direction and thereby, I believed, prolonged divisiveness and\ndeferred stable settlement of the issue”).\n 5 See 505 U. S., at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting\n\nin part); id., at 922 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in judg-\nment in part, and dissenting in part).\n 6 See id., at 944 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment in part and\n\ndissenting in part); id., at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part\nand dissenting in part).\n 7 See id., at 843 (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).\n 8 Id., at 853.\n 9 Id., at 860.\n"
[12] "4 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\noverruled in toto, and Roe itself was overruled in part.10 Ca-\nsey threw out Roe’s trimester scheme and substituted a new\nrule of uncertain origin under which States were forbidden\nto adopt any regulation that imposed an “undue burden” on\na woman’s right to have an abortion.11 The decision pro-\nvided no clear guidance about the difference between a\n“due” and an “undue” burden. But the three Justices who\nauthored the controlling opinion “call[ed] the contending\nsides of a national controversy to end their national divi-\nsion” by treating the Court’s decision as the final settlement\nof the question of the constitutional right to abortion.12\n As has become increasingly apparent in the intervening\nyears, Casey did not achieve that goal. Americans continue\nto hold passionate and widely divergent views on abortion,\nand state legislatures have acted accordingly. Some have\nrecently enacted laws allowing abortion, with few re-\nstrictions, at all stages of pregnancy. Others have tightly\nrestricted abortion beginning well before viability. And in\nthis case, 26 States have expressly asked this Court to over-\nrule Roe and Casey and allow the States to regulate or pro-\nhibit pre-viability abortions.\n Before us now is one such state law. The State of Missis-\nsippi asks us to uphold the constitutionality of a law that\ngenerally prohibits an abortion after the 15th week of preg-\nnancy—several weeks before the point at which a fetus is\nnow regarded as “viable” outside the womb. In defending\nthis law, the State’s primary argument is that we should\nreconsider and overrule Roe and Casey and once again allow\neach State to regulate abortion as its citizens wish. On the\nother side, respondents and the Solicitor General ask us to\n\n——————\n 10 Id., at 861, 870, 873 (overruling Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-\n\ntive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. American Col-\nlege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747 (1986)).\n 11 505 U. S., at 874.\n 12 Id., at 867.\n"
[13] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 5\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nreaffirm Roe and Casey, and they contend that the Missis-\nsippi law cannot stand if we do so. Allowing Mississippi to\nprohibit abortions after 15 weeks of pregnancy, they argue,\n“would be no different than overruling Casey and Roe en-\ntirely.” Brief for Respondents 43. They contend that “no\nhalf-measures” are available and that we must either reaf-\nfirm or overrule Roe and Casey. Brief for Respondents 50.\n We hold that Roe and Casey must be overruled. The Con-\nstitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right\nis implicitly protected by any constitutional provision, in-\ncluding the one on which the defenders of Roe and Casey\nnow chiefly rely—the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth\nAmendment. That provision has been held to guarantee\nsome rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution, but\nany such right must be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s his-\ntory and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered\nliberty.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721\n(1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).\n The right to abortion does not fall within this category.\nUntil the latter part of the 20th century, such a right was\nentirely unknown in American law. Indeed, when the Four-\nteenth Amendment was adopted, three quarters of the\nStates made abortion a crime at all stages of pregnancy.\nThe abortion right is also critically different from any other\nright that this Court has held to fall within the Fourteenth\nAmendment’s protection of “liberty.” Roe’s defenders char-\nacterize the abortion right as similar to the rights recog-\nnized in past decisions involving matters such as intimate\nsexual relations, contraception, and marriage, but abortion\nis fundamentally different, as both Roe and Casey acknowl-\nedged, because it destroys what those decisions called “fetal\nlife” and what the law now before us describes as an “un-\nborn human being.”13\n Stare decisis, the doctrine on which Casey’s controlling\n——————\n 13 Miss. Code Ann. §41–41–191(4)(b) (2018).\n"
[14] "6 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nopinion was based, does not compel unending adherence to\nRoe’s abuse of judicial authority. Roe was egregiously\nwrong from the start. Its reasoning was exceptionally\nweak, and the decision has had damaging consequences.\nAnd far from bringing about a national settlement of the\nabortion issue, Roe and Casey have enflamed debate and\ndeepened division.\n It is time to heed the Constitution and return the issue of\nabortion to the people’s elected representatives. “The per-\nmissibility of abortion, and the limitations, upon it, are to\nbe resolved like most important questions in our democ-\nracy: by citizens trying to persuade one another and then\nvoting.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in\njudgment in part and dissenting in part). That is what the\nConstitution and the rule of law demand.\n I\n The law at issue in this case, Mississippi’s Gestational\nAge Act, see Miss. Code Ann. §41–41–191 (2018), contains\nthis central provision: “Except in a medical emergency or in\nthe case of a severe fetal abnormality, a person shall not\nintentionally or knowingly perform . . . or induce an abor-\ntion of an unborn human being if the probable gestational\nage of the unborn human being has been determined to be\ngreater than fifteen (15) weeks.” §4(b).14\n To support this Act, the legislature made a series of fac-\ntual findings. It began by noting that, at the time of enact-\nment, only six countries besides the United States “per-\nmit[ted] nontherapeutic or elective abortion-on-demand\nafter the twentieth week of gestation.”15 §2(a). The legisla-\n\n\n——————\n 14 The Act defines “gestational age” to be “the age of an unborn human\n\nbeing as calculated from the first day of the last menstrual period of the\npregnant woman.” §3(f ).\n 15 Those other six countries were Canada, China, the Netherlands,\n"
[15] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 7\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nture then found that at 5 or 6 weeks’ gestational age an “un-\nborn human being’s heart begins beating”; at 8 weeks the\n“unborn human being begins to move about in the womb”;\nat 9 weeks “all basic physiological functions are present”; at\n10 weeks “vital organs begin to function,” and “[h]air, fin-\ngernails, and toenails . . . begin to form”; at 11 weeks “an\nunborn human being’s diaphragm is developing,” and he or\nshe may “move about freely in the womb”; and at 12 weeks\nthe “unborn human being” has “taken on ‘the human form’\nin all relevant respects.” §2(b)(i) (quoting Gonzales v. Car-\nhart, 550 U. S. 124, 160 (2007)). It found that most abor-\ntions after 15 weeks employ “dilation and evacuation proce-\ndures which involve the use of surgical instruments to\ncrush and tear the unborn child,” and it concluded that the\n“intentional commitment of such acts for nontherapeutic or\nelective reasons is a barbaric practice, dangerous for the\nmaternal patient, and demeaning to the medical profes-\nsion.” §2(b)(i)(8).\n Respondents are an abortion clinic, Jackson Women’s\nHealth Organization, and one of its doctors. On the day the\nGestational Age Act was enacted, respondents filed suit in\nFederal District Court against various Mississippi officials,\nalleging that the Act violated this Court’s precedents estab-\nlishing a constitutional right to abortion. The District\n\n——————\nNorth Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam. See A. Baglini, Charlotte Lozier\nInstitute, Gestational Limits on Abortion in the United States Compared\nto International Norms 6–7 (2014); M. Lee, Is the United States One of\nSeven Countries That “Allow Elective Abortions After 20 Weeks of Preg-\nnancy?” Wash. Post (Oct. 8, 2017), www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-\nchecker/wp/2017/10/09/is-the-united-states-one-of-seven-countries-that-\nallow-elective-abortions-after-20-weeks-of-preganacy (stating that the\nclaim made by the Mississippi Legislature and the Charlotte Lozier In-\nstitute was “backed by data”). A more recent compilation from the Cen-\nter for Reproductive Rights indicates that Iceland and Guinea-Bissau are\nnow also similarly permissive. See The World’s Abortion Laws, Center\nfor Reproductive Rights (Feb. 23, 2021), https://reproductiverights.org/\nmaps/worlds-abortion-laws/.\n"
[16] "8 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nCourt granted summary judgment in favor of respondents\nand permanently enjoined enforcement of the Act, reason-\ning that “viability marks the earliest point at which the\nState’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to\njustify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions” and\nthat 15 weeks’ gestational age is “prior to viability.” Jack-\nson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 349 F. Supp. 3d 536,\n539–540 (SD Miss. 2019) (internal quotation marks omit-\nted). The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 945 F. 3d 265 (2019).\n We granted certiorari, 593 U. S. ___ (2021), to resolve the\nquestion whether “all pre-viability prohibitions on elective\nabortions are unconstitutional,” Pet. for Cert. i. Petition-\ners’ primary defense of the Mississippi Gestational Age Act\nis that Roe and Casey were wrongly decided and that “the\nAct is constitutional because it satisfies rational-basis re-\nview.” Brief for Petitioners 49. Respondents answer that\nallowing Mississippi to ban pre-viability abortions “would\nbe no different than overruling Casey and Roe entirely.”\nBrief for Respondents 43. They tell us that “no half-\nmeasures” are available: We must either reaffirm or over-\nrule Roe and Casey. Brief for Respondents 50.\n II\n We begin by considering the critical question whether the\nConstitution, properly understood, confers a right to obtain\nan abortion. Skipping over that question, the controlling\nopinion in Casey reaffirmed Roe’s “central holding” based\nsolely on the doctrine of stare decisis, but as we will explain,\nproper application of stare decisis required an assessment\nof the strength of the grounds on which Roe was based. See\ninfra, at 45–56.\n We therefore turn to the question that the Casey plurality\ndid not consider, and we address that question in three\nsteps. First, we explain the standard that our cases have\nused in determining whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s\nreference to “liberty” protects a particular right. Second,\n"
[17] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 9\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nwe examine whether the right at issue in this case is rooted\nin our Nation’s history and tradition and whether it is an\nessential component of what we have described as “ordered\nliberty.” Finally, we consider whether a right to obtain an\nabortion is part of a broader entrenched right that is sup-\nported by other precedents.\n A\n 1\n Constitutional analysis must begin with “the language of\nthe instrument,” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 186–189\n(1824), which offers a “fixed standard” for ascertaining\nwhat our founding document means, 1 J. Story, Commen-\ntaries on the Constitution of the United States §399, p. 383\n(1833). The Constitution makes no express reference to a\nright to obtain an abortion, and therefore those who claim\nthat it protects such a right must show that the right is\nsomehow implicit in the constitutional text.\n Roe, however, was remarkably loose in its treatment of\nthe constitutional text. It held that the abortion right,\nwhich is not mentioned in the Constitution, is part of a right\nto privacy, which is also not mentioned. See 410 U. S., at\n152–153. And that privacy right, Roe observed, had been\nfound to spring from no fewer than five different constitu-\ntional provisions—the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and\nFourteenth Amendments. Id., at 152.\n The Court’s discussion left open at least three ways in\nwhich some combination of these provisions could protect\nthe abortion right. One possibility was that the right was\n“founded . . . in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of\nrights to the people.” Id., at 153. Another was that the\nright was rooted in the First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendment,\nor in some combination of those provisions, and that this\nright had been “incorporated” into the Due Process Clause\nof the Fourteenth Amendment just as many other Bill of\nRights provisions had by then been incorporated. Ibid; see\n"
[18] "10 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nalso McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 763–766 (2010)\n(majority opinion) (discussing incorporation). And a third\npath was that the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments\nplayed no role and that the right was simply a component\nof the “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s\nDue Process Clause. Roe, 410 U. S., at 153. Roe expressed\nthe “feel[ing]” that the Fourteenth Amendment was the pro-\nvision that did the work, but its message seemed to be that\nthe abortion right could be found somewhere in the Consti-\ntution and that specifying its exact location was not of par-\namount importance.16 The Casey Court did not defend this\nunfocused analysis and instead grounded its decision solely\non the theory that the right to obtain an abortion is part of\nthe “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due\nProcess Clause.\n We discuss this theory in depth below, but before doing\nso, we briefly address one additional constitutional provi-\nsion that some of respondents’ amici have now offered as\nyet another potential home for the abortion right: the Four-\nteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. See Brief for\nUnited States as Amicus Curiae 24 (Brief for United\nStates); see also Brief for Equal Protection Constitutional\nLaw Scholars as Amici Curiae. Neither Roe nor Casey saw\nfit to invoke this theory, and it is squarely foreclosed by our\nprecedents, which establish that a State’s regulation of\nabortion is not a sex-based classification and is thus not\nsubject to the “heightened scrutiny” that applies to such\nclassifications.17 The regulation of a medical procedure that\n\n——————\n 16 The Court’s words were as follows: “This right of privacy, whether it\n\nbe founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty\nand restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court\ndetermined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the peo-\nple, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to\nterminate her pregnancy.” 410 U. S., at 153.\n 17 See, e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 582 U. S. 47, ___ (2017) (slip\n\nop., at 8).\n"
[19] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 11\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nonly one sex can undergo does not trigger heightened con-\nstitutional scrutiny unless the regulation is a “mere pre-\ntex[t] designed to effect an invidious discrimination against\nmembers of one sex or the other.” Geduldig v. Aiello, 417\nU. S. 484, 496, n. 20 (1974). And as the Court has stated,\nthe “goal of preventing abortion” does not constitute “invid-\niously discriminatory animus” against women. Bray v. Al-\nexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U. S. 263, 273–274\n(1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,\nlaws regulating or prohibiting abortion are not subject to\nheightened scrutiny. Rather, they are governed by the\nsame standard of review as other health and safety\nmeasures.18\n With this new theory addressed, we turn to Casey’s bold\nassertion that the abortion right is an aspect of the “liberty”\nprotected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth\nAmendment. 505 U. S., at 846; Brief for Respondents 17;\nBrief for United States 21–22.\n 2\n The underlying theory on which this argument rests—\nthat the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause pro-\nvides substantive, as well as procedural, protection for “lib-\nerty”—has long been controversial. But our decisions have\nheld that the Due Process Clause protects two categories of\nsubstantive rights.\n The first consists of rights guaranteed by the first eight\nAmendments. Those Amendments originally applied only\nto the Federal Government, Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor\nof Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 247–251 (1833) (opinion for the\nCourt by Marshall, C. J.), but this Court has held that the\nDue Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “incor-\nporates” the great majority of those rights and thus makes\nthem equally applicable to the States. See McDonald, 561\n\n——————\n 18 We discuss this standard in Part VI of this opinion.\n"
[20] "12 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nU. S., at 763–767, and nn. 12–13. The second category—\nwhich is the one in question here—comprises a select list of\nfundamental rights that are not mentioned anywhere in the\nConstitution.\n In deciding whether a right falls into either of these cat-\negories, the Court has long asked whether the right is\n“deeply rooted in [our] history and tradition” and whether\nit is essential to our Nation’s “scheme of ordered liberty.”\nTimbs v. Indiana, 586 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 3)\n(internal quotation marks omitted); McDonald, 561 U. S.,\nat 764, 767 (internal quotation marks omitted); Glucksberg,\n521 U. S., at 721 (internal quotation marks omitted).19 And\nin conducting this inquiry, we have engaged in a careful\nanalysis of the history of the right at issue.\n Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court in Timbs is a re-\ncent example. In concluding that the Eighth Amendment’s\nprotection against excessive fines is “fundamental to our\nscheme of ordered liberty” and “deeply rooted in this Na-\ntion’s history and tradition,” 586 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7)\n(internal quotation marks omitted), her opinion traced the\nright back to Magna Carta, Blackstone’s Commentaries,\nand 35 of the 37 state constitutions in effect at the ratifica-\ntion of the Fourteenth Amendment. 586 U. S., at ___–___\n(slip op., at 3–7).\n A similar inquiry was undertaken in McDonald, which\nheld that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to\nkeep and bear arms. The lead opinion surveyed the origins\nof the Second Amendment, the debates in Congress about\n\n\n——————\n 19 See also, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 148 (1968) (asking\n\nwhether “a right is among those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and\njustice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions’ ”); Palko\nv. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937) (requiring “a ‘principle of justice\nso rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked\nas fundamental’ ” (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105\n(1934))).\n"
[21] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 13\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nthe adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state con-\nstitutions in effect when that Amendment was ratified (at\nleast 22 of the 37 States protected the right to keep and bear\narms), federal laws enacted during the same period, and\nother relevant historical evidence. 561 U. S., at 767–777.\nOnly then did the opinion conclude that “the Framers and\nratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to\nkeep and bear arms among those fundamental rights nec-\nessary to our system of ordered liberty.” Id., at 778; see also\nid., at 822–850 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concur-\nring in judgment) (surveying history and reaching the same\nresult under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Im-\nmunities Clause).\n Timbs and McDonald concerned the question whether\nthe Fourteenth Amendment protects rights that are ex-\npressly set out in the Bill of Rights, and it would be anom-\nalous if similar historical support were not required when a\nputative right is not mentioned anywhere in the Constitu-\ntion. Thus, in Glucksberg, which held that the Due Process\nClause does not confer a right to assisted suicide, the Court\nsurveyed more than 700 years of “Anglo-American common\nlaw tradition,” 521 U. S., at 711, and made clear that a fun-\ndamental right must be “objectively, deeply rooted in this\nNation’s history and tradition,” id., at 720–721.\n Historical inquiries of this nature are essential when-\never we are asked to recognize a new component of the “lib-\nerty” protected by the Due Process Clause because the term\n“liberty” alone provides little guidance. “Liberty” is a capa-\ncious term. As Lincoln once said: “We all declare for Lib-\nerty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the\nsame thing.”20 In a well-known essay, Isaiah Berlin re-\nported that “[h]istorians of ideas” had cataloged more than\n\n\n——————\n 20 Address at Sanitary Fair at Baltimore, Md. (Apr. 18, 1864), reprinted\n\nin 7 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 301 (R. Basler ed. 1953).\n"
[22] "14 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\n200 different senses in which the term had been used.21\n In interpreting what is meant by the Fourteenth Amend-\nment’s reference to “liberty,” we must guard against the\nnatural human tendency to confuse what that Amendment\nprotects with our own ardent views about the liberty that\nAmericans should enjoy. That is why the Court has long\nbeen “reluctant” to recognize rights that are not mentioned\nin the Constitution. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S.\n115, 125 (1992). “Substantive due process has at times been\na treacherous field for this Court,” Moore v. East Cleveland,\n431 U. S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion), and it has\nsometimes led the Court to usurp authority that the Con-\nstitution entrusts to the people’s elected representatives.\nSee Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U. S. 214, 225–\n226 (1985). As the Court cautioned in Glucksberg, “[w]e\nmust . . . exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked\nto break new ground in this field, lest the liberty protected\nby the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the\npolicy preferences of the Members of this Court.” 521 U. S.,\nat 720 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n On occasion, when the Court has ignored the “[a]ppropri-\nate limits” imposed by “ ‘respect for the teachings of his-\ntory,’ ” Moore, 431 U. S., at 503 (plurality opinion), it has\nfallen into the freewheeling judicial policymaking that\ncharacterized discredited decisions such as Lochner v. New\nYork, 198 U. S. 45 (1905). The Court must not fall prey to\nsuch an unprincipled approach. Instead, guided by the his-\ntory and tradition that map the essential components of our\nNation’s concept of ordered liberty, we must ask what the\nFourteenth Amendment means by the term “liberty.” When\nwe engage in that inquiry in the present case, the clear an-\nswer is that the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect\n\n\n\n——————\n 21 Four Essays on Liberty 121 (1969).\n"
[23] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 15\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nthe right to an abortion.22\n B\n 1\n Until the latter part of the 20th century, there was no\nsupport in American law for a constitutional right to obtain\nan abortion. No state constitutional provision had recog-\nnized such a right. Until a few years before Roe was handed\ndown, no federal or state court had recognized such a right.\nNor had any scholarly treatise of which we are aware. And\nalthough law review articles are not reticent about advocat-\ning new rights, the earliest article proposing a constitu-\ntional right to abortion that has come to our attention was\npublished only a few years before Roe.23\n\n——————\n 22 That is true regardless of whether we look to the Amendment’s Due\n\nProcess Clause or its Privileges or Immunities Clause. Some scholars\nand Justices have maintained that the Privileges or Immunities Clause\nis the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment that guarantees substan-\ntive rights. See, e.g., McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 813–850\n(2010) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Dun-\ncan, 391 U. S., at 165–166 (Black, J., concurring); A. Amar, Bill of Rights:\nCreation and Reconstruction 163–180 (1998) (Amar); J. Ely, Democracy\nand Distrust 22–30 (1980); 2 W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution\nin the History of the United States 1089–1095 (1953). But even on that\nview, such a right would need to be rooted in the Nation’s history and\ntradition. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–552 (No. 3,230) (CC\nED Pa. 1823) (describing unenumerated rights under the Privileges and\nImmunities Clause, Art. IV, §2, as those “fundamental” rights “which\nhave, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states”);\nAmar 176 (relying on Corfield to interpret the Privileges or Immunities\nClause); cf. McDonald, 561 U. S., at 819–820, 832, 854 (opinion of\nTHOMAS, J.) (reserving the question whether the Privileges or Immuni-\nties Clause protects “any rights besides those enumerated in the Consti-\ntution”).\n 23 See R. Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforce-\n\nment and Administration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N. C. L. Rev. 730\n(1968) (Lucas); see also D. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality 334–335 (1994)\n(Garrow) (stating that Lucas was “undeniably the first person to fully\n"
[24] "16 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\n Not only was there no support for such a constitutional\nright until shortly before Roe, but abortion had long been a\ncrime in every single State. At common law, abortion was\ncriminal in at least some stages of pregnancy and was re-\ngarded as unlawful and could have very serious conse-\nquences at all stages. American law followed the common\nlaw until a wave of statutory restrictions in the 1800s ex-\npanded criminal liability for abortions. By the time of the\nadoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, three-quarters of\nthe States had made abortion a crime at any stage of preg-\nnancy, and the remaining States would soon follow.\n Roe either ignored or misstated this history, and Casey\ndeclined to reconsider Roe’s faulty historical analysis. It is\ntherefore important to set the record straight.\n 2\n a\n We begin with the common law, under which abortion\nwas a crime at least after “quickening”—i.e., the first felt\nmovement of the fetus in the womb, which usually occurs\nbetween the 16th and 18th week of pregnancy.24\n\n——————\narticulate on paper” the argument that “a woman’s right to choose abor-\ntion was a fundamental individual freedom protected by the U. S. Con-\nstitution’s guarantee of personal liberty”).\n 24 The exact meaning of “quickening” is subject to some debate. Com-\n\npare Brief for Scholars of Jurisprudence as Amici Curiae 12–14, and\nn. 32 (emphasis deleted) (“ ‘a quick child’ ” meant simply a “live” child,\nand under the era’s outdated knowledge of embryology, a fetus was\nthought to become “quick” at around the sixth week of pregnancy), with\nBrief for American Historical Association et al. as Amici Curiae 6, n. 2\n(“quick” and “quickening” consistently meant “the woman’s perception of\nfetal movement”). We need not wade into this debate. First, it suffices\nfor present purposes to show that abortion was criminal by at least the\n16th or 18th week of pregnancy. Second, as we will show, during the\nrelevant period—i.e., the period surrounding the enactment of the Four-\nteenth Amendment—the quickening distinction was abandoned as\nStates criminalized abortion at all stages of pregnancy. See infra, at 21–\n"
[25] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 17\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\n The “eminent common-law authorities (Blackstone,\nCoke, Hale, and the like),” Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U. S. ___,\n___ (2020) (slip op., at 7), all describe abortion after quick-\nening as criminal. Henry de Bracton’s 13th-century trea-\ntise explained that if a person has “struck a pregnant\nwoman, or has given her poison, whereby he has caused\nabortion, if the foetus be already formed and animated, and\nparticularly if it be animated, he commits homicide.” 2 De\nLegibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae 279 (T. Twiss ed.\n1879); see also 1 Fleta, c. 23, reprinted in 72 Selden Soc. 60–\n61 (H. Richardson & G. Sayles eds. 1955) (13th-century\ntreatise).25\n Sir Edward Coke’s 17th-century treatise likewise as-\nserted that abortion of a quick child was “murder” if the\n“childe be born alive” and a “great misprision” if the “childe\ndieth in her body.” 3 Institutes of the Laws of England 50–\n51 (1644). (“Misprision” referred to “some heynous offence\nunder the degree of felony.” Id., at 139.) Two treatises by\nSir Matthew Hale likewise described abortion of a quick\nchild who died in the womb as a “great crime” and a “great\nmisprision.” Pleas of the Crown 53 (P. Glazebrook ed.\n1972); 1 History of the Pleas of the Crown 433 (1736) (Hale).\nAnd writing near the time of the adoption of our Constitu-\ntion, William Blackstone explained that abortion of a\n“quick” child was “by the ancient law homicide or man-\nslaughter” (citing Bracton), and at least a very “heinous\nmisdemeanor” (citing Coke). 1 Commentaries on the Laws\nof England 129–130 (7th ed. 1775) (Blackstone).\n English cases dating all the way back to the 13th century\ncorroborate the treatises’ statements that abortion was a\ncrime. See generally J. Dellapenna, Dispelling the Myths\n——————\n25.\n 25 Even before Bracton’s time, English law imposed punishment for the\n\nkilling of a fetus. See Leges Henrici Primi 222–223 (L. Downer ed. 1972)\n(imposing penalty for any abortion and treating a woman who aborted a\n“quick” child “as if she were a murderess”).\n"
[26] "18 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nof Abortion History 126, and n. 16, 134–142, 188–194, and\nnn. 84–86 (2006) (Dellapenna); J. Keown, Abortion, Doctors\nand the Law 3–12 (1988) (Keown). In 1732, for example,\nEleanor Beare was convicted of “destroying the Foetus in\nthe Womb” of another woman and “thereby causing her to\nmiscarry.”26 For that crime and another “misdemeanor,”\nBeare was sentenced to two days in the pillory and three\nyears’ imprisonment.27\n Although a pre-quickening abortion was not itself consid-\nered homicide, it does not follow that abortion was permis-\nsible at common law—much less that abortion was a legal\nright. Cf. Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 713 (removal of “com-\nmon law’s harsh sanctions did not represent an acceptance\nof suicide”). Quite to the contrary, in the 1732 case men-\ntioned above, the judge said of the charge of abortion (with\nno mention of quickening) that he had “never met with a\ncase so barbarous and unnatural.”28 Similarly, an indict-\nment from 1602, which did not distinguish between a pre-\nquickening and post-quickening abortion, described abor-\ntion as “pernicious” and “against the peace of our Lady the\nQueen, her crown and dignity.” Keown 7 (discussing R. v.\nWebb, Calendar of Assize Records, Surrey Indictments 512\n(1980)).\n That the common law did not condone even pre-\nquickening abortions is confirmed by what one might call a\nproto-felony-murder rule. Hale and Blackstone explained a\nway in which a pre-quickening abortion could rise to the\nlevel of a homicide. Hale wrote that if a physician gave a\nwoman “with child” a “potion” to cause an abortion, and the\nwoman died, it was “murder” because the potion was given\n“unlawfully to destroy her child within her.” 1 Hale 429–\n430 (emphasis added). As Blackstone explained, to be\n\n——————\n 26 2 Gentleman’s Magazine 931 (Aug. 1732).\n 27 Id., at 932.\n 28 Ibid.\n"
[27] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 19\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\n“murder” a killing had to be done with “malice afore-\nthought, . . . either express or implied.” 4 Blackstone 198\n(emphasis deleted). In the case of an abortionist, Black-\nstone wrote, “the law will imply [malice]” for the same rea-\nson that it would imply malice if a person who intended to\nkill one person accidentally killed a different person:\n “[I]f one shoots at A and misses him, but kills B, this is\n murder; because of the previous felonious intent, which\n the law transfers from one to the other. The same is\n the case, where one lays poison for A; and B, against\n whom the prisoner had no malicious intent, takes it,\n and it kills him; this is likewise murder. So also, if one\n gives a woman with child a medicine to procure abor-\n tion, and it operates so violently as to kill the woman,\n this is murder in the person who gave it.” Id., at 200–\n 201 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).29\n Notably, Blackstone, like Hale, did not state that this\nproto-felony-murder rule required that the woman be “with\nquick child”—only that she be “with child.” Id., at 201. And\nit is revealing that Hale and Blackstone treated abortion-\nists differently from other physicians or surgeons who\ncaused the death of a patient “without any intent of doing\n[the patient] any bodily hurt.” Hale 429; see 4 Blackstone\n197. These other physicians—even if “unlicensed”—would\nnot be “guilty of murder or manslaughter.” Hale 429. But\na physician performing an abortion would, precisely be-\ncause his aim was an “unlawful” one.\n In sum, although common-law authorities differed on the\nseverity of punishment for abortions committed at different\n——————\n 29 Other treatises restated the same rule. See 1 W. Russell & C.\nGreaves, Crimes and Misdemeanors 540 (5th ed. 1845) (“So where a per-\nson gave medicine to a woman to procure an abortion, and where a per-\nson put skewers into the woman for the same purpose, by which in both\ncases the women were killed, these acts were clearly held to be murder”\n(footnotes omitted)); 1 E. East, Pleas of the Crown 230 (1803) (similar).\n"
[28] "20 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\npoints in pregnancy, none endorsed the practice. Moreover,\nwe are aware of no common-law case or authority, and the\nparties have not pointed to any, that remotely suggests a\npositive right to procure an abortion at any stage of preg-\nnancy.\n b\n In this country, the historical record is similar. The “most\nimportant early American edition of Blackstone’s Commen-\ntaries,” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 594\n(2008), reported Blackstone’s statement that abortion of a\nquick child was at least “a heinous misdemeanor,” 2 St.\nGeorge Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries 129–130\n(1803), and that edition also included Blackstone’s discus-\nsion of the proto-felony-murder rule, 5 id., at 200–201.\nManuals for justices of the peace printed in the Colonies in\nthe 18th century typically restated the common-law rule on\nabortion, and some manuals repeated Hale’s and Black-\nstone’s statements that anyone who prescribed medication\n“unlawfully to destroy the child” would be guilty of murder\nif the woman died. See, e.g., J. Parker, Conductor Generalis\n220 (1788); 2 R. Burn, Justice of the Peace, and Parish Of-\nficer 221–222 (7th ed. 1762) (English manual stating the\nsame).30\n——————\n 30 For manuals restating one or both rules, see J. Davis, Criminal Law\n\n96, 102–103, 339 (1838); Conductor Generalis 194–195 (1801) (printed in\nPhiladelphia); Conductor Generalis 194–195 (1794) (printed in Albany);\nConductor Generalis 220 (1788) (printed in New York); Conductor Gen-\neralis 198 (1749) (printed in New York); G. Webb, Office and Authority\nof a Justice of Peace 232 (1736) (printed in Williamsburg); Conductor\nGeneralis 161 (1722) (printed in Philadelphia); see also J. Conley, Doing\nIt by the Book: Justice of the Peace Manuals and English Law in Eight-\neenth Century America, 6 J. Legal Hist. 257, 265, 267 (1985) (noting that\nthese manuals were the justices’ “primary source of legal reference” and\nof “practical value for a wider audience than the justices”).\n For cases stating the proto-felony-murder rule, see, e.g., Common-\nwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. 263, 265 (1845); People v. Sessions, 58 Mich.\n"
[29] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 21\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\n The few cases available from the early colonial period cor-\nroborate that abortion was a crime. See generally Del-\nlapenna 215–228 (collecting cases). In Maryland in 1652,\nfor example, an indictment charged that a man “Mur-\ntherously endeavoured to destroy or Murther the Child by\nhim begotten in the Womb.” Proprietary v. Mitchell, 10 Md.\nArchives 80, 183 (1652) (W. Browne ed. 1891). And by the\n19th century, courts frequently explained that the common\nlaw made abortion of a quick child a crime. See, e.g., Smith\nv. Gaffard, 31 Ala. 45, 51 (1857); Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48,\n55 (1851); State v. Cooper, 22 N. J. L. 52, 52–55 (1849); Com-\nmonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. 263, 264–268 (1845).\n c\n The original ground for drawing a distinction between\npre- and post-quickening abortions is not entirely clear, but\nsome have attributed the rule to the difficulty of proving\nthat a pre-quickening fetus was alive. At that time, there\nwere no scientific methods for detecting pregnancy in its\nearly stages,31 and thus, as one court put it in 1872: “[U]ntil\nthe period of quickening there is no evidence of life; and\nwhatever may be said of the feotus, the law has fixed upon\nthis period of gestation as the time when the child is en-\ndowed with life” because “foetal movements are the first\nclearly marked and well defined evidences of life.” Evans v.\nPeople, 49 N. Y. 86, 90 (emphasis added); Cooper, 22\nN. J. L., at 56 (“In contemplation of law life commences at\nthe moment of quickening, at that moment when the em-\nbryo gives the first physical proof of life, no matter when it\nfirst received it” (emphasis added)).\n——————\n594, 595–596, 26 N. W. 291, 292–293 (1886); State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128,\n131–132 (1868); Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48, 54–55 (1851).\n 31 See E. Rigby, A System of Midwifery 73 (1841) (“Under all circum-\n\nstances, the diagnosis of pregnancy must ever be difficult and obscure\nduring the early months”); see also id., at 74–80 (discussing rudimentary\ntechniques for detecting early pregnancy); A. Taylor, A Manual of Medi-\ncal Jurisprudence 418–421 (6th Am. ed. 1866) (same).\n"
[30] "22 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\n The Solicitor General offers a different explanation of the\nbasis for the quickening rule, namely, that before quicken-\ning the common law did not regard a fetus “as having a ‘sep-\narate and independent existence.’ ” Brief for United States\n26 (quoting Parker, 50 Mass., at 266). But the case on\nwhich the Solicitor General relies for this proposition also\nsuggested that the criminal law’s quickening rule was out\nof step with the treatment of prenatal life in other areas of\nlaw, noting that “to many purposes, in reference to civil\nrights, an infant in ventre sa mere is regarded as a person\nin being.” Ibid. (citing 1 Blackstone 129); see also Evans,\n49 N. Y., at 89; Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 631, 633\n(1850); Morrow v. Scott, 7 Ga. 535, 537 (1849); Hall v. Han-\ncock, 32 Mass. 255, 258 (1834); Thellusson v. Woodford, 4\nVes. 227, 321–322, 31 Eng. Rep. 117, 163 (1789).\n At any rate, the original ground for the quickening rule\nis of little importance for present purposes because the rule\nwas abandoned in the 19th century. During that period,\ntreatise writers and commentators criticized the quicken-\ning distinction as “neither in accordance with the result of\nmedical experience, nor with the principles of the common\nlaw.” F. Wharton, Criminal Law §1220, p. 606 (rev. 4th ed.\n1857) (footnotes omitted); see also J. Beck, Researches in\nMedicine and Medical Jurisprudence 26–28 (2d ed. 1835)\n(describing the quickening distinction as “absurd” and “in-\njurious”).32 In 1803, the British Parliament made abortion\n\n——————\n 32 See Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 204, 209–210 (1879) (ac-\n\nknowledging the common-law rule but arguing that “the law should pun-\nish abortions and miscarriages, willfully produced, at any time during\nthe period of gestation”); Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa., 631, 633 (1850)\n(the quickening rule “never ought to have been the law anywhere”); J.\nBishop, Commentaries on the Law of Statutory Crimes §744, p. 471\n(1873) (“If we look at the reason of the law, we shall prefer” a rule that\n“discard[s] this doctrine of the necessity of a quickening”); I. Dana, Re-\nport of the Committee on the Production of Abortion, in 5 Transactions\n"
[31] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 23\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\na crime at all stages of pregnancy and authorized the impo-\nsition of severe punishment. See Lord Ellenborough’s Act,\n43 Geo. 3, c. 58 (1803). One scholar has suggested that Par-\nliament’s decision “may partly have been attributable to the\nmedical man’s concern that fetal life should be protected by\nthe law at all stages of gestation.” Keown 22.\n In this country during the 19th century, the vast majority\nof the States enacted statutes criminalizing abortion at all\nstages of pregnancy. See Appendix A, infra (listing state\nstatutory provisions in chronological order).33 By 1868, the\nyear when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, three-\nquarters of the States, 28 out of 37, had enacted statutes\nmaking abortion a crime even if it was performed before\nquickening.34 See ibid. Of the nine States that had not yet\n\n——————\nof the Maine Medical Association 37–39 (1866); Report on Criminal Abor-\ntion, in 12 Transactions of the American Medical Association 75–77\n(1859); W. Guy, Principles of Medical Forensics 133–134 (1845); J.\nChitty, Practical Treatise on Medical Jurisprudence 438 (2d Am. ed.\n1836); 1 T. Beck & J. Beck, Elements of Medical Jurisprudence 293 (5th\ned. 1823); 2 T. Percival, The Works, Literary, Moral and Medical 430\n(1807); see also Keown 38–39 (collecting English authorities).\n 33 See generally Dellapenna 315–319 (cataloging the development of\n\nthe law in the States); E. Quay, Justifiable Abortion—Medical and Legal\nFoundations, 49 Geo. L. J. 395, 435–437, 447–520 (1961) (Quay) (same);\nJ. Witherspoon, Reexamining Roe: Nineteenth-Century Abortion Stat-\nutes and The Fourteenth Amendment, 17 St. Mary’s L. J. 29, 34–36\n(1985) (Witherspoon) (same).\n 34 Some scholars assert that only 27 States prohibited abortion at all\n\nstages. See, e.g., Dellapenna 315; Witherspoon 34–35, and n. 15. Those\nscholars appear to have overlooked Rhode Island, which criminalized\nabortion at all stages in 1861. See Acts and Resolves R. I. 1861, ch. 371,\n§1, p. 133 (criminalizing the attempt to “procure the miscarriage” of “any\npregnant woman” or “any woman supposed by such person to be preg-\nnant,” without mention of quickening). The amicus brief for the Ameri-\ncan Historical Association asserts that only 26 States prohibited abortion\nat all stages, but that brief incorrectly excludes West Virginia and Ne-\nbraska from its count. Compare Brief for American Historical Associa-\ntion 27–28 (citing Quay), with Appendix A, infra.\n"
[32] "24 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\ncriminalized abortion at all stages, all but one did so by\n1910. See ibid.\n The trend in the Territories that would become the last\n13 States was similar: All of them criminalized abortion at\nall stages of pregnancy between 1850 (the Kingdom of Ha-\nwaii) and 1919 (New Mexico). See Appendix B, infra; see\nalso Casey, 505 U. S., at 952 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring\nin judgment in part and dissenting in part); Dellapenna\n317–319. By the end of the 1950s, according to the Roe\nCourt’s own count, statutes in all but four States and the\nDistrict of Columbia prohibited abortion “however and\nwhenever performed, unless done to save or preserve the\nlife of the mother.” 410 U. S., at 139.35\n This overwhelming consensus endured until the day Roe\nwas decided. At that time, also by the Roe Court’s own\ncount, a substantial majority—30 States—still prohibited\nabortion at all stages except to save the life of the mother.\nSee id., at 118, and n. 2 (listing States). And though Roe\ndiscerned a “trend toward liberalization” in about “one-\nthird of the States,” those States still criminalized some\nabortions and regulated them more stringently than Roe\nwould allow. Id., at 140, and n. 37; Tribe 2. In short, the\n——————\n 35 The statutes of three States (Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Penn-\n\nsylvania) prohibited abortions performed “unlawfully” or “without lawful\njustification.” Roe, 410 U. S., at 139 (internal quotation marks omitted).\nIn Massachusetts, case law held that abortion was allowed when, accord-\ning to the judgment of physicians in the relevant community, the proce-\ndure was necessary to preserve the woman’s life or her physical or emo-\ntional health. Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394, 395, 53 N. E.\n2d 4, 5 (1944). In the other two States, however, there is no clear support\nin case law for the proposition that abortion was lawful where the\nmother’s life was not at risk. See State v. Brandenberg, 137 N. J. L. 124,\n58 A. 2d 709 (1948); Commonwealth v. Trombetta, 131 Pa. Super. 487,\n200 A. 107 (1938).\n Statutes in the two remaining jurisdictions (the District of Columbia\nand Alabama) permitted “abortion to preserve the mother’s health.” Roe,\n410 U. S., at 139. Case law in those jurisdictions does not clarify the\nbreadth of these exceptions.\n"
[33] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 25\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\n“Court’s opinion in Roe itself convincingly refutes the notion\nthat the abortion liberty is deeply rooted in the history or\ntradition of our people.” Thornburgh v. American College of\nObstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747, 793 (1986)\n(White, J., dissenting).\n d\n The inescapable conclusion is that a right to abortion is\nnot deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and traditions. On\nthe contrary, an unbroken tradition of prohibiting abortion\non pain of criminal punishment persisted from the earliest\ndays of the common law until 1973. The Court in Roe could\nhave said of abortion exactly what Glucksberg said of as-\nsisted suicide: “Attitudes toward [abortion] have changed\nsince Bracton, but our laws have consistently condemned,\nand continue to prohibit, [that practice].” 521 U. S., at 719.\n 3\n Respondents and their amici have no persuasive answer\nto this historical evidence.\n Neither respondents nor the Solicitor General disputes\nthe fact that by 1868 the vast majority of States criminal-\nized abortion at all stages of pregnancy. See Brief for Peti-\ntioners 12–13; see also Brief for American Historical Asso-\nciation et al. as Amici Curiae 27–28, and nn. 14–15\n(conceding that 26 out of 37 States prohibited abortion be-\nfore quickening); Tr. of Oral Arg. 74–75 (respondents’ coun-\nsel conceding the same). Instead, respondents are forced to\nargue that it “does [not] matter that some States prohibited\nabortion at the time Roe was decided or when the Four-\nteenth Amendment was adopted.” Brief for Respondents\n21. But that argument flies in the face of the standard we\nhave applied in determining whether an asserted right that\nis nowhere mentioned in the Constitution is nevertheless\nprotected by the Fourteenth Amendment.\n Not only are respondents and their amici unable to show\n"
[34] "26 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nthat a constitutional right to abortion was established when\nthe Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, but they have\nfound no support for the existence of an abortion right that\npredates the latter part of the 20th century—no state con-\nstitutional provision, no statute, no judicial decision, no\nlearned treatise. The earliest sources called to our atten-\ntion are a few district court and state court decisions de-\ncided shortly before Roe and a small number of law review\narticles from the same time period.36\n A few of respondents’ amici muster historical arguments,\nbut they are very weak. The Solicitor General repeats Roe’s\nclaim that it is “ ‘doubtful’ . . . ‘abortion was ever firmly es-\ntablished as a common-law crime even with respect to the\ndestruction of a quick fetus.’ ” Brief for United States 26\n(quoting Roe, 410 U. S., at 136). But as we have seen, great\ncommon-law authorities like Bracton, Coke, Hale, and\nBlackstone all wrote that a post-quickening abortion was a\ncrime—and a serious one at that. Moreover, Hale and\nBlackstone (and many other authorities following them) as-\nserted that even a pre-quickening abortion was “unlawful”\nand that, as a result, an abortionist was guilty of murder if\nthe woman died from the attempt.\n Instead of following these authorities, Roe relied largely\non two articles by a pro-abortion advocate who claimed that\nCoke had intentionally misstated the common law because\nof his strong anti-abortion views.37 These articles have\n\n——————\n 36 See 410 U. S., at 154–155 (collecting cases decided between 1970 and\n\n1973); C. Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or\nNinth-Amendment Right About To Arise From the Nineteenth-Century\nLegislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty? 17\nN. Y. L. Forum 335, 337–339 (1971) (Means II); C. Means, The Law of\nNew York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus, 1664–1968:\nA Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N. Y. L. Forum 411 (1968)\n(Means I); Lucas 730.\n 37 See 410 U. S., at 136, n. 26 (citing Means II); 410 U. S., at 132–133,\n\nn. 21 (citing Means I).\n"
[35] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 27\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nbeen discredited,38 and it has come to light that even mem-\nbers of Jane Roe’s legal team did not regard them as serious\nscholarship. An internal memorandum characterized this\nauthor’s work as donning “the guise of impartial scholar-\nship while advancing the proper ideological goals.”39 Con-\ntinued reliance on such scholarship is unsupportable.\n The Solicitor General next suggests that history supports\nan abortion right because the common law’s failure to crim-\ninalize abortion before quickening means that “at the\nFounding and for decades thereafter, women generally\ncould terminate a pregnancy, at least in its early stages.”40\nBrief for United States 26–27; see also Brief for Respond-\nents 21. But the insistence on quickening was not univer-\nsal, see Mills, 13 Pa., at 633; State v. Slagle, 83 N. C. 630,\n632 (1880), and regardless, the fact that many States in the\n——————\n 38 For critiques of Means’s work, see, e.g., Dellapenna 143–152, 325–\n\n331; Keown 3–12; J. Finnis, “Shameless Acts” in Colorado: Abuse of\nScholarship in Constitutional Cases, 7 Academic Questions 10, 11–12\n(1994); R. Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for a Life-\nProtective Amendment, 63 Cal. L. Rev. 1250, 1267–1282 (1975); R. Byrn,\nAn American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 Ford. L. Rev.\n807, 814–829 (1973).\n 39 Garrow 500–501, and n. 41 (internal quotation marks omitted).\n 40 In any event, Roe, Casey, and other related abortion decisions im-\n\nposed substantial restrictions on a State’s capacity to regulate abortions\nperformed after quickening. See, e.g., June Medical Services L. L. C. v.\nRusso, 591 U. S. ___ (2020) (holding a law requiring doctors performing\nabortions to secure admitting privileges to be unconstitutional); Whole\nWoman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U. S. 582 (2016) (similar); Casey, 505\nU. S., at 846 (declaring that prohibitions on “abortion before viability”\nare unconstitutional); id., at 887–898 (holding that a spousal notification\nprovision was unconstitutional). In addition, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179\n(1973), has been interpreted by some to protect a broad right to obtain\nan abortion at any stage of pregnancy provided that a physician is willing\nto certify that it is needed due to a woman’s “emotional” needs or “famil-\nial” concerns. Id., at 192. See, e.g., Women’s Medical Professional Corp.\nv. Voinovich, 130 F. 3d 187, 209 (CA6 1997), cert. denied, 523 U. S. 1036\n(1998); but see id., at 1039 (THOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of certio-\nrari).\n"
[36] "28 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nlate 18th and early 19th century did not criminalize pre-\nquickening abortions does not mean that anyone thought\nthe States lacked the authority to do so. When legislatures\nbegan to exercise that authority as the century wore on, no\none, as far as we are aware, argued that the laws they en-\nacted violated a fundamental right. That is not surprising\nsince common-law authorities had repeatedly condemned\nabortion and described it as an “unlawful” act without re-\ngard to whether it occurred before or after quickening. See\nsupra, at 16–21.\n Another amicus brief relied upon by respondents (see\nBrief for Respondents 21) tries to dismiss the significance\nof the state criminal statutes that were in effect when the\nFourteenth Amendment was adopted by suggesting that\nthey were enacted for illegitimate reasons. According to\nthis account, which is based almost entirely on statements\nmade by one prominent proponent of the statutes, im-\nportant motives for the laws were the fear that Catholic im-\nmigrants were having more babies than Protestants and\nthat the availability of abortion was leading White\nProtestant women to “shir[k their] maternal duties.” Brief\nfor American Historical Association et al. as Amici Curiae\n20.\n Resort to this argument is a testament to the lack of any\nreal historical support for the right that Roe and Casey rec-\nognized. This Court has long disfavored arguments based\non alleged legislative motives. See, e.g., Erie v. Pap’s A. M.,\n529 U. S. 277, 292 (2000) (plurality opinion); Turner Broad-\ncasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 652 (1994);\nUnited States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 383 (1968); Arizona\nv. California, 283 U. S. 423, 455 (1931) (collecting cases).\nThe Court has recognized that inquiries into legislative mo-\ntives “are a hazardous matter.” O’Brien, 391 U. S., at 383.\nEven when an argument about legislative motive is backed\nby statements made by legislators who voted for a law, we\n"
[37] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 29\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nhave been reluctant to attribute those motives to the legis-\nlative body as a whole. “What motivates one legislator to\nmake a speech about a statute is not necessarily what mo-\ntivates scores of others to enact it.” Id., at 384.\n Here, the argument about legislative motive is not even\nbased on statements by legislators, but on statements made\nby a few supporters of the new 19th-century abortion laws,\nand it is quite a leap to attribute these motives to all the\nlegislators whose votes were responsible for the enactment\nof those laws. Recall that at the time of the adoption of the\nFourteenth Amendment, over three-quarters of the States\nhad adopted statutes criminalizing abortion (usually at all\nstages of pregnancy), and that from the early 20th century\nuntil the day Roe was handed down, every single State had\nsuch a law on its books. Are we to believe that the hundreds\nof lawmakers whose votes were needed to enact these laws\nwere motivated by hostility to Catholics and women?\n There is ample evidence that the passage of these laws\nwas instead spurred by a sincere belief that abortion kills a\nhuman being. Many judicial decisions from the late 19th\nand early 20th centuries made that point. See, e.g., Nash\nv. Meyer, 54 Idaho 283, 301, 31 P. 2d 273, 280 (1934); State\nv. Ausplund, 86 Ore. 121, 131–132, 167 P. 1019, 1022–1023\n(1917); Trent v. State, 15 Ala. App. 485, 488, 73 S. 834, 836\n(1916); State v. Miller, 90 Kan. 230, 233, 133 P. 878, 879\n(1913); State v. Tippie, 89 Ohio St. 35, 39–40, 105 N. E. 75,\n77 (1913); State v. Gedicke, 43 N. J. L. 86, 90 (1881);\nDougherty v. People, 1 Colo. 514, 522–523 (1873); State v.\nMoore, 25 Iowa 128, 131–132 (1868); Smith, 33 Me., at 57;\nsee also Memphis Center for Reproductive Health v. Slatery,\n14 F. 4th 409, 446, and n. 11 (CA6 2021) (Thapar, J., con-\ncurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing\ncases).\n One may disagree with this belief (and our decision is not\nbased on any view about when a State should regard pre-\nnatal life as having rights or legally cognizable interests),\n"
[38] "30 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nbut even Roe and Casey did not question the good faith of\nabortion opponents. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U. S., at 850\n(“Men and women of good conscience can disagree . . . about\nthe profound moral and spiritual implications of terminat-\ning a pregnancy even in its earliest stage”). And we see no\nreason to discount the significance of the state laws in ques-\ntion based on these amici’s suggestions about legislative\nmotive.41\n C\n 1\n Instead of seriously pressing the argument that the abor-\ntion right itself has deep roots, supporters of Roe and Casey\ncontend that the abortion right is an integral part of a\nbroader entrenched right. Roe termed this a right to pri-\nvacy, 410 U. S., at 154, and Casey described it as the free-\ndom to make “intimate and personal choices” that are “cen-\ntral to personal dignity and autonomy,” 505 U. S., at 851.\nCasey elaborated: “At the heart of liberty is the right to de-\nfine one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni-\nverse, and of the mystery of human life.” Ibid.\n The Court did not claim that this broadly framed right is\nabsolute, and no such claim would be plausible. While in-\ndividuals are certainly free to think and to say what they\n——————\n 41 Other amicus briefs present arguments about the motives of propo-\n\nnents of liberal access to abortion. They note that some such supporters\nhave been motivated by a desire to suppress the size of the African-\nAmerican population. See Brief for African-American Organization et al.\nas Amici Curiae 14–21; see also Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. and\nKy., Inc., 587 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op.,\nat 1–4). And it is beyond dispute that Roe has had that demographic\neffect. A highly disproportionate percentage of aborted fetuses are Black.\nSee, e.g., Dept. of Health and Human Servs., Centers for Disease Control\nand Prevention (CDC), K. Kortsmit et al., Abortion Surveillance—United\nStates, 2019, 70 Morbidity and Mortality Report, Surveillance Summar-\nies, p. 20 (Nov. 26, 2021) (Table 6). For our part, we do not question the\nmotives of either those who have supported or those who have opposed\nlaws restricting abortions.\n"
[39] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 31\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nwish about “existence,” “meaning,” the “universe,” and “the\nmystery of human life,” they are not always free to act in\naccordance with those thoughts. License to act on the basis\nof such beliefs may correspond to one of the many under-\nstandings of “liberty,” but it is certainly not “ordered lib-\nerty.”\n Ordered liberty sets limits and defines the boundary be-\ntween competing interests. Roe and Casey each struck a\nparticular balance between the interests of a woman who\nwants an abortion and the interests of what they termed\n“potential life.” Roe, 410 U. S., at 150 (emphasis deleted);\nCasey, 505 U. S., at 852. But the people of the various\nStates may evaluate those interests differently. In some\nStates, voters may believe that the abortion right should be\neven more extensive than the right that Roe and Casey rec-\nognized. Voters in other States may wish to impose tight\nrestrictions based on their belief that abortion destroys an\n“unborn human being.” Miss. Code Ann. §41–41–191(4)(b).\nOur Nation’s historical understanding of ordered liberty\ndoes not prevent the people’s elected representatives from\ndeciding how abortion should be regulated.\n Nor does the right to obtain an abortion have a sound ba-\nsis in precedent. Casey relied on cases involving the right\nto marry a person of a different race, Loving v. Virginia, 388\nU. S. 1 (1967); the right to marry while in prison, Turner v.\nSafley, 482 U. S. 78 (1987); the right to obtain contracep-\ntives, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), Eisen-\nstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972), Carey v. Population\nServices Int’l, 431 U. S. 678 (1977); the right to reside with\nrelatives, Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977); the\nright to make decisions about the education of one’s chil-\ndren, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), Meyer\nv. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); the right not to be steri-\nlized without consent, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. William-\nson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942); and the right in certain circum-\nstances not to undergo involuntary surgery, forced\n"
[40] "32 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nadministration of drugs, or other substantially similar pro-\ncedures, Winston v. Lee, 470 U. S. 753 (1985), Washington\nv. Harper, 494 U. S. 210 (1990), Rochin v. California, 342\nU. S. 165 (1952). Respondents and the Solicitor General\nalso rely on post-Casey decisions like Lawrence v. Texas,\n539 U. S. 558 (2003) (right to engage in private, consensual\nsexual acts), and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015)\n(right to marry a person of the same sex). See Brief for Re-\nspondents 18; Brief for United States 23–24.\n These attempts to justify abortion through appeals to a\nbroader right to autonomy and to define one’s “concept of\nexistence” prove too much. Casey, 505 U. S., at 851. Those\ncriteria, at a high level of generality, could license funda-\nmental rights to illicit drug use, prostitution, and the like.\nSee Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F. 3d 1440,\n1444 (CA9 1996) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of\nrehearing en banc). None of these rights has any claim to\nbeing deeply rooted in history. Id., at 1440, 1445.\n What sharply distinguishes the abortion right from the\nrights recognized in the cases on which Roe and Casey rely\nis something that both those decisions acknowledged: Abor-\ntion destroys what those decisions call “potential life” and\nwhat the law at issue in this case regards as the life of an\n“unborn human being.” See Roe, 410 U. S., at 159 (abortion\nis “inherently different”); Casey, 505 U. S., at 852 (abortion\nis “a unique act”). None of the other decisions cited by Roe\nand Casey involved the critical moral question posed by\nabortion. They are therefore inapposite. They do not sup-\nport the right to obtain an abortion, and by the same token,\nour conclusion that the Constitution does not confer such a\nright does not undermine them in any way.\n 2\n In drawing this critical distinction between the abortion\nright and other rights, it is not necessary to dispute Casey’s\nclaim (which we accept for the sake of argument) that “the\n"
[41] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 33\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nspecific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the\nFourteenth Amendment” do not “mar[k] the outer limits of\nthe substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth\nAmendment protects.” 505 U. S., at 848. Abortion is noth-\ning new. It has been addressed by lawmakers for centuries,\nand the fundamental moral question that it poses is age-\nless.\n Defenders of Roe and Casey do not claim that any new\nscientific learning calls for a different answer to the under-\nlying moral question, but they do contend that changes in\nsociety require the recognition of a constitutional right to\nobtain an abortion. Without the availability of abortion,\nthey maintain, people will be inhibited from exercising\ntheir freedom to choose the types of relationships they de-\nsire, and women will be unable to compete with men in the\nworkplace and in other endeavors.\n Americans who believe that abortion should be restricted\npress countervailing arguments about modern develop-\nments. They note that attitudes about the pregnancy of un-\nmarried women have changed drastically; that federal and\nstate laws ban discrimination on the basis of pregnancy;42\nthat leave for pregnancy and childbirth are now guaranteed\nby law in many cases;43 that the costs of medical care asso-\n\n\n\n——————\n 42 See, e.g., Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 92 Stat. 2076, 42 U. S. C.\n\n§2000e(k) (federal law prohibiting pregnancy discrimination in employ-\nment); Dept. of Labor, Women’s Bureau, Employment Protections for\nWorkers Who Are Pregnant or Nursing, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/\nwb/pregnant-nursing-employment-protections (showing that 46 States\nand the District of Columbia have employment protections against preg-\nnancy discrimination).\n 43 See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 9, 29\n\nU. S. C. §2612 (federal law guaranteeing employment leave for preg-\nnancy and birth); Bureau of Labor Statistics, Access to Paid and Unpaid\nFamily Leave in 2018, https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2019/access-to-paid-\n"
[42] "34 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nciated with pregnancy are covered by insurance or govern-\nment assistance;44 that States have increasingly adopted\n“safe haven” laws, which generally allow women to drop off\nbabies anonymously;45 and that a woman who puts her new-\nborn up for adoption today has little reason to fear that the\nbaby will not find a suitable home.46 They also claim that\nmany people now have a new appreciation of fetal life and\nthat when prospective parents who want to have a child\nview a sonogram, they typically have no doubt that what\nthey see is their daughter or son.\n\n\n——————\nand-unpaid-family-leave-in-2018.htm (showing that 89 percent of civil-\nian workers had access to unpaid family leave in 2018).\n 44 The Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires non-grandfathered health\n\nplans in the individual and small group markets to cover certain essen-\ntial health benefits, which include maternity and newborn care. See 124\nStat. 163, 42 U. S. C. §18022(b)(1)(D). The ACA also prohibits annual\nlimits, see §300gg–11, and limits annual cost-sharing obligations on such\nbenefits, §18022(c). State Medicaid plans must provide coverage for\npregnancy-related services—including, but not limited to, prenatal care,\ndelivery, and postpartum care—as well as services for other conditions\nthat might complicate the pregnancy. 42 CFR §§440.210(a)(2)(i)–(ii)\n(2020). State Medicaid plans are also prohibited from imposing deduc-\ntions, cost-sharing, or similar charges for pregnancy-related services for\npregnant women. 42 U. S. C. §§1396o(a)(2)(B), (b)(2)(B).\n 45 Since Casey, all 50 States and the District of Columbia have enacted\n\nsuch laws. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., Children’s Bureau, Infant\nSafe Haven Laws 1–2 (2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/\nsafehaven.pdf (noting that safe haven laws began in Texas in 1999).\n 46 See, e.g., CDC, Adoption Experiences of Women and Men and De-\n\nmand for Children To Adopt by Women 18–44 Years of Age in the United\nStates 16 (Aug. 2008) (“[N]early 1 million women were seeking to adopt\nchildren in 2002 (i.e., they were in demand for a child), whereas the do-\nmestic supply of infants relinquished at birth or within the first month\nof life and available to be adopted had become virtually nonexistent”);\nCDC, National Center for Health Statistics, Adoption and Nonbiological\nParenting, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nsfg/key_statistics/a-keystat.htm#\nadoption (showing that approximately 3.1 million women between the\nages of 18–49 had ever “[t]aken steps to adopt a child” based on data\ncollected from 2015–2019).\n"
[43] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 35\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\n Both sides make important policy arguments, but sup-\nporters of Roe and Casey must show that this Court has the\nauthority to weigh those arguments and decide how abor-\ntion may be regulated in the States. They have failed to\nmake that showing, and we thus return the power to weigh\nthose arguments to the people and their elected represent-\natives.\n D\n 1\n The dissent is very candid that it cannot show that a con-\nstitutional right to abortion has any foundation, let alone a\n“ ‘deeply rooted’ ” one, “ ‘in this Nation’s history and tradi-\ntion.’ ” Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 721; see post, at 12–14\n(joint opinion of BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.).\nThe dissent does not identify any pre-Roe authority that\nsupports such a right—no state constitutional provision or\nstatute, no federal or state judicial precedent, not even a\nscholarly treatise. Compare post, at 12–14, n. 2, with su-\npra, at 15–16, and n. 23. Nor does the dissent dispute the\nfact that abortion was illegal at common law at least after\nquickening; that the 19th century saw a trend toward crim-\ninalization of pre-quickening abortions; that by 1868, a su-\npermajority of States (at least 26 of 37) had enacted stat-\nutes criminalizing abortion at all stages of pregnancy; that\nby the late 1950s at least 46 States prohibited abortion\n“however and whenever performed” except if necessary to\nsave “the life of the mother,” Roe, 410 U. S., at 139; and that\nwhen Roe was decided in 1973 similar statutes were still in\neffect in 30 States. Compare post, at 12–14, nn. 2–3, with\nsupra, at 23–25, and nn. 33–34.47\n The dissent’s failure to engage with this long tradition is\n——————\n 47 By way of contrast, at the time Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S.\n\n479 (1965), was decided, the Connecticut statute at issue was an extreme\noutlier. See Brief for Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. as\nAmicus Curiae in Griswold v. Connecticut, O. T. 1964, No. 496, p. 27.\n"
[44] "36 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\ndevastating to its position. We have held that the “estab-\nlished method of substantive-due-process analysis” re-\nquires that an unenumerated right be “ ‘deeply rooted in\nthis Nation’s history and tradition’ ” before it can be recog-\nnized as a component of the “liberty” protected in the Due\nProcess Clause. Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 721; cf. Timbs,\n586 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7). But despite the dissent’s\nprofessed fidelity to stare decisis, it fails to seriously engage\nwith that important precedent—which it cannot possibly\nsatisfy.\n The dissent attempts to obscure this failure by misrepre-\nsenting our application of Glucksberg. The dissent suggests\nthat we have focused only on “the legal status of abortion in\nthe 19th century,” post, at 26, but our review of this Na-\ntion’s tradition extends well past that period. As explained,\nfor more than a century after 1868—including “another\nhalf-century” after women gained the constitutional right\nto vote in 1920, see post, at 15; Amdt. 19—it was firmly es-\ntablished that laws prohibiting abortion like the Texas law\nat issue in Roe were permissible exercises of state regula-\ntory authority. And today, another half century later, more\nthan half of the States have asked us to overrule Roe and\nCasey. The dissent cannot establish that a right to abortion\nhas ever been part of this Nation’s tradition.\n 2\n Because the dissent cannot argue that the abortion right\nis rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, it contends\nthat the “constitutional tradition” is “not captured whole at\na single moment,” and that its “meaning gains content from\nthe long sweep of our history and from successive judicial\nprecedents.” Post, at 18 (internal quotation marks omit-\nted). This vague formulation imposes no clear restraints on\nwhat Justice White called the “exercise of raw judicial\npower,” Roe, 410 U. S., at 222 (dissenting opinion), and\nwhile the dissent claims that its standard “does not mean\n"
[45] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 37\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nanything goes,” post, at 17, any real restraints are hard to\ndiscern.\n The largely limitless reach of the dissenters’ standard is\nillustrated by the way they apply it here. First, if the “long\nsweep of history” imposes any restraint on the recognition\nof unenumerated rights, then Roe was surely wrong, since\nabortion was never allowed (except to save the life of the\nmother) in a majority of States for over 100 years before\nthat decision was handed down. Second, it is impossible to\ndefend Roe based on prior precedent because all of the prec-\nedents Roe cited, including Griswold and Eisenstadt, were\ncritically different for a reason that we have explained:\nNone of those cases involved the destruction of what Roe\ncalled “potential life.” See supra, at 32.\n So without support in history or relevant precedent, Roe’s\nreasoning cannot be defended even under the dissent’s pro-\nposed test, and the dissent is forced to rely solely on the fact\nthat a constitutional right to abortion was recognized in Roe\nand later decisions that accepted Roe’s interpretation. Un-\nder the doctrine of stare decisis, those precedents are enti-\ntled to careful and respectful consideration, and we engage\nin that analysis below. But as the Court has reiterated time\nand time again, adherence to precedent is not “ ‘an inexora-\nble command.’ ” Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576\nU. S. 446, 455 (2015). There are occasions when past deci-\nsions should be overruled, and as we will explain, this is one\nof them.\n 3\n The most striking feature of the dissent is the absence of\nany serious discussion of the legitimacy of the States’ inter-\nest in protecting fetal life. This is evident in the analogy\nthat the dissent draws between the abortion right and the\nrights recognized in Griswold (contraception), Eisenstadt\n(same), Lawrence (sexual conduct with member of the same\nsex), and Obergefell (same-sex marriage). Perhaps this is\n"
[46] "38 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\ndesigned to stoke unfounded fear that our decision will im-\nperil those other rights, but the dissent’s analogy is objec-\ntionable for a more important reason: what it reveals about\nthe dissent’s views on the protection of what Roe called “po-\ntential life.” The exercise of the rights at issue in Griswold,\nEisenstadt, Lawrence, and Obergefell does not destroy a “po-\ntential life,” but an abortion has that effect. So if the rights\nat issue in those cases are fundamentally the same as the\nright recognized in Roe and Casey, the implication is clear:\nThe Constitution does not permit the States to regard the\ndestruction of a “potential life” as a matter of any signifi-\ncance.\n That view is evident throughout the dissent. The dissent\nhas much to say about the effects of pregnancy on women,\nthe burdens of motherhood, and the difficulties faced by\npoor women. These are important concerns. However, the\ndissent evinces no similar regard for a State’s interest in\nprotecting prenatal life. The dissent repeatedly praises the\n“balance,” post, at 2, 6, 8, 10, 12, that the viability line\nstrikes between a woman’s liberty interest and the State’s\ninterest in prenatal life. But for reasons we discuss later,\nsee infra, at 50–54, 55–56, and given in the opinion of THE\nCHIEF JUSTICE, post, at 2–5 (opinion concurring in judg-\nment), the viability line makes no sense. It was not ade-\nquately justified in Roe, and the dissent does not even try\nto defend it today. Nor does it identify any other point in a\npregnancy after which a State is permitted to prohibit the\ndestruction of a fetus.\n Our opinion is not based on any view about if and when\nprenatal life is entitled to any of the rights enjoyed after\nbirth. The dissent, by contrast, would impose on the people\na particular theory about when the rights of personhood\nbegin. According to the dissent, the Constitution requires\nthe States to regard a fetus as lacking even the most basic\nhuman right—to live—at least until an arbitrary point in a\npregnancy has passed. Nothing in the Constitution or in\n"
[47] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 39\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nour Nation’s legal traditions authorizes the Court to adopt\nthat “ ‘theory of life.’ ” Post, at 8.\n III\n We next consider whether the doctrine of stare decisis\ncounsels continued acceptance of Roe and Casey. Stare de-\ncisis plays an important role in our case law, and we have\nexplained that it serves many valuable ends. It protects the\ninterests of those who have taken action in reliance on a\npast decision. See Casey, 505 U. S., at 856 (joint opinion);\nsee also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 828 (1991). It\n“reduces incentives for challenging settled precedents, sav-\ning parties and courts the expense of endless relitigation.”\nKimble, 576 U. S., at 455. It fosters “evenhanded” deci-\nsionmaking by requiring that like cases be decided in a like\nmanner. Payne, 501 U. S., at 827. It “contributes to the\nactual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Ibid.\nAnd it restrains judicial hubris and reminds us to respect\nthe judgment of those who have grappled with important\nquestions in the past. “Precedent is a way of accumulating\nand passing down the learning of past generations, a font\nof established wisdom richer than what can be found in any\nsingle judge or panel of judges.” N. Gorsuch, A Republic, If\nYou Can Keep It 217 (2019).\n We have long recognized, however, that stare decisis is\n“not an inexorable command,” Pearson v. Callahan, 555\nU. S. 223, 233 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted),\nand it “is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitu-\ntion,” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 235 (1997). It has\nbeen said that it is sometimes more important that an issue\n“ ‘be settled than that it be settled right.’ ” Kimble, 576\nU. S., at 455 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,\n285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). But\nwhen it comes to the interpretation of the Constitution—\nthe “great charter of our liberties,” which was meant “to en-\n"
[48] "40 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\ndure through a long lapse of ages,” Martin v. Hunter’s Les-\nsee, 1 Wheat. 304, 326 (1816) (opinion for the Court by\nStory, J.)—we place a high value on having the matter “set-\ntled right.” In addition, when one of our constitutional de-\ncisions goes astray, the country is usually stuck with the\nbad decision unless we correct our own mistake. An erro-\nneous constitutional decision can be fixed by amending the\nConstitution, but our Constitution is notoriously hard to\namend. See Art. V; Kimble, 576 U. S., at 456. Therefore, in\nappropriate circumstances we must be willing to reconsider\nand, if necessary, overrule constitutional decisions.\n Some of our most important constitutional decisions have\noverruled prior precedents. We mention three. In Brown\nv. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), the Court re-\npudiated the “separate but equal” doctrine, which had al-\nlowed States to maintain racially segregated schools and\nother facilities. Id., at 488 (internal quotation marks omit-\nted). In so doing, the Court overruled the infamous decision\nin Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), along with six\nother Supreme Court precedents that had applied the\nseparate-but-equal rule. See Brown, 347 U. S., at 491.\n In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937),\nthe Court overruled Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D. C.,\n261 U. S. 525 (1923), which had held that a law setting min-\nimum wages for women violated the “liberty” protected by\nthe Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id., at 545.\nWest Coast Hotel signaled the demise of an entire line of\nimportant precedents that had protected an individual lib-\nerty right against state and federal health and welfare leg-\nislation. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905)\n(holding invalid a law setting maximum working hours);\nCoppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 (1915) (holding invalid a law\nbanning contracts forbidding employees to join a union);\nJay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504 (1924) (hold-\ning invalid laws fixing the weight of loaves of bread).\n Finally, in West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S.\n"
[49] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 41\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\n624 (1943), after the lapse of only three years, the Court\noverruled Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586\n(1940), and held that public school students could not be\ncompelled to salute the flag in violation of their sincere be-\nliefs. Barnette stands out because nothing had changed\nduring the intervening period other than the Court’s be-\nlated recognition that its earlier decision had been seriously\nwrong.\n On many other occasions, this Court has overruled im-\nportant constitutional decisions. (We include a partial list\nin the footnote that follows.48) Without these decisions,\n——————\n 48 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015) (right to same-\n\nsex marriage), overruling Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810 (1972); Citizens\nUnited v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310 (2010) (right to engage\nin campaign-related speech), overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of\nCommerce, 494 U. S. 652 (1990), and partially overruling McConnell v.\nFederal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93 (2003); Montejo v. Louisiana, 556\nU. S. 778 (2009) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel), overruling Michi-\ngan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 (1986); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S.\n36 (2004) (Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses), overruling\nOhio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558\n(2003) (right to engage in consensual, same-sex intimacy in one’s home),\noverruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986); Ring v. Arizona,\n536 U. S. 584 (2002) (Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in capital\nprosecutions), overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990); Agos-\ntini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203 (1997) (evaluating whether government aid\nviolates the Establishment Clause), overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473\nU. S. 402 (1985), and School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373\n(1985); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44 (1996) (lack of con-\ngressional power under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate States’\nEleventh Amendment immunity), overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas\nCo., 491 U. S. 1 (1989); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808 (1991) (the\nEighth Amendment does not erect a per se bar to the admission of victim\nimpact evidence during the penalty phase of a capital trial), overruling\nBooth v. Maryland, 482 U. S. 496 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers,\n490 U. S. 805 (1989); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986) (the Equal\nProtection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not ex-\nclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race), over-\nruling Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965); Garcia v. San Antonio\n"
[50] "42 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\n——————\nMetropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 530 (1985) (rejecting the\nprinciple that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to en-\nforce requirements, such as minimum wage laws, against the States “ ‘in\nareas of traditional governmental functions’ ”), overruling National\nLeague of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S.\n213 (1983) (the Fourth Amendment requires a totality of the circum-\nstances approach for determining whether an informant’s tip establishes\nprobable cause), overruling Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), and\nSpinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969); United States v. Scott, 437\nU. S. 82 (1978) (the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to Govern-\nment appeals from orders granting defense motions to terminate a trial\nbefore verdict), overruling United States v. Jenkins, 420 U. S. 358 (1975);\nCraig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1976) (gender-based classifications are\nsubject to intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause),\noverruling Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464 (1948); Taylor v. Louisiana,\n419 U. S. 522 (1975) (jury system which operates to exclude women from\njury service violates the defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment\nright to an impartial jury), overruling Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U. S. 57\n(1961); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (the mere\nadvocacy of violence is protected under the First Amendment unless it is\ndirected to incite or produce imminent lawless action), overruling Whit-\nney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S.\n347, 351 (1967) (Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places,” and\nextends to what a person “seeks to preserve as private”), overruling\nOlmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928), and Goldman v. United\nStates, 316 U. S. 129 (1942); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966)\n(procedural safeguards to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against\nself-incrimination), overruling Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433\n(1958), and Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504 (1958); Malloy v. Hogan, 378\nU. S. 1 (1964) (the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination\nis also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by\nthe States), overruling Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908), and\nAdamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376\nU. S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (congressional districts should be apportioned so that\n“as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is\nto be worth as much as another’s”), overruling in effect Colegrove v.\nGreen, 328 U. S. 549 (1946); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963)\n(right to counsel for indigent defendant in a criminal prosecution in state\ncourt under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments), overruling Betts v.\nBrady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942); Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962) (federal\ncourts have jurisdiction to consider constitutional challenges to state re-\ndistricting plans), effectively overruling in part Colegrove, 328 U. S. 549;\n"
[51] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 43\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nAmerican constitutional law as we know it would be unrec-\nognizable, and this would be a different country.\n No Justice of this Court has ever argued that the Court\nshould never overrule a constitutional decision, but overrul-\ning a precedent is a serious matter. It is not a step that\nshould be taken lightly. Our cases have attempted to pro-\nvide a framework for deciding when a precedent should be\noverruled, and they have identified factors that should be\nconsidered in making such a decision. Janus v. State,\nCounty, and Municipal Employees, 585 U. S. ___, ___–___\n(2018) (slip op., at 34–35); Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S.\n___, ___–___ (2020) (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part)\n(slip op., at 7–9).\n In this case, five factors weigh strongly in favor of over-\nruling Roe and Casey: the nature of their error, the quality\nof their reasoning, the “workability” of the rules they im-\nposed on the country, their disruptive effect on other areas\nof the law, and the absence of concrete reliance.\n A\n The nature of the Court’s error. An erroneous interpreta-\ntion of the Constitution is always important, but some are\nmore damaging than others.\n The infamous decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, was one\n\n——————\nMapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961) (the exclusionary rule regarding the\ninadmissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amend-\nment applies to the States), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25\n(1949); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944) (racial restrictions on\nthe right to vote in primary elections violates the Equal Protection\nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment), overruling Grovey v. Townsend,\n295 U. S. 45 (1935); United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941) (con-\ngressional power to regulate employment conditions under the Com-\nmerce Clause), overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918);\nErie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938) (Congress does not have the\npower to declare substantive rules of common law; a federal court sitting\nin diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive state law), overrul-\ning Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842).\n"
[52] "44 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nsuch decision. It betrayed our commitment to “equality be-\nfore the law.” 163 U. S., at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting). It\nwas “egregiously wrong” on the day it was decided, see Ra-\nmos, 590 U. S., at ___ (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op.,\nat 7), and as the Solicitor General agreed at oral argument,\nit should have been overruled at the earliest opportunity,\nsee Tr. of Oral Arg. 92–93.\n Roe was also egregiously wrong and deeply damaging.\nFor reasons already explained, Roe’s constitutional analysis\nwas far outside the bounds of any reasonable interpretation\nof the various constitutional provisions to which it vaguely\npointed.\n Roe was on a collision course with the Constitution from\nthe day it was decided, Casey perpetuated its errors, and\nthose errors do not concern some arcane corner of the law\nof little importance to the American people. Rather, wield-\ning nothing but “raw judicial power,” Roe, 410 U. S., at 222\n(White, J., dissenting), the Court usurped the power to ad-\ndress a question of profound moral and social importance\nthat the Constitution unequivocally leaves for the people.\nCasey described itself as calling both sides of the national\ncontroversy to resolve their debate, but in doing so, Casey\nnecessarily declared a winning side. Those on the losing\nside—those who sought to advance the State’s interest in\nfetal life—could no longer seek to persuade their elected\nrepresentatives to adopt policies consistent with their\nviews. The Court short-circuited the democratic process by\nclosing it to the large number of Americans who dissented\nin any respect from Roe. “Roe fanned into life an issue that\nhas inflamed our national politics in general, and has ob-\nscured with its smoke the selection of Justices to this Court\nin particular, ever since.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 995–996\n(opinion of Scalia, J.). Together, Roe and Casey represent\nan error that cannot be allowed to stand.\n As the Court’s landmark decision in West Coast Hotel il-\nlustrates, the Court has previously overruled decisions that\n"
[53] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 45\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nwrongly removed an issue from the people and the demo-\ncratic process. As Justice White later explained, “decisions\nthat find in the Constitution principles or values that can-\nnot fairly be read into that document usurp the people’s au-\nthority, for such decisions represent choices that the people\nhave never made and that they cannot disavow through cor-\nrective legislation. For this reason, it is essential that this\nCourt maintain the power to restore authority to its proper\npossessors by correcting constitutional decisions that, on re-\nconsideration, are found to be mistaken.” Thornburgh, 476\nU. S., at 787 (dissenting opinion).\n B\n The quality of the reasoning. Under our precedents, the\nquality of the reasoning in a prior case has an important\nbearing on whether it should be reconsidered. See Janus,\n585 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 38); Ramos, 590 U. S., at ___–\n___ (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op., at 7–8). In Part II,\nsupra, we explained why Roe was incorrectly decided, but\nthat decision was more than just wrong. It stood on excep-\ntionally weak grounds.\n Roe found that the Constitution implicitly conferred a\nright to obtain an abortion, but it failed to ground its deci-\nsion in text, history, or precedent. It relied on an erroneous\nhistorical narrative; it devoted great attention to and pre-\nsumably relied on matters that have no bearing on the\nmeaning of the Constitution; it disregarded the fundamen-\ntal difference between the precedents on which it relied and\nthe question before the Court; it concocted an elaborate set\nof rules, with different restrictions for each trimester of\npregnancy, but it did not explain how this veritable code\ncould be teased out of anything in the Constitution, the his-\ntory of abortion laws, prior precedent, or any other cited\nsource; and its most important rule (that States cannot pro-\ntect fetal life prior to “viability”) was never raised by any\n"
[54] "46 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nparty and has never been plausibly explained. Roe’s rea-\nsoning quickly drew scathing scholarly criticism, even from\nsupporters of broad access to abortion.\n The Casey plurality, while reaffirming Roe’s central hold-\ning, pointedly refrained from endorsing most of its reason-\ning. It revised the textual basis for the abortion right, si-\nlently abandoned Roe’s erroneous historical narrative, and\njettisoned the trimester framework. But it replaced that\nscheme with an arbitrary “undue burden” test and relied on\nan exceptional version of stare decisis that, as explained be-\nlow, this Court had never before applied and has never in-\nvoked since.\n 1\n a\n The weaknesses in Roe’s reasoning are well-known.\nWithout any grounding in the constitutional text, history,\nor precedent, it imposed on the entire country a detailed set\nof rules much like those that one might expect to find in a\nstatute or regulation. See 410 U. S., at 163–164. Dividing\npregnancy into three trimesters, the Court imposed special\nrules for each. During the first trimester, the Court an-\nnounced, “the abortion decision and its effectuation must be\nleft to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s at-\ntending physician.” Id., at 164. After that point, a State’s\ninterest in regulating abortion for the sake of a woman’s\nhealth became compelling, and accordingly, a State could\n“regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasona-\nbly related to maternal health.” Ibid. Finally, in “the stage\nsubsequent to viability,” which in 1973 roughly coincided\nwith the beginning of the third trimester, the State’s inter-\nest in “the potentiality of human life” became compelling,\nand therefore a State could “regulate, and even proscribe,\nabortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medi-\ncal judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the\nmother.” Id., at 164–165.\n"
[55] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 47\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\n This elaborate scheme was the Court’s own brainchild.\nNeither party advocated the trimester framework; nor did\neither party or any amicus argue that “viability” should\nmark the point at which the scope of the abortion right and\na State’s regulatory authority should be substantially\ntransformed. See Brief for Appellant and Brief for Appellee\nin Roe v. Wade, O. T. 1972, No. 70–18; see also C. Forsythe,\nAbuse of Discretion: The Inside Story of Roe v. Wade 127,\n141 (2012).\n b\n Not only did this scheme resemble the work of a legisla-\nture, but the Court made little effort to explain how these\nrules could be deduced from any of the sources on which\nconstitutional decisions are usually based. We have al-\nready discussed Roe’s treatment of constitutional text, and\nthe opinion failed to show that history, precedent, or any\nother cited source supported its scheme.\n Roe featured a lengthy survey of history, but much of its\ndiscussion was irrelevant, and the Court made no effort to\nexplain why it was included. For example, multiple para-\ngraphs were devoted to an account of the views and prac-\ntices of ancient civilizations where infanticide was widely\naccepted. See 410 U. S., at 130–132 (discussing ancient\nGreek and Roman practices).49 When it came to the most\nimportant historical fact—how the States regulated abor-\ntion when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted—the\nCourt said almost nothing. It allowed that States had tight-\nened their abortion laws “in the middle and late 19th cen-\ntury,” id., at 139, but it implied that these laws might have\n\n——————\n 49 See, e.g., C. Patterson, “Not Worth the Rearing”: The Causes of In-\n\nfant Exposure in Ancient Greece, 115 Transactions Am. Philosophical\nAssn. 103, 111–123 (1985); A. Cameron, The Exposure of Children and\nGreek Ethics, 46 Classical Rev. 105–108 (1932); H. Bennett, The Expo-\nsure of Infants in Ancient Rome, 18 Classical J. 341–351 (1923); W. Har-\nris, Child-Exposure in the Roman Empire, 84 J. Roman Studies 1 (1994).\n"
[56] "48 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nbeen enacted not to protect fetal life but to further “a Victo-\nrian social concern” about “illicit sexual conduct,” id., at\n148.\n Roe’s failure even to note the overwhelming consensus of\nstate laws in effect in 1868 is striking, and what it said\nabout the common law was simply wrong. Relying on two\ndiscredited articles by an abortion advocate, the Court er-\nroneously suggested—contrary to Bracton, Coke, Hale,\nBlackstone, and a wealth of other authority—that the com-\nmon law had probably never really treated post-quickening\nabortion as a crime. See id., at 136 (“[I]t now appear[s]\ndoubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as a com-\nmon-law crime even with respect to the destruction of a\nquick fetus”). This erroneous understanding appears to\nhave played an important part in the Court’s thinking be-\ncause the opinion cited “the lenity of the common law” as\none of the four factors that informed its decision. Id., at\n165.\n After surveying history, the opinion spent many para-\ngraphs conducting the sort of fact-finding that might be un-\ndertaken by a legislative committee. This included a\nlengthy account of the “position of the American Medical\nAssociation” and “[t]he position of the American Public\nHealth Association,” as well as the vote by the American\nBar Association’s House of Delegates in February 1972 on\nproposed abortion legislation. Id., at 141, 144, 146 (empha-\nsis deleted). Also noted were a British judicial decision\nhanded down in 1939 and a new British abortion law en-\nacted in 1967. Id., at 137–138. The Court did not explain\nwhy these sources shed light on the meaning of the Consti-\ntution, and not one of them adopted or advocated anything\nlike the scheme that Roe imposed on the country.\n Finally, after all this, the Court turned to precedent. Cit-\ning a broad array of cases, the Court found support for a\nconstitutional “right of personal privacy,” id., at 152, but it\nconflated two very different meanings of the term: the right\n"
[57] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 49\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nto shield information from disclosure and the right to make\nand implement important personal decisions without gov-\nernmental interference. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589,\n599–600 (1977). Only the cases involving this second sense\nof the term could have any possible relevance to the abor-\ntion issue, and some of the cases in that category involved\npersonal decisions that were obviously very, very far afield.\nSee Pierce, 268 U. S. 510 (right to send children to religious\nschool); Meyer, 262 U. S. 390 (right to have children receive\nGerman language instruction).\n What remained was a handful of cases having something\nto do with marriage, Loving, 388 U. S. 1 (right to marry a\nperson of a different race), or procreation, Skinner, 316\nU. S. 535 (right not to be sterilized); Griswold, 381 U. S. 479\n(right of married persons to obtain contraceptives); Eisen-\nstadt, 405 U. S. 438 (same, for unmarried persons). But\nnone of these decisions involved what is distinctive about\nabortion: its effect on what Roe termed “potential life.”\n When the Court summarized the basis for the scheme it\nimposed on the country, it asserted that its rules were “con-\nsistent with” the following: (1) “the relative weights of the\nrespective interests involved,” (2) “the lessons and exam-\nples of medical and legal history,” (3) “the lenity of the com-\nmon law,” and (4) “the demands of the profound problems\nof the present day.” Roe, 410 U. S., at 165. Put aside the\nsecond and third factors, which were based on the Court’s\nflawed account of history, and what remains are precisely\nthe sort of considerations that legislative bodies often take\ninto account when they draw lines that accommodate com-\npeting interests. The scheme Roe produced looked like leg-\nislation, and the Court provided the sort of explanation that\nmight be expected from a legislative body.\n c\n What Roe did not provide was any cogent justification for\nthe lines it drew. Why, for example, does a State have no\n"
[58] "50 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nauthority to regulate first trimester abortions for the pur-\npose of protecting a woman’s health? The Court’s only ex-\nplanation was that mortality rates for abortion at that stage\nwere lower than the mortality rates for childbirth. Id., at\n163. But the Court did not explain why mortality rates\nwere the only factor that a State could legitimately con-\nsider. Many health and safety regulations aim to avoid ad-\nverse health consequences short of death. And the Court\ndid not explain why it departed from the normal rule that\ncourts defer to the judgments of legislatures “in areas\nfraught with medical and scientific uncertainties.” Mar-\nshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974).\n An even more glaring deficiency was Roe’s failure to jus-\ntify the critical distinction it drew between pre- and post-\nviability abortions. Here is the Court’s entire explanation:\n “With respect to the State’s important and legitimate\n interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at vi-\n ability. This is so because the fetus then presumably\n has the capability of meaningful life outside the womb.”\n 410 U. S., at 163.\nAs Professor Laurence Tribe has written, “[c]learly, this\nmistakes ‘a definition for a syllogism.’ ” Tribe 4 (quoting Ely\n924). The definition of a “viable” fetus is one that is capable\nof surviving outside the womb, but why is this the point at\nwhich the State’s interest becomes compelling? If, as Roe\nheld, a State’s interest in protecting prenatal life is compel-\nling “after viability,” 410 U. S., at 163, why isn’t that inter-\nest “equally compelling before viability”? Webster v. Repro-\nductive Health Services, 492 U. S. 490, 519 (1989) (plurality\nopinion) (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 795 (White, J.,\ndissenting)). Roe did not say, and no explanation is appar-\nent.\n This arbitrary line has not found much support among\nphilosophers and ethicists who have attempted to justify a\nright to abortion. Some have argued that a fetus should not\n"
[59] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 51\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nbe entitled to legal protection until it acquires the charac-\nteristics that they regard as defining what it means to be a\n“person.” Among the characteristics that have been offered\nas essential attributes of “personhood” are sentience, self-\nawareness, the ability to reason, or some combination\nthereof.50 By this logic, it would be an open question\nwhether even born individuals, including young children or\nthose afflicted with certain developmental or medical con-\nditions, merit protection as “persons.” But even if one takes\nthe view that “personhood” begins when a certain attribute\nor combination of attributes is acquired, it is very hard to\nsee why viability should mark the point where “personhood”\nbegins.\n The most obvious problem with any such argument is\nthat viability is heavily dependent on factors that have\nnothing to do with the characteristics of a fetus. One is the\n\n——————\n 50 See, e.g., P. Singer, Rethinking Life & Death 218 (1994) (defining a\n\nperson as “a being with awareness of her or his own existence over time,\nand the capacity to have wants and plans for the future”); B. Steinbock,\nLife Before Birth: The Moral and Legal Status of Embryos and Fetuses\n9–13 (1992) (arguing that “the possession of interests is both necessary\nand sufficient for moral status” and that the “capacity for conscious\nawareness is a necessary condition for the possession of interests” (em-\nphasis deleted)); M. Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion,\n57 The Monist 1, 5 (1973) (arguing that, to qualify as a person, a being\nmust have at least one of five traits that are “central to the concept of\npersonhood”: (1) “consciousness (of objects and events external and/or in-\nternal to the being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain”; (2) “rea-\nsoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex prob-\nlems)”; (3) “self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively\nindependent of either genetic or direct external control)”; (4) “the capac-\nity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite vari-\nety of types”; and (5) “the presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness,\neither individual or racial, or both” (emphasis deleted)); M. Tooley, Abor-\ntion & Infanticide, 2 Philosophy & Pub. Affairs 37, 49 (Autumn 1972)\n(arguing that “having a right to life presupposes that one is capable of\ndesiring to continue existing as a subject of experiences and other mental\nstates”).\n"
[60] "52 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nstate of neonatal care at a particular point in time. Due to\nthe development of new equipment and improved practices,\nthe viability line has changed over the years. In the 19th\ncentury, a fetus may not have been viable until the 32d or\n33d week of pregnancy or even later.51 When Roe was de-\ncided, viability was gauged at roughly 28 weeks. See 410\nU. S., at 160. Today, respondents draw the line at 23 or 24\nweeks. Brief for Respondents 8. So, according to Roe’s logic,\nStates now have a compelling interest in protecting a fetus\nwith a gestational age of, say, 26 weeks, but in 1973 States\ndid not have an interest in protecting an identical fetus.\nHow can that be?\n Viability also depends on the “quality of the available\nmedical facilities.” Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 396\n(1979). Thus, a 24-week-old fetus may be viable if a woman\ngives birth in a city with hospitals that provide advanced\ncare for very premature babies, but if the woman travels to\na remote area far from any such hospital, the fetus may no\nlonger be viable. On what ground could the constitutional\nstatus of a fetus depend on the pregnant woman’s location?\nAnd if viability is meant to mark a line having universal\nmoral significance, can it be that a fetus that is viable in a\nbig city in the United States has a privileged moral status\n\n——————\n 51 See W. Lusk, Science and the Art of Midwifery 74–75 (1882) (explain-\n\ning that “[w]ith care, the life of a child born within [the eighth month of\npregnancy] may be preserved”); id., at 326 (“Where the choice lies with\nthe physician, the provocation of labor is usually deferred until the\nthirty-third or thirty-fourth week”); J. Beck, Researches in Medicine and\nMedical Jurisprudence 68 (2d ed. 1835) (“Although children born before\nthe completion of the seventh month have occasionally survived, and\nbeen reared, yet in a medico-legal point of view, no child ought to be con-\nsidered as capable of sustaining an independent existence until the sev-\nenth month has been fully completed”); see also J. Baker, The Incubator\nand the Medical Discovery of the Premature Infant, J. Perinatology 322\n(2000) (explaining that, in the 19th century, infants born at seven to\neight months’ gestation were unlikely to survive beyond “the first days\nof life”).\n"
[61] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 53\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nnot enjoyed by an identical fetus in a remote area of a poor\ncountry?\n In addition, as the Court once explained, viability is not\nreally a hard-and-fast line. Ibid. A physician determining\na particular fetus’s odds of surviving outside the womb\nmust consider “a number of variables,” including “gesta-\ntional age,” “fetal weight,” a woman’s “general health and\nnutrition,” the “quality of the available medical facilities,”\nand other factors. Id., at 395–396. It is thus “only with\ndifficulty” that a physician can estimate the “probability” of\na particular fetus’s survival. Id., at 396. And even if each\nfetus’s probability of survival could be ascertained with cer-\ntainty, settling on a “probabilit[y] of survival” that should\ncount as “viability” is another matter. Ibid. Is a fetus via-\nble with a 10 percent chance of survival? 25 percent? 50\npercent? Can such a judgment be made by a State? And\ncan a State specify a gestational age limit that applies in all\ncases? Or must these difficult questions be left entirely to\nthe individual “attending physician on the particular facts\nof the case before him”? Id., at 388.\n The viability line, which Casey termed Roe’s central rule,\nmakes no sense, and it is telling that other countries almost\nuniformly eschew such a line.52 The Court thus asserted\nraw judicial power to impose, as a matter of constitutional\nlaw, a uniform viability rule that allowed the States less\nfreedom to regulate abortion than the majority of western\ndemocracies enjoy.\n d\n All in all, Roe’s reasoning was exceedingly weak, and ac-\nademic commentators, including those who agreed with the\n——————\n 52 According to the Center for Reproductive Rights, only the United\n\nStates and the Netherlands use viability as a gestational limit on the\navailability of abortion on-request. See Center for Reproductive Rights,\nThe World’s Abortion Laws (Feb. 23, 2021), https://reproductiverights\n.org/maps/worlds-abortion-laws.\n"
[62] "54 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\ndecision as a matter of policy, were unsparing in their crit-\nicism. John Hart Ely famously wrote that Roe was “not con-\nstitutional law and g[ave] almost no sense of an obligation\nto try to be.” Ely 947 (emphasis deleted). Archibald Cox,\nwho served as Solicitor General under President Kennedy,\ncommented that Roe “read[s] like a set of hospital rules and\nregulations” that “[n]either historian, layman, nor lawyer\nwill be persuaded . . . are part of . . . the Constitution.” The\nRole of the Supreme Court in American Government 113–\n114 (1976). Laurence Tribe wrote that “even if there is a\nneed to divide pregnancy into several segments with lines\nthat clearly identify the limits of governmental power,\n‘interest-balancing’ of the form the Court pursues fails to\njustify any of the lines actually drawn.” Tribe 4–5. Mark\nTushnet termed Roe a “totally unreasoned judicial opinion.”\nRed, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional\nLaw 54 (1988). See also P. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate 157\n(1982); A. Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doc-\ntrine, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 110 (2000).\n Despite Roe’s weaknesses, its reach was steadily ex-\ntended in the years that followed. The Court struck down\nlaws requiring that second-trimester abortions be per-\nformed only in hospitals, Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-\nductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416, 433–439 (1983); that mi-\nnors obtain parental consent, Planned Parenthood of\nCentral Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 74 (1976); that\nwomen give written consent after being informed of the sta-\ntus of the developing prenatal life and the risks of abortion,\nAkron, 462 U. S., at 442–445; that women wait 24 hours for\nan abortion, id., at 449–451; that a physician determine vi-\nability in a particular manner, Colautti, 439 U. S., at 390–\n397; that a physician performing a post-viability abortion\nuse the technique most likely to preserve the life of the fe-\ntus, id., at 397–401; and that fetal remains be treated in a\nhumane and sanitary manner, Akron, 462 U. S., at 451–\n452.\n"
[63] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 55\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\n Justice White complained that the Court was engaging in\n“unrestrained imposition of its own extraconstitutional\nvalue preferences.” Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 794 (dissent-\ning opinion). And the United States as amicus curiae asked\nthe Court to overrule Roe five times in the decade before\nCasey, see 505 U. S., at 844 (joint opinion), and then asked\nthe Court to overrule it once more in Casey itself.\n 2\n When Casey revisited Roe almost 20 years later, very lit-\ntle of Roe’s reasoning was defended or preserved. The Court\nabandoned any reliance on a privacy right and instead\ngrounded the abortion right entirely on the Fourteenth\nAmendment’s Due Process Clause. 505 U. S., at 846. The\nCourt did not reaffirm Roe’s erroneous account of abortion\nhistory. In fact, none of the Justices in the majority said\nanything about the history of the abortion right. And as for\nprecedent, the Court relied on essentially the same body of\ncases that Roe had cited. Thus, with respect to the standard\ngrounds for constitutional decisionmaking—text, history,\nand precedent—Casey did not attempt to bolster Roe’s rea-\nsoning.\n The Court also made no real effort to remedy one of the\ngreatest weaknesses in Roe’s analysis: its much-criticized\ndiscussion of viability. The Court retained what it called\nRoe’s “central holding”—that a State may not regulate pre-\nviability abortions for the purpose of protecting fetal life—\nbut it provided no principled defense of the viability line.\n505 U. S., at 860, 870–871. Instead, it merely rephrased\nwhat Roe had said, stating that viability marked the point\nat which “the independent existence of a second life can in\nreason and fairness be the object of state protection that\nnow overrides the rights of the woman.” 505 U. S., at 870.\nWhy “reason and fairness” demanded that the line be\ndrawn at viability the Court did not explain. And the Jus-\ntices who authored the controlling opinion conspicuously\n"
[64] "56 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nfailed to say that they agreed with the viability rule; in-\nstead, they candidly acknowledged “the reservations [some]\nof us may have in reaffirming [that] holding of Roe.” Id., at\n853.\n The controlling opinion criticized and rejected Roe’s tri-\nmester scheme, 505 U. S., at 872, and substituted a new\n“undue burden” test, but the basis for this test was obscure.\nAnd as we will explain, the test is full of ambiguities and is\ndifficult to apply.\n Casey, in short, either refused to reaffirm or rejected im-\nportant aspects of Roe’s analysis, failed to remedy glaring\ndeficiencies in Roe’s reasoning, endorsed what it termed\nRoe’s central holding while suggesting that a majority\nmight not have thought it was correct, provided no new sup-\nport for the abortion right other than Roe’s status as prece-\ndent, and imposed a new and problematic test with no firm\ngrounding in constitutional text, history, or precedent.\n As discussed below, Casey also deployed a novel version\nof the doctrine of stare decisis. See infra, at 64–69. This\nnew doctrine did not account for the profound wrongness of\nthe decision in Roe, and placed great weight on an intangi-\nble form of reliance with little if any basis in prior case law.\nStare decisis does not command the preservation of such a\ndecision.\n C\n Workability. Our precedents counsel that another im-\nportant consideration in deciding whether a precedent\nshould be overruled is whether the rule it imposes is work-\nable—that is, whether it can be understood and applied in\na consistent and predictable manner. Montejo v. Louisiana,\n556 U. S. 778, 792 (2009); Patterson v. McLean Credit Un-\nion, 491 U. S. 164, 173 (1989); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.\nv. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U. S. 271, 283–284 (1988). Ca-\nsey’s “undue burden” test has scored poorly on the worka-\nbility scale.\n"
[65] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 57\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\n 1\n Problems begin with the very concept of an “undue bur-\nden.” As Justice Scalia noted in his Casey partial dissent,\ndetermining whether a burden is “due” or “undue” is “inher-\nently standardless.” 505 U. S., at 992; see also June Medi-\ncal Services L. L. C. v. Russo, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020)\n(GORSUCH, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 17) (“[W]hether a bur-\nden is deemed undue depends heavily on which factors the\njudge considers and how much weight he accords each of\nthem” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).\n The Casey plurality tried to put meaning into the “undue\nburden” test by setting out three subsidiary rules, but these\nrules created their own problems. The first rule is that “a\nprovision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place\na substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an\nabortion before the fetus attains viability.” 505 U. S., at 878\n(emphasis added); see also id., at 877. But whether a par-\nticular obstacle qualifies as “substantial” is often open to\nreasonable debate. In the sense relevant here, “substan-\ntial” means “of ample or considerable amount, quantity, or\nsize.” Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary\n1897 (2d ed. 2001). Huge burdens are plainly “substantial,”\nand trivial ones are not, but in between these extremes,\nthere is a wide gray area.\n This ambiguity is a problem, and the second rule, which\napplies at all stages of a pregnancy, muddies things further.\nIt states that measures designed “to ensure that the\nwoman’s choice is informed” are constitutional so long as\nthey do not impose “an undue burden on the right.” Casey,\n505 U. S., at 878. To the extent that this rule applies to pre-\nviability abortions, it overlaps with the first rule and ap-\npears to impose a different standard. Consider a law that\nimposes an insubstantial obstacle but serves little purpose.\nAs applied to a pre-viability abortion, would such a regula-\ntion be constitutional on the ground that it does not impose\na “substantial obstacle”? Or would it be unconstitutional on\n"
[66] "58 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nthe ground that it creates an “undue burden” because the\nburden it imposes, though slight, outweighs its negligible\nbenefits? Casey does not say, and this ambiguity would lead\nto confusion down the line. Compare June Medical, 591\nU. S., at ___–___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 1–2), with\nid., at ___–___ (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring) (slip op., at 5–\n6).\n The third rule complicates the picture even more. Under\nthat rule, “[u]nnecessary health regulations that have the\npurpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a\nwoman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the\nright.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 878 (emphasis added). This rule\ncontains no fewer than three vague terms. It includes the\ntwo already discussed—“undue burden” and “substantial\nobstacle”—even though they are inconsistent. And it adds\na third ambiguous term when it refers to “unnecessary\nhealth regulations.” The term “necessary” has a range of\nmeanings—from “essential” to merely “useful.” See Black’s\nLaw Dictionary 928 (5th ed. 1979); American Heritage Dic-\ntionary of the English Language 877 (1971). Casey did not\nexplain the sense in which the term is used in this rule.\n In addition to these problems, one more applies to all\nthree rules. They all call on courts to examine a law’s effect\non women, but a regulation may have a very different im-\npact on different women for a variety of reasons, including\ntheir places of residence, financial resources, family situa-\ntions, work and personal obligations, knowledge about fetal\ndevelopment and abortion, psychological and emotional dis-\nposition and condition, and the firmness of their desire to\nobtain abortions. In order to determine whether a regula-\ntion presents a substantial obstacle to women, a court needs\nto know which set of women it should have in mind and how\nmany of the women in this set must find that an obstacle is\n“substantial.”\n Casey provided no clear answer to these questions. It\nsaid that a regulation is unconstitutional if it imposes a\n"
[67] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 59\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nsubstantial obstacle “in a large fraction of cases in which\n[it] is relevant,” 505 U. S., at 895, but there is obviously no\nclear line between a fraction that is “large” and one that is\nnot. Nor is it clear what the Court meant by “cases in\nwhich” a regulation is “relevant.” These ambiguities have\ncaused confusion and disagreement. Compare Whole\nWoman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U. S. 582, 627–628\n(2016), with id., at 666–667, and n. 11 (ALITO, J., dissent-\ning).\n 2\n The difficulty of applying Casey’s new rules surfaced in\nthat very case. The controlling opinion found that Pennsyl-\nvania’s 24-hour waiting period requirement and its\ninformed-consent provision did not impose “undue bur-\nden[s],” Casey, 505 U. S., at 881–887, but Justice Stevens,\napplying the same test, reached the opposite result, id., at\n920–922 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).\nThat did not bode well, and then-Chief Justice Rehnquist\naptly observed that “the undue burden standard presents\nnothing more workable than the trimester framework.” Id.,\nat 964–966 (dissenting opinion).\n The ambiguity of the “undue burden” test also produced\ndisagreement in later cases. In Whole Woman’s Health, the\nCourt adopted the cost-benefit interpretation of the test,\nstating that “[t]he rule announced in Casey . . . requires\nthat courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion\naccess together with the benefits those laws confer.” 579\nU. S., at 607 (emphasis added). But five years later, a ma-\njority of the Justices rejected that interpretation. See June\nMedical, 591 U. S. ___. Four Justices reaffirmed Whole\nWoman’s Health’s instruction to “weigh” a law’s “benefits”\nagainst “the burdens it imposes on abortion access.” 591\nU. S., at ___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 2) (internal quo-\ntation marks omitted). But THE CHIEF JUSTICE—who cast\n"
[68] "60 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nthe deciding vote—argued that “[n]othing about Casey sug-\ngested that a weighing of costs and benefits of an abortion\nregulation was a job for the courts.” Id., at ___ (opinion con-\ncurring in judgment) (slip op., at 6). And the four Justices\nin dissent rejected the plurality’s interpretation of Casey.\nSee 591 U. S., at ___ (opinion of ALITO, J., joined in relevant\npart by THOMAS, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ.) (slip op.,\nat 4); id., at ___–___ (opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at\n15–18); id., at ___–___ (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op.,\nat 1–2) (“[F]ive Members of the Court reject the Whole\nWoman’s Health cost-benefit standard”).\n This Court’s experience applying Casey has confirmed\nChief Justice Rehnquist’s prescient diagnosis that the\nundue-burden standard was “not built to last.” Casey, 505\nU. S., at 965 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and\ndissenting in part).\n 3\n The experience of the Courts of Appeals provides further\nevidence that Casey’s “line between” permissible and un-\nconstitutional restrictions “has proved to be impossible to\ndraw with precision.” Janus, 585 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at\n38).\n Casey has generated a long list of Circuit conflicts. Most\nrecently, the Courts of Appeals have disagreed about\nwhether the balancing test from Whole Woman’s Health\ncorrectly states the undue-burden framework.53 They have\ndisagreed on the legality of parental notification rules.54\n\n——————\n 53 Compare Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 10 F. 4th 430, 440 (CA5\n\n2021), EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 978 F. 3d\n418, 437 (CA6 2020), and Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F. 3d 912, 915 (CA8\n2020) (per curiam), with Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Box,\n991 F. 3d 740, 751–752 (CA7 2021).\n 54 Compare Planned Parenthood of Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 155 F. 3d\n\n352, 367 (CA4 1998), with Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Ad-\n"
[69] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 61\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nThey have disagreed about bans on certain dilation and\nevacuation procedures.55 They have disagreed about when\nan increase in the time needed to reach a clinic constitutes\nan undue burden.56 And they have disagreed on whether a\nState may regulate abortions performed because of the fe-\ntus’s race, sex, or disability.57\n The Courts of Appeals have experienced particular diffi-\nculty in applying the large-fraction-of-relevant-cases test.\nThey have criticized the assignment while reaching unpre-\ndictable results.58 And they have candidly outlined Casey’s\nmany other problems.59\n\n——————\nams, 937 F. 3d 973, 985–990 (CA7 2019), cert. granted, judgment va-\ncated, 591 U. S. ___ (2020), and Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic\nv. Miller, 63 F. 3d 1452, 1460 (CA8 1995).\n 55 Compare Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 10 F. 4th, at 435–436,\n\nwith West Ala. Women’s Center v. Williamson, 900 F. 3d 1310, 1319, 1327\n(CA11 2018), and EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Friedlander,\n960 F. 3d 785, 806–808 (CA6 2020).\n 56 Compare Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F. 3d 531, 541 (CA9\n\n2004), with Women’s Medical Professional Corp. v. Baird, 438 F. 3d 595,\n605 (CA6 2006), and Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F. 3d 157,\n171–172 (CA4 2000).\n 57 Compare Preterm-Cleveland v. McCloud, 994 F. 3d 512, 520–535\n\n(CA6 2021), with Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Rutledge, 984\nF. 3d 682, 688–690 (CA8 2021).\n 58 See, e.g., Bristol Regional Women’s Center, P.C. v. Slatery, 7 F. 4th\n\n478, 485 (CA6 2021); Reproductive Health Servs. v. Strange, 3 F. 4th\n1240, 1269 (CA11 2021) (per curiam); June Medical Servs., L.L.C. v. Gee,\n905 F. 3d 787, 814 (CA5 2020), rev’d, 591 U. S. ___; Preterm-Cleveland,\n994 F. 3d, at 534; Planned Parenthood of Ark. & Eastern Okla. v. Jegley,\n864 F. 3d 953, 958–960 (CA8 2017); McCormack v. Hertzog, 788 F. 3d\n1017, 1029–1030 (CA9 2015); compare A Womans Choice–East Side\nWomens Clinic v. Newman, 305 F. 3d 684, 699 (CA7 2002) (Coffey, J.,\nconcurring), with id., at 708 (Wood, J., dissenting).\n 59 See, e.g., Memphis Center for Reproductive Health v. Slatery, 14\n\nF. 4th 409, 451 (CA6 2021) (Thapar, J., concurring in judgment in part\nand dissenting in part); Preterm-Cleveland, 994 F. 3d, at 524; Planned\nParenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Commissioner of Ind. State Dept. of\n"
[70] "62 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\n Casey’s “undue burden” test has proved to be unworkable.\n“[P]lucked from nowhere,” 505 U. S., at 965 (opinion of\nRehnquist, C. J.), it “seems calculated to perpetuate give-it-\na-try litigation” before judges assigned an unwieldy and in-\nappropriate task. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U. S.\n507, 551 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part\nand dissenting in part). Continued adherence to that\nstandard would undermine, not advance, the “evenhanded,\npredictable, and consistent development of legal princi-\nples.” Payne, 501 U. S., at 827.\n D\n Effect on other areas of law. Roe and Casey have led to\nthe distortion of many important but unrelated legal doc-\ntrines, and that effect provides further support for overrul-\ning those decisions. See Ramos, 590 U. S., at ___ (opinion\nof KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op., at 8); Janus, 585 U. S., at ___\n(slip op., at 34).\n Members of this Court have repeatedly lamented that “no\nlegal rule or doctrine is safe from ad hoc nullification by this\nCourt when an occasion for its application arises in a case\ninvolving state regulation of abortion.” Thornburgh, 476\nU. S., at 814 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see Madsen v.\nWomen’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753, 785 (1994)\n(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting\n\n\n——————\nHealth, 888 F. 3d 300, 313 (CA7 2018) (Manion, J., concurring in judg-\nment in part and dissenting in part); Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky.,\nInc. v. Box, 949 F. 3d 997, 999 (CA7 2019) (Easterbrook, J., concurring in\ndenial of reh’g en banc) (“How much burden is ‘undue’ is a matter of judg-\nment, which depends on what the burden would be . . . and whether that\nburden is excessive (a matter of weighing costs against benefits, which\none judge is apt to do differently from another, and which judges as a\ngroup are apt to do differently from state legislators)”); National Abor-\ntion Federation v. Gonzales, 437 F. 3d 278, 290–296 (CA2 2006) (Walker,\nC. J., concurring); Planned Parenthood of Rocky Mountains Servs. Corp.\nv. Owens, 287 F. 3d 910, 931 (CA10 2002) (Baldock, J., dissenting).\n"
[71] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 63\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nin part); Whole Woman’s Health, 579 U. S., at 631–633\n(THOMAS, J., dissenting); id., at 645–666, 678–684 (ALITO,\nJ., dissenting); June Medical, 591 U. S., at ___–___\n(GORSUCH, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1–15).\n The Court’s abortion cases have diluted the strict stand-\nard for facial constitutional challenges.60 They have ig-\nnored the Court’s third-party standing doctrine.61 They\nhave disregarded standard res judicata principles.62 They\nhave flouted the ordinary rules on the severability of uncon-\nstitutional provisions,63 as well as the rule that statutes\nshould be read where possible to avoid unconstitutional-\nity.64 And they have distorted First Amendment doc-\ntrines.65\n When vindicating a doctrinal innovation requires courts\nto engineer exceptions to longstanding background rules,\nthe doctrine “has failed to deliver the ‘principled and intel-\nligible’ development of the law that stare decisis purports to\nsecure.” Id., at ___ (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 19)\n(quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265 (1986)).\n E\n Reliance interests. We last consider whether overruling\nRoe and Casey will upend substantial reliance interests.\n——————\n 60 Compare United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987), with\n\nCasey, 505 U. S., at 895; see also supra, at 56–59.\n 61 Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 (1975), and Elk Grove\n\nUnified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 15, 17–18 (2004), with June\nMedical, 591 U. S., at ___ (ALITO, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 28), id., at\n___–___ (GORSUCH, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 6–7) (collecting cases), and\nWhole Woman’s Health, 579 U. S., at 632, n. 1 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).\n 62 Compare id., at 598–606 (majority opinion), with id., at 645–666\n\n(ALITO, J., dissenting).\n 63 Compare id., at 623–626 (majority opinion), with id., at 644–645\n\n(ALITO, J., dissenting).\n 64 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U. S. 914, 977–978 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,\n\ndissenting); id., at 996–997 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).\n 65 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U. S. 703, 741–742 (2000) (Scalia, J., dis-\n\nsenting); id., at 765 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).\n"
[72] "64 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nSee Ramos, 590 U. S., at ___ (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.)\n(slip op., at 15); Janus, 585 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 34–\n35).\n 1\n Traditional reliance interests arise “where advance plan-\nning of great precision is most obviously a necessity.” Ca-\nsey, 505 U. S., at 856 (joint opinion); see also Payne, 501\nU. S., at 828. In Casey, the controlling opinion conceded\nthat those traditional reliance interests were not implicated\nbecause getting an abortion is generally “unplanned activ-\nity,” and “reproductive planning could take virtually imme-\ndiate account of any sudden restoration of state authority\nto ban abortions.” 505 U. S., at 856. For these reasons, we\nagree with the Casey plurality that conventional, concrete\nreliance interests are not present here.\n 2\n Unable to find reliance in the conventional sense, the con-\ntrolling opinion in Casey perceived a more intangible form\nof reliance. It wrote that “people [had] organized intimate\nrelationships and made choices that define their views of\nthemselves and their places in society . . . in reliance on the\navailability of abortion in the event that contraception\nshould fail” and that “[t]he ability of women to participate\nequally in the economic and social life of the Nation has\nbeen facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive\nlives.” Ibid. But this Court is ill-equipped to assess “gen-\neralized assertions about the national psyche.” Id., at 957\n(opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.). Casey’s notion of reliance thus\nfinds little support in our cases, which instead emphasize\nvery concrete reliance interests, like those that develop in\n“cases involving property and contract rights.” Payne, 501\nU. S., at 828.\n When a concrete reliance interest is asserted, courts are\nequipped to evaluate the claim, but assessing the novel and\n"
[73] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 65\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nintangible form of reliance endorsed by the Casey plurality\nis another matter. That form of reliance depends on an em-\npirical question that is hard for anyone—and in particular,\nfor a court—to assess, namely, the effect of the abortion\nright on society and in particular on the lives of women.\nThe contending sides in this case make impassioned and\nconflicting arguments about the effects of the abortion right\non the lives of women. Compare Brief for Petitioners 34–\n36; Brief for Women Scholars et al. as Amici Curiae 13–20,\n29–41, with Brief for Respondents 36–41; Brief for National\nWomen’s Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae 15–32. The\ncontending sides also make conflicting arguments about the\nstatus of the fetus. This Court has neither the authority\nnor the expertise to adjudicate those disputes, and the Ca-\nsey plurality’s speculations and weighing of the relative im-\nportance of the fetus and mother represent a departure\nfrom the “original constitutional proposition” that “courts\ndo not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the\njudgment of legislative bodies.” Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372\nU. S. 726, 729–730 (1963).\n Our decision returns the issue of abortion to those legis-\nlative bodies, and it allows women on both sides of the abor-\ntion issue to seek to affect the legislative process by influ-\nencing public opinion, lobbying legislators, voting, and\nrunning for office. Women are not without electoral or po-\nlitical power. It is noteworthy that the percentage of\nwomen who register to vote and cast ballots is consistently\nhigher than the percentage of men who do so.66 In the last\nelection in November 2020, women, who make up around\n51.5 percent of the population of Mississippi,67 constituted\n——————\n 66 See Dept. of Commerce, U. S. Census Bureau (Census Bureau), An\n\nAnalysis of the 2018 Congressional Election 6 (Dec. 2021) (Fig. 5) (show-\ning that women made up over 50 percent of the voting population in every\ncongressional election between 1978 and 2018).\n 67 Census Bureau, QuickFacts, Mississippi (July 1, 2021), https://www.\n"
[74] "66 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\n55.5 percent of the voters who cast ballots.68\n 3\n Unable to show concrete reliance on Roe and Casey them-\nselves, the Solicitor General suggests that overruling those\ndecisions would “threaten the Court’s precedents holding\nthat the Due Process Clause protects other rights.” Brief\nfor United States 26 (citing Obergefell, 576 U. S. 644; Law-\nrence, 539 U. S. 558; Griswold, 381 U. S. 479). That is not\ncorrect for reasons we have already discussed. As even the\nCasey plurality recognized, “[a]bortion is a unique act” be-\ncause it terminates “life or potential life.” 505 U. S., at 852;\nsee also Roe, 410 U. S., at 159 (abortion is “inherently dif-\nferent from marital intimacy,” “marriage,” or “procrea-\ntion”). And to ensure that our decision is not misunderstood\nor mischaracterized, we emphasize that our decision con-\ncerns the constitutional right to abortion and no other right.\nNothing in this opinion should be understood to cast doubt\non precedents that do not concern abortion.\n IV\n Having shown that traditional stare decisis factors do not\nweigh in favor of retaining Roe or Casey, we must address\none final argument that featured prominently in the Casey\nplurality opinion.\n The argument was cast in different terms, but stated\nsimply, it was essentially as follows. The American people’s\nbelief in the rule of law would be shaken if they lost respect\nfor this Court as an institution that decides important cases\nbased on principle, not “social and political pressures.” 505\nU. S., at 865. There is a special danger that the public will\n\n——————\ncensus.gov/quickfacts/MS.\n 68 Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November\n\n2020, Table 4b: Reported Voting and Registration, by Sex, Race and His-\npanic Origin, for States: November 2020, https://www.census.gov/data/\ntables/time-series/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-585.html.\n"
[75] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 67\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nperceive a decision as having been made for unprincipled\nreasons when the Court overrules a controversial “water-\nshed” decision, such as Roe. 505 U. S., at 866–867. A deci-\nsion overruling Roe would be perceived as having been\nmade “under fire” and as a “surrender to political pressure,”\n505 U. S., at 867, and therefore the preservation of public\napproval of the Court weighs heavily in favor of retaining\nRoe, see 505 U. S., at 869.\n This analysis starts out on the right foot but ultimately\nveers off course. The Casey plurality was certainly right\nthat it is important for the public to perceive that our deci-\nsions are based on principle, and we should make every ef-\nfort to achieve that objective by issuing opinions that care-\nfully show how a proper understanding of the law leads to\nthe results we reach. But we cannot exceed the scope of our\nauthority under the Constitution, and we cannot allow our\ndecisions to be affected by any extraneous influences such\nas concern about the public’s reaction to our work. Cf.\nTexas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397 (1989); Brown, 347 U. S.\n483. That is true both when we initially decide a constitu-\ntional issue and when we consider whether to overrule a\nprior decision. As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, “The\nJudicial Branch derives its legitimacy, not from following\npublic opinion, but from deciding by its best lights whether\nlegislative enactments of the popular branches of Govern-\nment comport with the Constitution. The doctrine of stare\ndecisis is an adjunct of this duty, and should be no more\nsubject to the vagaries of public opinion than is the basic\njudicial task.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 963 (opinion concurring\nin judgment in part and dissenting in part). In suggesting\notherwise, the Casey plurality went beyond this Court’s role\nin our constitutional system.\n The Casey plurality “call[ed] the contending sides of a na-\ntional controversy to end their national division,” and\nclaimed the authority to impose a permanent settlement of\nthe issue of a constitutional abortion right simply by saying\n"
[76] "68 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nthat the matter was closed. Id., at 867. That unprece-\ndented claim exceeded the power vested in us by the Con-\nstitution. As Alexander Hamilton famously put it, the Con-\nstitution gives the judiciary “neither Force nor Will.” The\nFederalist No. 78, p. 523 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Our sole au-\nthority is to exercise “judgment”—which is to say, the au-\nthority to judge what the law means and how it should ap-\nply to the case at hand. Ibid. The Court has no authority\nto decree that an erroneous precedent is permanently ex-\nempt from evaluation under traditional stare decisis princi-\nples. A precedent of this Court is subject to the usual prin-\nciples of stare decisis under which adherence to precedent\nis the norm but not an inexorable command. If the rule\nwere otherwise, erroneous decisions like Plessy and Loch-\nner would still be the law. That is not how stare decisis op-\nerates.\n The Casey plurality also misjudged the practical limits of\nthis Court’s influence. Roe certainly did not succeed in end-\ning division on the issue of abortion. On the contrary, Roe\n“inflamed” a national issue that has remained bitterly divi-\nsive for the past half century. Casey, 505 U. S., at 995 (opin-\nion of Scalia, J.); see also R. Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judi-\ncial Voice, 67 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1185, 1208 (1992) (Roe may\nhave “halted a political process,” “prolonged divisiveness,”\nand “deferred stable settlement of the issue”). And for the\npast 30 years, Casey has done the same.\n Neither decision has ended debate over the issue of a\nconstitutional right to obtain an abortion. Indeed, in this\ncase, 26 States expressly ask us to overrule Roe and Casey\nand to return the issue of abortion to the people and their\nelected representatives. This Court’s inability to end de-\nbate on the issue should not have been surprising. This\nCourt cannot bring about the permanent resolution of a\nrancorous national controversy simply by dictating a settle-\nment and telling the people to move on. Whatever influence\nthe Court may have on public attitudes must stem from the\n"
[77] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 69\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nstrength of our opinions, not an attempt to exercise “raw\njudicial power.” Roe, 410 U. S., at 222 (White, J., dissent-\ning).\n We do not pretend to know how our political system or\nsociety will respond to today’s decision overruling Roe and\nCasey. And even if we could foresee what will happen, we\nwould have no authority to let that knowledge influence our\ndecision. We can only do our job, which is to interpret the\nlaw, apply longstanding principles of stare decisis, and de-\ncide this case accordingly.\n We therefore hold that the Constitution does not confer a\nright to abortion. Roe and Casey must be overruled, and the\nauthority to regulate abortion must be returned to the peo-\nple and their elected representatives.\n V\n A\n 1\n The dissent argues that we have “abandon[ed]” stare de-\ncisis, post, at 30, but we have done no such thing, and it is\nthe dissent’s understanding of stare decisis that breaks\nwith tradition. The dissent’s foundational contention is\nthat the Court should never (or perhaps almost never) over-\nrule an egregiously wrong constitutional precedent unless\nthe Court can “poin[t] to major legal or factual changes un-\ndermining [the] decision’s original basis.” Post, at 37. To\nsupport this contention, the dissent claims that Brown v.\nBoard of Education, 347 U. S. 483, and other landmark\ncases overruling prior precedents “responded to changed\nlaw and to changed facts and attitudes that had taken hold\nthroughout society.” Post, at 43. The unmistakable impli-\ncation of this argument is that only the passage of time and\nnew developments justified those decisions. Recognition\nthat the cases they overruled were egregiously wrong on the\nday they were handed down was not enough.\n The Court has never adopted this strange new version of\n"
[78] "70 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nstare decisis—and with good reason. Does the dissent really\nmaintain that overruling Plessy was not justified until the\ncountry had experienced more than a half-century of state-\nsanctioned segregation and generations of Black school\nchildren had suffered all its effects? Post, at 44–45.\n Here is another example. On the dissent’s view, it must\nhave been wrong for West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette,\n319 U. S. 624, to overrule Minersville School Dist. v. Gobi-\ntis, 310 U. S. 586, a bare three years after it was handed\ndown. In both cases, children who were Jehovah’s Wit-\nnesses refused on religious grounds to salute the flag or re-\ncite the pledge of allegiance. The Barnette Court did not\nclaim that its reexamination of the issue was prompted by\nany intervening legal or factual developments, so if the\nCourt had followed the dissent’s new version of stare deci-\nsis, it would have been compelled to adhere to Gobitis and\ncountenance continued First Amendment violations for\nsome unspecified period.\n Precedents should be respected, but sometimes the Court\nerrs, and occasionally the Court issues an important deci-\nsion that is egregiously wrong. When that happens, stare\ndecisis is not a straitjacket. And indeed, the dissent even-\ntually admits that a decision could “be overruled just be-\ncause it is terribly wrong,” though the dissent does not ex-\nplain when that would be so. Post, at 45.\n 2\n Even if the dissent were correct in arguing that an egre-\ngiously wrong decision should (almost) never be overruled\nunless its mistake is later highlighted by “major legal or\nfactual changes,” reexamination of Roe and Casey would be\namply justified. We have already mentioned a number of\npost-Casey developments, see supra, at 33–34, 59–63, but\nthe most profound change may be the failure of the Casey\nplurality’s call for “the contending sides” in the controversy\nabout abortion “to end their national division,” 505 U. S., at\n"
[79] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 71\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\n867. That has not happened, and there is no reason to think\nthat another decision sticking with Roe would achieve what\nCasey could not.\n The dissent, however, is undeterred. It contends that the\n“very controversy surrounding Roe and Casey” is an im-\nportant stare decisis consideration that requires upholding\nthose precedents. See post, at 55–57. The dissent charac-\nterizes Casey as a “precedent about precedent” that is per-\nmanently shielded from further evaluation under tradi-\ntional stare decisis principles. See post, at 57. But as we\nhave explained, Casey broke new ground when it treated\nthe national controversy provoked by Roe as a ground for\nrefusing to reconsider that decision, and no subsequent case\nhas relied on that factor. Our decision today simply applies\nlongstanding stare decisis factors instead of applying a ver-\nsion of the doctrine that seems to apply only in abortion\ncases.\n 3\n Finally, the dissent suggests that our decision calls into\nquestion Griswold, Eisenstadt, Lawrence, and Obergefell.\nPost, at 4–5, 26–27, n. 8. But we have stated unequivocally\nthat “[n]othing in this opinion should be understood to cast\ndoubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.” Supra,\nat 66. We have also explained why that is so: rights regard-\ning contraception and same-sex relationships are inher-\nently different from the right to abortion because the latter\n(as we have stressed) uniquely involves what Roe and Casey\ntermed “potential life.” Roe, 410 U. S., at 150 (emphasis de-\nleted); Casey, 505 U. S., at 852. Therefore, a right to abor-\ntion cannot be justified by a purported analogy to the rights\nrecognized in those other cases or by “appeals to a broader\nright to autonomy.” Supra, at 32. It is hard to see how we\ncould be clearer. Moreover, even putting aside that these\ncases are distinguishable, there is a further point that the\ndissent ignores: Each precedent is subject to its own stare\n"
[80] "72 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\ndecisis analysis, and the factors that our doctrine instructs\nus to consider like reliance and workability are different for\nthese cases than for our abortion jurisprudence.\n B\n 1\n We now turn to the concurrence in the judgment, which\nreproves us for deciding whether Roe and Casey should be\nretained or overruled. That opinion (which for convenience\nwe will call simply “the concurrence”) recommends a “more\nmeasured course,” which it defends based on what it claims\nis “a straightforward stare decisis analysis.” Post, at 1\n(opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). The concurrence would “leave\nfor another day whether to reject any right to an abortion\nat all,” post, at 7, and would hold only that if the Constitu-\ntion protects any such right, the right ends once women\nhave had “a reasonable opportunity” to obtain an abortion,\npost, at 1. The concurrence does not specify what period of\ntime is sufficient to provide such an opportunity, but it\nwould hold that 15 weeks, the period allowed under Missis-\nsippi’s law, is enough—at least “absent rare circum-\nstances.” Post, at 2, 10.\n There are serious problems with this approach, and it is\nrevealing that nothing like it was recommended by either\nparty. As we have recounted, both parties and the Solicitor\nGeneral have urged us either to reaffirm or overrule Roe\nand Casey. See supra, at 4–5. And when the specific ap-\nproach advanced by the concurrence was broached at oral\nargument, both respondents and the Solicitor General em-\nphatically rejected it. Respondents’ counsel termed it “com-\npletely unworkable” and “less principled and less workable\nthan viability.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 54. The Solicitor General\nargued that abandoning the viability line would leave\ncourts and others with “no continued guidance.” Id., at 101.\nWhat is more, the concurrence has not identified any of the\n"
[81] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 73\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nmore than 130 amicus briefs filed in this case that advo-\ncated its approach. The concurrence would do exactly what\nit criticizes Roe for doing: pulling “out of thin air” a test that\n“[n]o party or amicus asked the Court to adopt.” Post, at 3.\n 2\n The concurrence’s most fundamental defect is its failure\nto offer any principled basis for its approach. The concur-\nrence would “discar[d]” “the rule from Roe and Casey that a\nwoman’s right to terminate her pregnancy extends up to the\npoint that the fetus is regarded as ‘viable’ outside the\nwomb.” Post, at 2. But this rule was a critical component\nof the holdings in Roe and Casey, and stare decisis is “a doc-\ntrine of preservation, not transformation,” Citizens United\nv. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310, 384 (2010)\n(ROBERTS, C. J., concurring). Therefore, a new rule that\ndiscards the viability rule cannot be defended on stare deci-\nsis grounds.\n The concurrence concedes that its approach would “not be\navailable” if “the rationale of Roe and Casey were inextrica-\nbly entangled with and dependent upon the viability stand-\nard.” Post, at 7. But the concurrence asserts that the via-\nbility line is separable from the constitutional right they\nrecognized, and can therefore be “discarded” without dis-\nturbing any past precedent. Post, at 7–8. That is simply\nincorrect.\n Roe’s trimester rule was expressly tied to viability, see\n410 U. S., at 163–164, and viability played a critical role in\nlater abortion decisions. For example, in Planned\nParenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, the\nCourt reiterated Roe’s rule that a “State may regulate an\nabortion to protect the life of the fetus and even may pro-\nscribe abortion” at “the stage subsequent to viability.” 428\nU. S., at 61 (emphasis added). The Court then rejected a\nchallenge to Missouri’s definition of viability, holding that\nthe State’s definition was consistent with Roe’s. 428 U. S.,\n"
[82] "74 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nat 63–64. If viability was not an essential part of the rule\nadopted in Roe, the Court would have had no need to make\nthat comparison.\n The holding in Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, is even\nmore instructive. In that case, the Court noted that prior\ncases had “stressed viability” and reiterated that “[v]iabil-\nity is the critical point” under Roe. 439 U. S., at 388–389.\nIt then struck down Pennsylvania’s definition of viability,\nid., at 389–394, and it is hard to see how the Court could\nhave done that if Roe’s discussion of viability was not part\nof its holding.\n When the Court reconsidered Roe in Casey, it left no\ndoubt about the importance of the viability rule. It de-\nscribed the rule as Roe’s “central holding,” 505 U. S., at 860,\nand repeatedly stated that the right it reaffirmed was “the\nright of the woman to choose to have an abortion before vi-\nability.” Id., at 846 (emphasis added). See id., at 871 (“The\nwoman’s right to terminate her pregnancy before viability\nis the most central principle of Roe v. Wade. It is a rule of\nlaw and a component of liberty we cannot renounce” (em-\nphasis added)); id., at 872 (A “woman has a right to choose\nto terminate or continue her pregnancy before viability”\n(emphasis added)); id., at 879 (“[A] State may not prohibit\nany woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate\nher pregnancy before viability” (emphasis added)).\n Our subsequent cases have continued to recognize the\ncentrality of the viability rule. See Whole Women’s Health,\n579 U. S., at 589–590 (“[A] provision of law is constitution-\nally invalid, if the ‘purpose or effect’ of the provision ‘is to\nplace a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking\nan abortion before the fetus attains viability’ ” (emphasis de-\nleted and added)); id., at 627 (“[W]e now use ‘viability’ as\nthe relevant point at which a State may begin limiting\nwomen’s access to abortion for reasons unrelated to mater-\nnal health” (emphasis added)).\n"
[83] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 75\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\n Not only is the new rule proposed by the concurrence in-\nconsistent with Casey’s unambiguous “language,” post, at 8,\nit is also contrary to the judgment in that case and later\nabortion cases. In Casey, the Court held that Pennsylva-\nnia’s spousal-notification provision was facially unconstitu-\ntional, not just that it was unconstitutional as applied to\nabortions sought prior to the time when a woman has had\na reasonable opportunity to choose. See 505 U. S., at 887–\n898. The same is true of Whole Women’s Health, which held\nthat certain rules that required physicians performing\nabortions to have admitting privileges at a nearby hospital\nwere facially unconstitutional because they placed “a sub-\nstantial obstacle in the path of women seeking a previabil-\nity abortion.” 579 U. S., at 591 (emphasis added).\n For all these reasons, stare decisis cannot justify the new\n“reasonable opportunity” rule propounded by the concur-\nrence. If that rule is to become the law of the land, it must\nstand on its own, but the concurrence makes no attempt to\nshow that this rule represents a correct interpretation of\nthe Constitution. The concurrence does not claim that the\nright to a reasonable opportunity to obtain an abortion is\n“ ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ ” and\n“ ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ ” Glucksberg,\n521 U. S., at 720–721. Nor does it propound any other the-\nory that could show that the Constitution supports its new\nrule. And if the Constitution protects a woman’s right to\nobtain an abortion, the opinion does not explain why that\nright should end after the point at which all “reasonable”\nwomen will have decided whether to seek an abortion.\nWhile the concurrence is moved by a desire for judicial min-\nimalism, “we cannot embrace a narrow ground of decision\nsimply because it is narrow; it must also be right.” Citizens\nUnited, 558 U. S., at 375 (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring). For\nthe reasons that we have explained, the concurrence’s ap-\nproach is not.\n"
[84] "76 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\n 3\n The concurrence would “leave for another day whether to\nreject any right to an abortion at all,” post, at 7, but “an-\nother day” would not be long in coming. Some States have\nset deadlines for obtaining an abortion that are shorter\nthan Mississippi’s. See, e.g., Memphis Center for Reproduc-\ntive Health v. Slatery, 14 F. 4th, at 414 (considering law\nwith bans “at cascading intervals of two to three weeks” be-\nginning at six weeks), reh’g en banc granted, 14 F. 4th 550\n(CA6 2021). If we held only that Mississippi’s 15-week rule\nis constitutional, we would soon be called upon to pass on\nthe constitutionality of a panoply of laws with shorter dead-\nlines or no deadline at all. The “measured course” charted\nby the concurrence would be fraught with turmoil until the\nCourt answered the question that the concurrence seeks to\ndefer.\n Even if the Court ultimately adopted the new rule sug-\ngested by the concurrence, we would be faced with the dif-\nficult problem of spelling out what it means. For example,\nif the period required to give women a “reasonable” oppor-\ntunity to obtain an abortion were pegged, as the concur-\nrence seems to suggest, at the point when a certain percent-\nage of women make that choice, see post, at 1–2, 9–10, we\nwould have to identify the relevant percentage. It would\nalso be necessary to explain what the concurrence means\nwhen it refers to “rare circumstances” that might justify an\nexception. Post, at 10. And if this new right aims to give\nwomen a reasonable opportunity to get an abortion, it\nwould be necessary to decide whether factors other than\npromptness in deciding might have a bearing on whether\nsuch an opportunity was available.\n In sum, the concurrence’s quest for a middle way would\nonly put off the day when we would be forced to confront the\nquestion we now decide. The turmoil wrought by Roe and\nCasey would be prolonged. It is far better—for this Court\n"
[85] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 77\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\nand the country—to face up to the real issue without fur-\nther delay.\n VI\n We must now decide what standard will govern if state\nabortion regulations undergo constitutional challenge and\nwhether the law before us satisfies the appropriate stand-\nard.\n A\n Under our precedents, rational-basis review is the appro-\npriate standard for such challenges. As we have explained,\nprocuring an abortion is not a fundamental constitutional\nright because such a right has no basis in the Constitution’s\ntext or in our Nation’s history. See supra, at 8–39.\n It follows that the States may regulate abortion for legit-\nimate reasons, and when such regulations are challenged\nunder the Constitution, courts cannot “substitute their so-\ncial and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bod-\nies.” Ferguson, 372 U. S., at 729–730; see also Dandridge\nv. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 484–486 (1970); United States v.\nCarolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152 (1938). That re-\nspect for a legislature’s judgment applies even when the\nlaws at issue concern matters of great social significance\nand moral substance. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of Univ.\nof Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356, 365–368 (2001) (“treatment\nof the disabled”); Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 728 (“assisted\nsuicide”); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodri-\nguez, 411 U. S. 1, 32–35, 55 (1973) (“financing public edu-\ncation”).\n A law regulating abortion, like other health and welfare\nlaws, is entitled to a “strong presumption of validity.” Hel-\nler v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312, 319 (1993). It must be sustained\nif there is a rational basis on which the legislature could\nhave thought that it would serve legitimate state interests.\nId., at 320; FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U. S.\n"
[86] "78 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion of the Court\n\n307, 313 (1993); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303\n(1976) (per curiam); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc.,\n348 U. S. 483, 491 (1955). These legitimate interests in-\nclude respect for and preservation of prenatal life at all\nstages of development, Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 157–158; the\nprotection of maternal health and safety; the elimination of\nparticularly gruesome or barbaric medical procedures; the\npreservation of the integrity of the medical profession; the\nmitigation of fetal pain; and the prevention of discrimina-\ntion on the basis of race, sex, or disability. See id., at 156–\n157; Roe, 410 U. S., at 150; cf. Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 728–\n731 (identifying similar interests).\n B\n These legitimate interests justify Mississippi’s Gesta-\ntional Age Act. Except “in a medical emergency or in the\ncase of a severe fetal abnormality,” the statute prohibits\nabortion “if the probable gestational age of the unborn hu-\nman being has been determined to be greater than fifteen\n(15) weeks.” Miss. Code Ann. §41–41–191(4)(b). The Mis-\nsissippi Legislature’s findings recount the stages of “human\nprenatal development” and assert the State’s interest in\n“protecting the life of the unborn.” §2(b)(i). The legislature\nalso found that abortions performed after 15 weeks typi-\ncally use the dilation and evacuation procedure, and the\nlegislature found the use of this procedure “for nonthera-\npeutic or elective reasons [to be] a barbaric practice, dan-\ngerous for the maternal patient, and demeaning to the med-\nical profession.” §2(b)(i)(8); see also Gonzales, 550 U. S., at\n135–143 (describing such procedures). These legitimate in-\nterests provide a rational basis for the Gestational Age Act,\nand it follows that respondents’ constitutional challenge\nmust fail.\n VII\n We end this opinion where we began. Abortion presents\n"
[87] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 79\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\na profound moral question. The Constitution does not pro-\nhibit the citizens of each State from regulating or prohibit-\ning abortion. Roe and Casey arrogated that authority. We\nnow overrule those decisions and return that authority to\nthe people and their elected representatives.\n The judgment of the Fifth Circuit is reversed, and the\ncase is remanded for further proceedings consistent with\nthis opinion.\n It is so ordered.\n\n APPENDICES\n A\n This appendix contains statutes criminalizing abortion at\nall stages of pregnancy in the States existing in 1868. The\nstatutes appear in chronological order.\n1. Missouri (1825):\n Sec. 12. “That every person who shall wilfully and\n maliciously administer or cause to be administered to\n or taken by any person, any poison, or other noxious,\n poisonous or destructive substance or liquid, with an\n intention to harm him or her thereby to murder, or\n thereby to cause or procure the miscarriage of any\n woman then being with child, and shall thereof be duly\n convicted, shall suffer imprisonment not exceeding\n seven years, and be fined not exceeding three thousand\n dollars.”69\n2. Illinois (1827):\n Sec. 46. “Every person who shall wilfully and mali-\n ciously administer, or cause to be administered to, or\n taken by any person, any poison, or other noxious or\n——————\n 69 1825 Mo. Laws p. 283 (emphasis added); see also, Mo. Rev. Stat., Art.\n\nII, §§10, 36 (1835) (extending liability to abortions performed by instru-\nment and establishing differential penalties for pre- and post-quickening\nabortion) (emphasis added).\n"
[88] "80 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\n destructive substance or liquid, with an intention to\n cause the death of such person, or to procure the mis-\n carriage of any woman, then being with child, and shall\n thereof be duly convicted, shall be imprisoned for a\n term not exceeding three years, and be fined in a sum\n not exceeding one thousand dollars.” 70\n3. New York (1828):\n Sec. 9. “Every person who shall administer to any\n woman pregnant with a quick child, any medicine,\n drug or substance whatever, or shall use or employ any\n instrument or other means, with intent thereby to de-\n stroy such child, unless the same shall have been nec-\n essary to preserve the life of such mother, or shall have\n been advised by two physicians to be necessary for such\n purpose, shall, in case the death of such child or of such\n mother be thereby produced, be deemed guilty of man-\n slaughter in the second degree.”\n Sec. 21. “Every person who shall willfully adminis-\n ter to any pregnant woman, any medicine, drug, sub-\n stance or thing whatever, or shall use or employ any\n instrument of other means whatever, with intent\n thereby to procure the miscarriage of any such woman,\n unless the same shall have been necessary to preserve\n the life of such woman, or shall have been advised by\n two physicians to be necessary for that purpose; shall,\n upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment in a\n county jail not more than one year, or by fine not ex-\n ceeding five hundred dollars, or by both such fine and\n imprisonment.”71\n\n\n——————\n 70 Ill. Rev. Code §46 (1827) (emphasis added); see also Ill. Rev. Code\n\n§46 (1833) (same); 1867 Ill. Laws p. 89 (extending liability to abortions\n“by means of any instrument[s]” and raising penalties to imprisonment\n“not less than two nor more than ten years”).\n 71 N. Y. Rev. Stat., pt. 4, ch. 1, Tit. 2, §9 (emphasis added); Tit. 6, §21\n"
[89] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 81\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\n4. Ohio (1834):\n Sec. 1. “Be it enacted by the General Assembly of\n State of Ohio, That any physician, or other person, who\n shall wilfully administer to any pregnant woman any\n medicine, drug, substance, or thing whatever, or shall\n use any instrument or other means whatever, with in-\n tent thereby to procure the miscarriage of any such\n woman, unless the same shall have been necessary to\n preserve the life of such woman, or shall have been ad-\n vised by two physicians to be necessary for that pur-\n pose, shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprison-\n ment in the county jail not more than one year, or by\n fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by both such\n fine and imprisonment.”\n Sec. 2. “That any physician, or other person, who\n shall administer to any woman pregnant with a quick\n child, any medicine, drug, or substance whatever, or\n shall use or employ any instrument, or other means,\n with intent thereby to destroy such child, unless the\n same shall have been necessary to preserve the life of\n such mother, or shall have been advised by two physi-\n cians to be necessary for such purpose, shall, in case of\n the death of such child or mother in consequence\n thereof, be deemed guilty of high misdemeanor, and,\n upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the pen-\n itentiary not more than seven years, nor less than one\n year.”72\n5. Indiana (1835):\n Sec. 3. “That every person who shall wilfully admin-\n ister to any pregnant woman, any medicine, drug, sub-\n stance or thing whatever, or shall use or employ any\n instrument or other means whatever, with intent\n——————\n(1828) (emphasis added); 1829 N. Y. Laws p. 19 (codifying these provi-\nsions in the revised statutes).\n 72 1834 Ohio Laws pp. 20–21 (emphasis deleted and added).\n"
[90] "82 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\n thereby to procure the miscarriage of any such woman,\n unless the same shall have been necessary to preserve\n the life of such woman, shall upon conviction be pun-\n ished by imprisonment in the county jail any term of\n [time] not exceeding twelve months and be fined any\n sum not exceeding five hundred dollars.”73\n6. Maine (1840):\n Sec. 13. “Every person, who shall administer to any\n woman pregnant with child, whether such child be\n quick or not, any medicine, drug or substance what-\n ever, or shall use or employ any instrument or other\n means whatever, with intent to destroy such child, and\n shall thereby destroy such child before its birth, unless\n the same shall have been done as necessary to preserve\n the life of the mother, shall be punished by imprison-\n ment in the state prison, not more than five years, or\n by fine, not exceeding one thousand dollars, and im-\n prisonment in the county jail, not more than one year.”\n Sec. 14. “Every person, who shall administer to any\n woman, pregnant with child, whether such child shall\n be quick or not, any medicine, drug or substance what-\n ever, or shall use or employ any instrument or other\n means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the\n miscarriage of such woman, unless the same shall have\n been done, as necessary to preserve her life, shall be\n punished by imprisonment in the county jail, not more\n than one year, or by fine, not exceeding one thousand\n dollars.”74\n7. Alabama (1841):\n Sec. 2. “Every person who shall wilfully administer\n to any pregnant woman any medicines, drugs, sub-\n stance or thing whatever, or shall use and employ any\n——————\n 73 1835 Ind. Laws p. 66 (emphasis added).\n 74 Me. Rev. Stat., Tit. 12, ch. 160, §§13–14 (1840) (emphasis added).\n"
[91] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 83\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\n instrument or means whatever with intent thereby to\n procure the miscarriage of such woman, unless the\n same shall be necessary to preserve her life, or shall\n have been advised by a respectable physician to be nec-\n essary for that purpose, shall upon conviction, be pun-\n ished by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, and\n by imprisonment in the county jail, not less than three,\n and not exceeding six months.”75\n8. Massachusetts (1845):\n Ch. 27. “Whoever, maliciously or without lawful jus-\n tification, with intent to cause and procure the miscar-\n riage of a woman then pregnant with child, shall ad-\n minister to her, prescribe for her, or advise or direct her\n to take or swallow, any poison, drug, medicine or nox-\n ious thing, or shall cause or procure her with like in-\n tent, to take or swallow any poison, drug, medicine or\n noxious thing; and whoever maliciously and without\n lawful justification, shall use any instrument or means\n whatever with the like intent, and every person, with\n the like intent, knowingly aiding and assisting such of-\n fender or offenders, shall be deemed guilty of felony, if\n the woman die in consequence thereof, and shall be im-\n prisoned not more than twenty years, nor less than five\n years in the State Prison; and if the woman doth not\n die in consequence thereof, such offender shall be\n guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by im-\n prisonment not exceeding seven years, nor less than\n one year, in the state prison or house of correction, or\n common jail, and by fine not exceeding two thousand\n dollars.”76\n9. Michigan (1846):\n Sec. 33. “Every person who shall administer to any\n\n——————\n 75 1841 Ala. Acts p. 143 (emphasis added).\n 76 1845 Mass. Acts p. 406 (emphasis added).\n"
[92] "84 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\n woman pregnant with a quick child, any medicine,\n drug or substance whatever, or shall use or employ any\n instrument or other means, with intent thereby to de-\n stroy such child, unless the same shall have been nec-\n essary to preserve the life of such mother, or shall have\n been advised by two physicians to be necessary for such\n purpose, shall, in case the death of such child or of such\n mother be thereby produced, be deemed guilty of man-\n slaughter.”\n Sec. 34. “Every person who shall wilfully administer\n to any pregnant woman any medicine, drug, substance\n or thing whatever, or shall employ any instrument or\n other means whatever, with intent thereby to procure\n the miscarriage of any such woman, unless the same\n shall have been necessary to preserve the life of such\n woman, or shall have been advised by two physicians\n to be necessary for that purpose, shall, upon conviction,\n be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not more\n than one year, or by a fine not exceeding five hundred\n dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”77\n10. Vermont (1846):\n Sec. 1. “Whoever maliciously, or without lawful jus-\n tification with intent to cause and procure the miscar-\n riage of a woman, then pregnant with child, shall ad-\n minister to her, prescribe for her, or advise or direct her\n to take or swallow any poison, drug, medicine or nox-\n ious thing, or shall cause or procure her, with like in-\n tent, to take or swallow any poison, drug, medicine or\n noxious thing, and whoever maliciously and without\n lawful justification, shall use any instrument or means\n whatever, with the like intent, and every person, with\n the like intent, knowingly aiding and assisting such of-\n fenders, shall be deemed guilty of felony, if the woman\n die in consequence thereof, and shall be imprisoned in\n——————\n 77 Mich. Rev. Stat., Tit. 30, ch. 153, §§33–34 (1846) (emphasis added).\n"
[93] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 85\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\n the state prison, not more than ten years, nor less than\n five years; and if the woman does not die in conse-\n quence thereof, such offenders shall be deemed guilty\n of a misdemeanor; and shall be punished by imprison-\n ment in the state prison not exceeding three years, nor\n less than one year, and pay a fine not exceeding two\n hundred dollars.”78\n11. Virginia (1848):\n Sec. 9. “Any free person who shall administer to any\n pregnant woman, any medicine, drug or substance\n whatever, or use or employ any instrument or other\n means with intent thereby to destroy the child with\n which such woman may be pregnant, or to produce\n abortion or miscarriage, and shall thereby destroy such\n child, or produce such abortion or miscarriage, unless\n the same shall have been done to preserve the life of\n such woman, shall be punished, if the death of a quick\n child be thereby produced, by confinement in the peni-\n tentiary, for not less than one nor more than five years,\n or if the death of a child, not quick, be thereby pro-\n duced, by confinement in the jail for not less than one\n nor more than twelve months.”79\n12. New Hampshire (1849):\n Sec. 1. “That every person, who shall wilfully admin-\n ister to any pregnant woman, any medicine, drug, sub-\n stance or thing whatever, or shall use or employ any\n instrument or means whatever with intent thereby to\n procure the miscarriage of any such woman, unless the\n same shall have been necessary to preserve the life of\n such woman, or shall have been advised by two physi-\n cians to be necessary for that purpose, shall, upon con-\n viction, be punished by imprisonment in the county jail\n\n——————\n 78 1846 Vt. Acts & Resolves pp. 34–35 (emphasis added).\n 79 1848 Va. Acts p. 96 (emphasis added).\n"
[94] "86 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\n not more than one year, or by a fine not exceeding one\n thousand dollars, or by both such fine and imprison-\n ment at the discretion of the Court.”\n Sec. 2. “Every person who shall administer to any\n woman pregnant with a quick child, any medicine,\n drug or substance whatever, or shall use or employ any\n instrument or means whatever, with intent thereby to\n destroy such child, unless the same shall have been\n necessary to preserve the life of such woman, or shall\n have been advised by two physicians to be necessary\n for such purpose, shall, upon conviction, be punished\n by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, and by con-\n finement to hard labor not less than one year, nor more\n than ten years.”80\n13. New Jersey (1849):\n “That if any person or persons, maliciously or with-\n out lawful justification, with intent to cause and pro-\n cure the miscarriage of a woman then pregnant with\n child, shall administer to her, prescribe for her, or ad-\n vise or direct her to take or swallow any poison, drug,\n medicine, or noxious thing; and if any person or per-\n sons maliciously, and without lawful justification, shall\n use any instrument or means whatever, with the like\n intent; and every person, with the like intent, know-\n ingly aiding and assisting such offender or offenders,\n shall, on conviction thereof, be adjudged guilty of a high\n misdemeanor; and if the woman die in consequence\n thereof, shall be punished by fine, not exceeding one\n thousand dollars, or imprisonment at hard labour for\n any term not exceeding fifteen years, or both; and if the\n woman doth not die in consequence thereof, such of-\n fender shall, on conviction thereof, be adjudged guilty\n of a misdemeanor, and be punished by fine, not exceed-\n\n——————\n 80 1849 N. H. Laws p. 708 (emphasis added).\n"
[95] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 87\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\n ing five hundred dollars, or imprisonment at hard la-\n bour, for any term not exceeding seven years, or\n both.”81\n14. California (1850):\n Sec. 45. “And every person who shall administer or\n cause to be administered or taken, any medical sub-\n stances, or shall use or cause to be used any instru-\n ments whatever, with the intention to procure the mis-\n carriage of any woman then being with child, and shall\n be thereof duly convicted, shall be punished by impris-\n onment in the State Prison for a term not less than two\n years, nor more than five years: Provided, that no phy-\n sician shall be affected by the last clause of this section,\n who, in the discharge of his professional duties, deems\n it necessary to produce the miscarriage of any woman\n in order to save her life.”82\n15. Texas (1854):\n Sec. 1. “If any person, with the intent to procure the\n miscarriage of any woman being with child, unlawfully\n and maliciously shall administer to her or cause to be\n taken by her any poison or other noxious thing, or shall\n use any instrument or any means whatever, with like\n intent, every such offender, and every person counsel-\n ling or aiding or abetting such offender, shall be pun-\n ished by confinement to hard labor in the Penitentiary\n not exceeding ten years.”83\n16. Louisiana (1856):\n Sec. 24. “Whoever shall feloniously administer or\n cause to be administered any drug, potion, or any other\n thing to any woman, for the purpose of procuring a\n premature delivery, and whoever shall administer or\n——————\n 81 1849 N. J. Laws pp. 266–267 (emphasis added).\n 82 1850 Cal. Stats. p. 233 (emphasis added and deleted).\n 83 1854 Tex. Gen. Laws p. 58 (emphasis added).\n"
[96] "88 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\n cause to be administered to any woman pregnant with\n child, any drug, potion, or any other thing, for the pur-\n pose of procuring abortion, or a premature delivery,\n shall be imprisoned at hard labor, for not less than one,\n nor more than ten years.”84\n17. Iowa (1858):\n Sec. 1. “That every person who shall willfully admin-\n ister to any pregnant woman, any medicine, drug, sub-\n stance or thing whatever, or shall use or employ any\n instrument or other means whatever, with the intent\n thereby to procure the miscarriage of any such woman,\n unless the same shall be necessary to preserve the life\n of such woman, shall upon conviction thereof, be pun-\n ished by imprisonment in the county jail for a term of\n not exceeding one year, and be fined in a sum not ex-\n ceeding one thousand dollars.”85\n18. Wisconsin (1858):\n Sec. 11. “Every person who shall administer to any\n woman pregnant with a child any medicine, drug, or\n substance whatever, or shall use or employ any instru-\n ment or other means, with intent thereby to destroy\n such child, unless the same shall have been necessary\n to preserve the life of such mother, or shall have been\n advised by two physicians to be necessary for such pur-\n pose, shall, in case the death of such child or of such\n mother be thereby produced, be deemed guilty of man-\n slaughter in the second degree.”86\n Sec. 58. “Every person who shall administer to any\n pregnant woman, or prescribe for any such woman, or\n advise or procure any such woman to take, any medi-\n cine, drug, or substance or thing whatever, or shall use\n——————\n 84 La. Rev. Stat. §24 (1856) (emphasis added).\n 85 1858 Iowa Acts p. 93 (codified in Iowa Rev. Laws §4221) (emphasis\n\nadded).\n 86 Wis. Rev. Stat., ch. 164, §11, ch. 169, §58 (1858) (emphasis added).\n"
[97] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 89\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\n or employ any instrument or other means whatever, or\n advise or procure the same to be used, with intent\n thereby to procure the miscarriage of any such woman,\n shall upon conviction be punished by imprisonment in\n a county jail, not more than one year nor less than\n three months, or by fine, not exceeding five hundred\n dollars, or by both fine and imprisonment, at the dis-\n cretion of the court.”\n19. Kansas (1859):\n Sec. 10. “Every person who shall administer to any\n woman, pregnant with a quick child, any medicine,\n drug or substance whatsoever, or shall use or employ\n any instrument or other means, with intent thereby to\n destroy such child, unless the same shall have been\n necessary to preserve the life of such mother, or shall\n have been advised by a physician to be necessary for\n that purpose, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter\n in the second degree.”\n Sec. 37. “Every physician or other person who shall\n wilfully administer to any pregnant woman any medi-\n cine, drug or substance whatsoever, or shall use or em-\n ploy any instrument or means whatsoever, with intent\n thereby to procure abortion or the miscarriage of any\n such woman, unless the same shall have been neces-\n sary to preserve the life of such woman, or shall have\n been advised by a physician to be necessary for that\n purpose, shall, upon conviction, be adjudged guilty of a\n misdemeanor, and punished by imprisonment in a\n county jail not exceeding one year, or by fine not ex-\n ceeding five hundred dollars, or by both such fine and\n imprisonment.”87\n20. Connecticut (1860):\n Sec. 1. “That any person with intent to procure the\n——————\n 87 1859 Kan. Laws pp. 233, 237 (emphasis added).\n"
[98] "90 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\n miscarriage or abortion of any woman, shall give or ad-\n minister to her, prescribe for her, or advise, or direct,\n or cause or procure her to take, any medicine, drug or\n substance whatever, or use or advise the use of any in-\n strument, or other means whatever, with the like in-\n tent, unless the same shall have been necessary to pre-\n serve the life of such woman, or of her unborn child,\n shall be deemed guilty of felony, and upon due convic-\n tion thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the\n Connecticut state prison, not more than five years or\n less than one year, or by a fine of one thousand dollars,\n or both, at the discretion of the court.”88\n21. Pennsylvania (1860):\n Sec. 87. “If any person shall unlawfully administer\n to any woman, pregnant or quick with child, or sup-\n posed and believed to be pregnant or quick with child,\n any drug, poison, or other substance whatsoever, or\n shall unlawfully use any instrument or other means\n whatsoever, with the intent to procure the miscarriage\n of such woman, and such woman, or any child with\n which she may be quick, shall die in consequence of ei-\n ther of said unlawful acts, the person so offending shall\n be guilty of felony, and shall be sentenced to pay a fine\n not exceeding five hundred dollars, and to undergo an\n imprisonment, by separate or solitary confinement at\n labor, not exceeding seven years.”\n Sec. 88. “If any person, with intent to procure the\n miscarriage of any woman, shall unlawfully administer\n to her any poison, drug or substance whatsoever, or\n shall unlawfully use any instrument, or other means\n whatsoever, with the like intent, such person shall be\n guilty of felony, and being thereof convicted, shall be\n sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding five hundred dol-\n\n——————\n 88 1860 Conn. Pub. Acts p. 65 (emphasis added).\n"
[99] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 91\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\n lars, and undergo an imprisonment, by separate or sol-\n itary confinement at labor, not exceeding three\n years.”89\n22. Rhode Island (1861):\n Sec. 1. “Every person who shall be convicted of wil-\n fully administering to any pregnant woman, or to any\n woman supposed by such person to be pregnant, any-\n thing whatever, or shall employ any means whatever,\n with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of such\n woman, unless the same is necessary to preserve her\n life, shall be imprisoned not exceeding one year, or\n fined not exceeding one thousand dollars.”90\n23. Nevada (1861):\n Sec. 42. “[E]very person who shall administer, or\n cause to be administered or taken, any medicinal sub-\n stance, or shall use, or cause to be used, any instru-\n ments whatever, with the intention to procure the mis-\n carriage of any woman then being with child, and shall\n be thereof duly convicted, shall be punished by impris-\n onment in the Territorial prison, for a term not less\n than two years, nor more than five years; provided,\n that no physician shall be affected by the last clause of\n this section, who, in the discharge of his professional\n duties, deems it necessary to produce the miscarriage\n of any woman in order to save her life.”91\n24. West Virginia (1863):\nWest Virginia’s Constitution adopted the laws of Virginia\nwhen it became its own State:\n “Such parts of the common law and of the laws of the\n State of Virginia as are in force within the boundaries\n\n——————\n 89 1861 Pa. Laws pp. 404–405 (emphasis added).\n 90 R. I. Acts & Resolves p. 133 (emphasis added).\n 91 1861 Nev. Laws p. 63 (emphasis added and deleted).\n"
[100] "92 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\n of the State of West Virginia, when this Constitution\n goes into operation, and are not repugnant thereto,\n shall be and continue the law of this State until altered\n or repealed by the Legislature.”92\nThe Virginia law in force in 1863 stated:\n Sec. 8. “Any free person who shall administer to, or\n cause to be taken, by a woman, any drug or other thing,\n or use any means, with intent to destroy her unborn\n child, or to produce abortion or miscarriage, and shall\n thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or\n miscarriage, shall be confined in the penitentiary not\n less than one, nor more than five years. No person, by\n reason of any act mentioned in this section, shall be\n punishable where such act is done in good faith, with\n the intention of saving the life of such woman or\n child.”93\n25. Oregon (1864):\n Sec. 509. “If any person shall administer to any\n woman pregnant with child, any medicine, drug or sub-\n stance whatever, or shall use or employ any instrument\n or other means, with intent thereby to destroy such\n child, unless the same shall be necessary to preserve\n the life of such mother, such person shall, in case the\n death of such child or mother be thereby produced, be\n deemed guilty of manslaughter.”94\n26. Nebraska (1866):\n Sec. 42. “Every person who shall willfully and mali-\n ciously administer or cause to be administered to or\n taken by any person, any poison or other noxious or de-\n structive substance or liquid, with the intention to\n\n——————\n 92 W. Va. Const., Art. XI, §8 (1862).\n 93 Va. Code, Tit. 54, ch. 191, §8 (1849) (emphasis added); see also W. Va.\n\nCode, ch. 144, §8 (1870) (similar).\n 94 Ore. Gen. Laws, Crim. Code, ch. 43, §509 (1865).\n"
[101] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 93\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\n cause the death of such person, and being thereof duly\n convicted, shall be punished by confinement in the pen-\n itentiary for a term not less than one year and not more\n than seven years. And every person who shall admin-\n ister or cause to be administered or taken, any such\n poison, substance or liquid, with the intention to pro-\n cure the miscarriage of any woman then being with\n child, and shall thereof be duly convicted, shall be im-\n prisoned for a term not exceeding three years in the\n penitentiary, and fined in a sum not exceeding one\n thousand dollars.”95\n27. Maryland (1868):\n Sec. 2. “And be it enacted, That any person who shall\n knowingly advertise, print, publish, distribute or circu-\n late, or knowingly cause to be advertised, printed, pub-\n lished, distributed or circulated, any pamphlet, printed\n paper, book, newspaper notice, advertisement or refer-\n ence containing words or language, giving or conveying\n any notice, hint or reference to any person, or to the\n name of any person real or fictitious, from whom; or to\n any place, house, shop or office, when any poison, drug,\n mixture, preparation, medicine or noxious thing, or any\n instrument or means whatever; for the purpose of pro-\n ducing abortion, or who shall knowingly sell, or cause\n to be sold any such poison, drug, mixture, preparation,\n medicine or noxious thing or instrument of any kind\n whatever; or where any advice, direction, information\n or knowledge may be obtained for the purpose of caus-\n ing the miscarriage or abortion of any woman pregnant\n with child, at any period of her pregnancy, or shall\n knowingly sell or cause to be sold any medicine, or who\n shall knowingly use or cause to be used any means\n——————\n 95 Neb. Rev. Stat., Tit. 4, ch. 4, §42 (1866) (emphasis added); see also\n\nNeb. Gen. Stat., ch. 58, §§6, 39 (1873) (expanding criminal liability for\nabortions by other means, including instruments).\n"
[102] "94 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\n whatsoever for that purpose, shall be punished by im-\n prisonment in the penitentiary for not less than three\n years, or by a fine of not less than five hundred nor\n more than one thousand dollars, or by both, in the dis-\n cretion of the Court; and in case of fine being imposed,\n one half thereof shall be paid to the State of Maryland,\n and one-half to the School Fund of the city or county\n where the offence was committed; provided, however,\n that nothing herein contained shall be construed so as\n to prohibit the supervision and management by a reg-\n ular practitioner of medicine of all cases of abortion oc-\n curring spontaneously, either as the result of accident,\n constitutional debility, or any other natural cause, or\n the production of abortion by a regular practitioner of\n medicine when, after consulting with one or more re-\n spectable physicians, he shall be satisfied that the foe-\n tus is dead, or that no other method will secure the\n safety of the mother.”96\n28. Florida (1868):\n Ch. 3, Sec. 11. “Every person who shall administer\n to any woman pregnant with a quick child any medi-\n cine, drug, or substance whatever, or shall use or em-\n ploy any instrument, or other means, with intent\n thereby to destroy such child, unless the same shall\n have been necessary to preserve the life of such mother,\n or shall have been advised by two physicians to be nec-\n essary for such purpose, shall, in case the death of such\n child or of such mother be thereby produced, be deemed\n guilty of manslaughter in the second degree.”\n Ch. 8, Sec. 9. “Whoever, with intent to procure mis-\n carriage of any woman, unlawfully administers to her,\n or advises, or prescribes for her, or causes to be taken\n by her, any poison, drug, medicine, or other noxious\n thing, or unlawfully uses any instrument or other\n——————\n 96 1868 Md. Laws p. 315 (emphasis deleted and added).\n"
[103] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 95\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\n means whatever with the like intent, or with like intent\n aids or assists therein, shall, if the woman does not die\n in consequence thereof, be punished by imprisonment\n in the State penittentiary not exceeding seven years,\n nor less than one year, or by fine not exceeding one\n thousand dollars.”97\n29. Minnesota (1873):\n Sec. 1. “That any person who shall administer to any\n woman with child, or prescribe for any such woman, or\n suggest to, or advise, or procure her to take any medi-\n cine, drug, substance or thing whatever, or who shall\n use or employ, or advise or suggest the use or employ-\n ment of any instrument or other means or force what-\n ever, with intent thereby to cause or procure the mis-\n carriage or abortion or premature labor of any such\n woman, unless the same shall have been necessary to\n preserve her life, or the life of such child, shall, in case\n the death of such child or of such woman results in\n whole or in part therefrom, be deemed guilty of a fel-\n ony, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by\n imprisonment in the state prison for a term not more\n than ten (10) years nor less than three (3) years.”\n Sec. 2. “Any person who shall administer to any\n woman with child, or prescribe, or procure, or provide\n for any such woman, or suggest to, or advise, or procure\n any such woman to take any medicine, drug, substance\n or thing whatever, or shall use or employ, or suggest,\n or advise the use or employment of any instrument or\n other means or force whatever, with intent thereby to\n cause or procure the miscarriage or abortion or prema-\n ture labor of any such woman, shall upon conviction\n thereof be punished by imprisonment in the state\n prison for a term not more than two years nor less than\n\n——————\n 97 1868 Fla. Laws, ch. 1637, pp. 64, 97 (emphasis added).\n"
[104] "96 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\n one year, or by fine not more than five thousand dollars\n nor less than five hundred dollars, or by such fine and\n imprisonment both, at the discretion of the court.”98\n30. Arkansas (1875):\n Sec. 1. “That it shall be unlawful for any one to ad-\n minister or prescribe any medicine or drugs to any\n woman with child, with intent to produce an abortion,\n or premature delivery of any foetus before the period of\n quickening, or to produce or attempt to produce such\n abortion by any other means; and any person offending\n against the provision of this section, shall be fined in\n any sum not exceeding one thousand ($1000) dollars,\n and imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one\n (1) nor more than five (5) years; provided, that this sec-\n tion shall not apply to any abortion produced by any\n regular practicing physician, for the purpose of saving\n the mother’s life.”99\n31. Georgia (1876):\n Sec. 2. “That every person who shall administer to\n any woman pregnant with a child, any medicine, drug,\n or substance whatever, or shall use or employ any in-\n strument or other means, with intent thereby to de-\n stroy such child, unless the same shall have been nec-\n essary to preserve the life of such mother, or shall have\n been advised by two physicians to be necessary for such\n purpose, shall, in case the death of such child or mother\n be thereby produced, be declared guilty of an assault\n with intent to murder.”\n Sec. 3. “That any person who shall wilfully adminis-\n ter to any pregnant woman any medicine, drug or sub-\n stance, or anything whatever, or shall employ any in-\n strument or means whatever, with intent thereby to\n——————\n 98 1873 Minn. Laws pp. 117–118 (emphasis added).\n 99 1875 Ark. Acts p. 5 (emphasis added and deleted).\n"
[105] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 97\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\n procure the miscarriage or abortion of any such\n woman, unless the same shall have been necessary to\n preserve the life of such woman, or shall have been ad-\n vised by two physicians to be necessary for that pur-\n pose, shall, upon conviction, be punished as prescribed\n in section 4310 of the Revised Code of Georgia.”100\n32. North Carolina (1881):\n Sec. 1. “That every person who shall wilfully admin-\n ister to any woman either pregnant or quick with child,\n or prescribe for any such woman, or advise or procure\n any such woman to take any medicine, drug or sub-\n stance whatever, or shall use or employ any instrument\n or other means with intent thereby to destroy said\n child, unless the same shall have been necessary to pre-\n serve the life of such mother, shall be guilty of a felony,\n and shall be imprisoned in the state penitentiary for\n not less than one year nor more than ten years, and be\n fined at the discretion of the court.”\n Sec. 2. “That every person who shall administer to\n any pregnant woman, or prescribe for any such woman,\n or advise and procure such woman to take any medi-\n cine, drug or any thing whatsoever, with intent thereby\n to procure the miscarriage of any such woman, or to\n injure or destroy such woman, or shall use any instru-\n ment or application for any of the above purposes, shall\n be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be\n imprisoned in the jail or state penitentiary for not less\n than one year or more than five years, and fined at the\n discretion of the court.”101\n33. Delaware (1883):\n Sec. 2. “Every person who, with the intent to procure\n\n\n——————\n 100 1876 Ga. Acts & Resolutions p. 113 (emphasis added).\n 101 1881 N. C. Sess. Laws pp. 584–585 (emphasis added).\n"
[106] "98 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\n the miscarriage of any pregnant woman or women sup-\n posed by such person to be pregnant, unless the same\n be necessary to preserve her life, shall administer to\n her, advise, or prescribe for her, or cause to be taken by\n her any poison, drug, medicine, or other noxious thing,\n or shall use any instrument or other means whatso-\n ever, or shall aid, assist, or counsel any person so in-\n tending to procure a miscarriage, whether said miscar-\n riage be accomplished or not, shall be guilty of a felony,\n and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less than\n one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dol-\n lars and be imprisoned for a term not exceeding five\n years nor less than one year.”102\n34. Tennessee (1883):\n Sec. 1. “That every person who shall administer to\n any woman pregnant with child, whether such child be\n quick or not, any medicine, drug or substance what-\n ever, or shall use or employ any instrument, or other\n means whatever with intent to destroy such child, and\n shall thereby destroy such child before its birth, unless\n the same shall have been done with a view to preserve\n the life of the mother, shall be punished by imprison-\n ment in the penitentiary not less than one nor more\n than five years.”\n Sec. 2. “Every person who shall administer any sub-\n stance with the intention to procure the miscarriage of\n a woman then being with child, or shall use or employ\n any instrument or other means with such intent, un-\n less the same shall have been done with a view to pre-\n serve the life of such mother, shall be punished by im-\n prisonment in the penitentiary not less than one nor\n more than three years.”103\n\n——————\n 102 1883 Del. Laws, ch. 226 (emphasis added).\n 103 1883 Tenn. Acts pp. 188–189 (emphasis added).\n"
[107] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 99\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\n35. South Carolina (1883):\n Sec. 1. “That any person who shall administer to any\n woman with child, or prescribe for any such woman, or\n suggest to or advise or procure her to take, any medi-\n cine, substance, drug or thing whatever, or who shall\n use or employ, or advise the use or employment of, any\n instrument or other means of force whatever, with in-\n tent thereby to cause or procure the miscarriage or\n abortion or premature labor of any such woman, unless\n the same shall have been necessary to preserve her life,\n or the life of such child, shall, in case the death of such\n child or of such woman results in whole or in part\n therefrom, be deemed guilty of a felony, and, upon con-\n viction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in\n the Penitentiary for a term not more than twenty years\n nor less than five years.”\n Sec. 2. “That any person who shall administer to any\n woman with child, or prescribe or procure or provide\n for any such woman, or advise or procure any such\n woman to take, any medicine, drug, substance or thing\n whatever, or shall use or employ or advise the use or\n employment of, any instrument or other means of force\n whatever, with intent thereby to cause or procure the\n miscarriage or abortion or premature labor of any such\n woman, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by\n imprisonment in the Penitentiary for a term not more\n than five years, or by fine not more than five thousand\n dollars, or by such fine and imprisonment both, at the\n discretion of the Court; but no conviction shall be had\n under the provisions of Section 1 or 2 of this Act upon\n the uncorroborated evidence of such woman.”104\n36. Kentucky (1910):\n Sec. 1. “It shall be unlawful for any person to pre-\n scribe or administer to any pregnant woman, or to any\n——————\n 104 1883 S. C. Acts pp. 547–548 (emphasis added).\n"
[108] "100 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n A to opinion of the Court\n\n woman whom he has reason to believe pregnant, at any\n time during the period of gestation, any drug, medicine\n or substance, whatsoever, with the intent thereby to\n procure the miscarriage of such woman, or with like in-\n tent, to use any instrument or means whatsoever, un-\n less such miscarriage is necessary to preserve her life;\n and any person so offending, shall be punished by a fine\n of not less than five hundred nor more than one thou-\n sand dollars, and imprisoned in the State prison for not\n less than one nor more than ten years.”\n Sec. 2. “If by reason of any of the acts described in\n Section 1 hereof, the miscarriage of such woman is pro-\n cured, and she does miscarry, causing the death of the\n unborn child, whether before or after quickening time,\n the person so offending shall be guilty of a felony, and\n confined in the penitentiary for not less than two, nor\n more than twenty-one years.”\n Sec. 3. “If, by reason of the commission of any of the\n acts described in Section 1 hereof, the woman to whom\n such drug or substance has been administered, or upon\n whom such instrument has been used, shall die, the\n person offending shall be punished as now prescribed\n by law, for the offense of murder or manslaughter, as\n the facts may justify.”\n Sec. 4. “The consent of the woman to the perfor-\n mance of the operation or administering of the medi-\n cines or substances, referred to, shall be no defense,\n and she shall be a competent witness in any prosecu-\n tion under this act, and for that purpose she shall not\n be considered an accomplice.”105\n37. Mississippi (1952):\n Sec. 1. “Whoever, by means of any instrument, med-\n icine, drug, or other means whatever shall willfully and\n——————\n 105 1910 Ky. Acts pp. 189–190 (emphasis added).\n"
[109] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 101\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n B to opinion of the Court\n\n knowingly cause any woman pregnant with child to\n abort or miscarry, or attempts to procure or produce an\n abortion or miscarriage, unless the same were done as\n necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life, shall\n be imprisoned in the state penitentiary no less than\n one (1) year, nor more than ten (10) years; or if the\n death of the mother results therefrom, the person pro-\n curing, causing, or attempting to procure or cause the\n abortion or miscarriage shall be guilty of murder.”\n Sec. 2. “No act prohibited in section 1 hereof shall be\n considered as necessary for the preservation of the\n mother’s life unless upon the prior advice, in writing,\n of two reputable licensed physicians.”\n Sec. 3. “The license of any physician or nurse shall\n be automatically revoked upon conviction under the\n provisions of this act.”106\n B\n This appendix contains statutes criminalizing abortion at\nall stages in each of the Territories that became States and\nin the District of Columbia. The statutes appear in chron-\nological order of enactment.\n1. Hawaii (1850):\n Sec. 1. “Whoever maliciously, without lawful justifi-\n cation, administers, or causes or procures to be admin-\n istered any poison or noxious thing to a woman then\n with child, in order to produce her mis-carriage, or ma-\n liciously uses any instrument or other means with like\n intent, shall, if such woman be then quick with child,\n be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars\n and imprisonment at hard labor not more than five\n years. And if she be then not quick with child, shall be\n punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars,\n——————\n 106 1952 Miss. Laws p. 289 (codified at Miss. Code Ann. §2223 (1956)\n\n(emphasis added)).\n"
[110] "102 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n B to opinion of the Court\n\n and imprisonment at hard labor not more than two\n years.”\n Sec. 2. “Where means of causing abortion are used\n for the purpose of saving the life of the woman, the sur-\n geon or other person using such means is lawfully jus-\n tified.”107\n2. Washington (1854):\n Sec. 37. “Every person who shall administer to any\n woman pregnant with a quick child, any medicine,\n drug, or substance whatever, or shall use or employ any\n instrument, or other means, with intent thereby to de-\n stroy such child, unless the same shall have been nec-\n essary to preserve the life of such mother, shall, in case\n the death of such child or of such mother be thereby\n produced, on conviction thereof, be imprisoned in the\n penitentiary not more than twenty years, nor less than\n one year.”\n Sec. 38. “Every person who shall administer to any\n pregnant woman, or to any woman who he supposes to\n be pregnant, any medicine, drug, or substance what-\n ever, or shall use or employ any instrument, or other\n means, thereby to procure the miscarriage of such\n woman, unless the same is necessary to preserve her\n life, shall on conviction thereof, be imprisoned in the\n penitentiary not more than five years, nor less than one\n year, or be imprisoned in the county jail not more than\n twelve months, nor less than one month, and be fined\n in any sum not exceeding one thousand dollars.”108\n3. Colorado (1861):\n——————\n 107 Haw. Penal Code, ch. 12, §§1–2 (1850) (emphasis added). Hawaii\n\nbecame a State in 1959. See Presidential Proclamation No. 3309, 73\nStat. c74–c75.\n 108 Terr. of Wash. Stat., ch. 2, §§37–38, p. 81 (1854) (emphasis added).\n\nWashington became a State in 1889. See Presidential Proclamation\nNo. 8, 26 Stat. 1552–1553.\n"
[111] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 103\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n B to opinion of the Court\n\n Sec. 42. “[E]very person who shall administer sub-\n stance or liquid, or who shall use or cause to be used\n any instrument, of whatsoever kind, with the intention\n to procure the miscarriage of any woman then being\n with child, and shall thereof be duly convicted, shall be\n imprisoned for a term not exceeding three years, and\n fined in a sum not exceeding one thousand dollars; and\n if any woman, by reason of such treatment, shall die,\n the person or persons administering, or causing to be\n administered, such poison, substance or liquid, or us-\n ing or causing to be used, any instrument, as aforesaid,\n shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter, and if con-\n victed, be punished accordingly.”109\n4. Idaho (1864):\n Sec. 42. “[E]very person who shall administer or\n cause to be administered, or taken, any medicinal sub-\n stance, or shall use or cause to be used, any instru-\n ments whatever, with the intention to procure the mis-\n carriage of any woman then being with child, and shall\n be thereof duly convicted, shall be punished by impris-\n onment in the territorial prison for a term not less than\n two years, nor more than five years: Provided, That no\n physician shall be effected by the last clause of this sec-\n tion, who in the discharge of his professional duties,\n deems it necessary to produce the miscarriage of any\n woman in order to save her life.”110\n5. Montana (1864):\n Sec. 41. “[E]very person who shall administer, or\n cause to be administered, or taken, any medicinal sub-\n stance, or shall use, or cause to be used, any instru-\n\n——————\n 109 1861 Terr. of Colo. Gen. Laws pp. 296–297. Colorado became a\n\nState in 1876. See Presidential Proclamation No. 7, 19 Stat. 665–666.\n 110 1863–1864 Terr. of Idaho Laws p. 443. Idaho became a State in\n\n1890. See 26 Stat. 215–219.\n"
[112] "104 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n B to opinion of the Court\n\n ments whatever, with the intention to produce the mis-\n carriage of any woman then being with child, and shall\n be thereof duly convicted, shall be punished by impris-\n onment in the Territorial prison for a term not less\n than two years nor more than five years. Provided,\n That no physician shall be affected by the last clause of\n this section, who in the discharge of his professional\n duties deems it necessary to produce the miscarriage of\n any woman in order to save her life.”111\n6. Arizona (1865):\n Sec. 45. “[E]very person who shall administer or\n cause to be administered or taken, any medicinal sub-\n stances, or shall use or cause to be used any instru-\n ments whatever, with the intention to procure the mis-\n carriage of any woman then being with child, and shall\n be thereof duly convicted, shall be punished by impris-\n onment in the Territorial prison for a term not less\n than two years nor more than five years: Provided, that\n no physician shall be affected by the last clause of this\n section, who in the discharge of his professional duties,\n deems it necessary to produce the miscarriage of any\n woman in order to save her life.”112\n7. Wyoming (1869):\n Sec. 25. “[A]ny person who shall administer, or\n cause to be administered, or taken, any such poison,\n substance or liquid, or who shall use, or cause to be\n used, any instrument of whatsoever kind, with the in-\n tention to procure the miscarriage of any woman then\n being with child, and shall thereof be duly convicted,\n shall be imprisoned for a term not exceeding three\n\n——————\n 111 1864 Terr. of Mont. Laws p. 184. Montana became a State in 1889.\n\nSee Presidential Proclamation No. 7, 26 Stat. 1551–1552.\n 112 Howell Code, ch. 10, §45 (1865). Arizona became a State in 1912.\n\nSee Presidential Proclamation of Feb. 14, 1912, 37 Stat. 1728–1729.\n"
[113] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 105\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n B to opinion of the Court\n\n years, in the penitentiary, and fined in a sum not ex-\n ceeding one thousand dollars; and if any woman by rea-\n son of such treatment shall die, the person, or persons,\n administering, or causing to be administered such poi-\n son, substance, or liquid, or using or causing to be used,\n any instrument, as aforesaid, shall be deemed guilty of\n manslaughter, and if convicted, be punished by impris-\n onment for a term not less than three years in the pen-\n itentiary, and fined in a sum not exceeding one thou-\n sand dollars, unless it appear that such miscarriage\n was procured or attempted by, or under advice of a phy-\n sician or surgeon, with intent to save the life of such\n woman, or to prevent serious and permanent bodily in-\n jury to her.”113\n8. Utah (1876):\n Sec. 142. “Every person who provides, supplies, or\n administers to any pregnant woman, or procures any\n such woman to take any medicine, drug, or substance,\n or uses or employs any instrument or other means\n whatever, with intent thereby to procure the miscar-\n riage of such woman, unless the same is necessary to\n preserve her life, is punishable by imprisonment in the\n penitentiary not less than two nor more than ten\n years.”114\n9. North Dakota (1877):\n Sec. 337. “Every person who administers to any\n pregnant woman, or who prescribes for any such\n woman, or advises or procures any such woman to take\n any medicine, drug or substance, or uses or employs\n\n——————\n 113 1869 Terr. of Wyo. Gen. Laws p. 104 (emphasis added). Wyoming\n\nbecame a State in 1889. See 26 Stat. 222–226.\n 114 Terr. of Utah Comp. Laws §1972 (1876) (emphasis added). Utah\n\nbecame a State in 1896. See Presidential Proclamation No. 9, 29 Stat.\n876–877.\n"
[114] "106 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n B to opinion of the Court\n\n any instrument, or other means whatever with intent\n thereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman, un-\n less the same is necessary to preserve her life, is pun-\n ishable by imprisonment in the territorial prison not\n exceeding three years, or in a county jail not exceeding\n one year.”115\n10. South Dakota (1877): Same as North Dakota.\n11. Oklahoma (1890):\n Sec. 2187. “Every person who administers to any\n pregnant woman, or who prescribes for any such\n woman, or advises or procures any such woman to take\n any medicine, drug or substance, or uses or employs\n any instrument, or other means whatever, with intent\n thereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman, un-\n less the same is necessary to preserve her life, is pun-\n ishable by imprisonment in the Territorial prison not\n exceeding three years, or in a county jail not exceeding\n one year.”116\n12. Alaska (1899):\n Sec. 8. “That if any person shall administer to any\n woman pregnant with a child any medicine, drug, or\n substance whatever, or shall use any instrument or\n other means, with intent thereby to destroy such child,\n unless the same shall be necessary to preserve the life\n of such mother, such person shall, in case the death of\n such child or mother be thereby produced, be deemed\n\n\n——————\n 115 Dakota Penal Code §337 (1877) (codified at N. D. Rev. Code §7177\n\n(1895)), and S. D. Rev. Penal Code Ann. §337 (1883). North and South\nDakota became States in 1889. See Presidential Proclamation No. 5, 26\nStat. 1548–1551.\n 116 Okla. Stat. §2187 (1890) (emphasis added). Oklahoma became a\n\nState in 1907. See Presidential Proclamation of Nov. 16, 1907, 35 Stat.\n2160–2161.\n"
[115] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 107\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n B to opinion of the Court\n\n guilty of manslaughter, and shall be punished accord-\n ingly.”117\n13. New Mexico (1919):\n Sec. 1. “Any person who shall administer to any\n pregnant woman any medicine, drug or substance\n whatever, or attempt by operation or any other method\n or means to produce an abortion or miscarriage upon\n such woman, shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon con-\n viction thereof, shall be fined not more than two thou-\n sand ($2,000.00) Dollars, nor less than five hundred\n ($500.00) Dollars, or imprisoned in the penitentiary for\n a period of not less than one nor more than five years,\n or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion\n of the court trying the case.”\n Sec. 2. “Any person committing such act or acts men-\n tioned in section one hereof which shall culminate in\n the death of the woman shall be deemed guilty of mur-\n der in the second degree; Provided, however, an abor-\n tion may be produced when two physicians licensed to\n practice in the State of New Mexico, in consultation,\n deem it necessary to preserve the life of the woman, or\n to prevent serious and permanent bodily injury.”\n Sec. 3. “For the purpose of the act, the term “preg-\n nancy” is defined as that condition of a woman from the\n date of conception to the birth of her child.”118\n * * *\nDistrict of Columbia (1901):\n Sec. 809. “Whoever, with intent to procure the mis-\n carriage of any woman, prescribes or administers to her\n——————\n 117 1899 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 2, p. 3 (emphasis added). Alaska be-\n\ncame a State in 1959. See Presidential Proclamation No. 3269, 73 Stat.\nc16.\n 118 N. M. Laws p. 6 (emphasis added). New Mexico became a State in\n\n1912. See Presidential Proclamation of Jan. 6, 1912, 37 Stat. 1723–1724.\n"
[116] "108 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n Opinion\n Appendix of the Court\n B to opinion of the Court\n\n any medicine, drug, or substance whatever, or with like\n intent uses any instrument or means, unless when nec-\n essary to preserve her life or health and under the di-\n rection of a competent licensed practitioner of medi-\n cine, shall be imprisoned for not more than five years;\n or if the woman or her child dies in consequence of such\n act, by imprisonment for not less than three nor more\n than twenty years.”119\n\n\n\n\n——————\n 119 §809, 31 Stat. 1322 (1901) (emphasis added).\n"
[117] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 1\n\n THOMAS, J., concurring\n\nSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES\n _________________\n\n No. 19–1392\n _________________\n\n\n THOMAS E. DOBBS, STATE HEALTH OFFICER OF\n THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,\n ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S\n HEALTH ORGANIZATION, ET AL.\n ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF\n APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n [June 24, 2022]\n\n JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.\n I join the opinion of the Court because it correctly holds\nthat there is no constitutional right to abortion. Respond-\nents invoke one source for that right: the Fourteenth\nAmendment’s guarantee that no State shall “deprive any\nperson of life, liberty, or property without due process of\nlaw.” The Court well explains why, under our substantive\ndue process precedents, the purported right to abortion is\nnot a form of “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause.\nSuch a right is neither “deeply rooted in this Nation’s his-\ntory and tradition” nor “implicit in the concept of ordered\nliberty.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721\n(1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he idea that\nthe Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood the\nDue Process Clause to protect a right to abortion is farcical.”\nJune Medical Services L. L. C. v. Russo, 591 U. S. ___, ___\n(2020) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 17).\n I write separately to emphasize a second, more funda-\nmental reason why there is no abortion guarantee lurking\nin the Due Process Clause. Considerable historical evi-\ndence indicates that “due process of law” merely required\nexecutive and judicial actors to comply with legislative en-\nactments and the common law when depriving a person of\n"
[118] "2 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n THOMAS, J., concurring\n\nlife, liberty, or property. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States,\n576 U. S. 591, 623 (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judg-\nment). Other sources, by contrast, suggest that “due pro-\ncess of law” prohibited legislatures “from authorizing the\ndeprivation of a person’s life, liberty, or property without\nproviding him the customary procedures to which freemen\nwere entitled by the old law of England.” United States v.\nVaello Madero, 596 U. S. ___, ____ (2022) (THOMAS, J., con-\ncurring) (slip op., at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted).\nEither way, the Due Process Clause at most guarantees\nprocess. It does not, as the Court’s substantive due process\ncases suppose, “forbi[d] the government to infringe certain\n‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what pro-\ncess is provided.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 302 (1993);\nsee also, e.g., Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125\n(1992).\n As I have previously explained, “substantive due process”\nis an oxymoron that “lack[s] any basis in the Constitution.”\nJohnson, 576 U. S., at 607–608 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); see\nalso, e.g., Vaello Madero, 596 U. S., at ___ (THOMAS, J., con-\ncurring) (slip op., at 3) (“[T]ext and history provide little\nsupport for modern substantive due process doctrine”).\n“The notion that a constitutional provision that guarantees\nonly ‘process’ before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or\nproperty could define the substance of those rights strains\ncredulity for even the most casual user of words.” McDon-\nald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 811 (2010) (THOMAS, J., con-\ncurring in part and concurring in judgment); see also\nUnited States v. Carlton, 512 U. S. 26, 40 (1994) (Scalia, J.,\nconcurring in judgment). The resolution of this case is thus\nstraightforward. Because the Due Process Clause does not\nsecure any substantive rights, it does not secure a right to\nabortion.\n The Court today declines to disturb substantive due pro-\ncess jurisprudence generally or the doctrine’s application in\nother, specific contexts. Cases like Griswold v. Connecticut,\n"
[119] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 3\n\n THOMAS, J., concurring\n\n381 U. S. 479 (1965) (right of married persons to obtain con-\ntraceptives)*; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003) (right\nto engage in private, consensual sexual acts); and Oberge-\nfell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015) (right to same-sex mar-\nriage), are not at issue. The Court’s abortion cases are\nunique, see ante, at 31–32, 66, 71–72, and no party has\nasked us to decide “whether our entire Fourteenth Amend-\nment jurisprudence must be preserved or revised,” McDon-\nald, 561 U. S., at 813 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Thus, I agree\nthat “[n]othing in [the Court’s] opinion should be under-\nstood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abor-\ntion.” Ante, at 66.\n For that reason, in future cases, we should reconsider all\nof this Court’s substantive due process precedents, includ-\ning Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell. Because any sub-\nstantive due process decision is “demonstrably erroneous,”\nRamos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (THOMAS, J.,\nconcurring in judgment) (slip op., at 7), we have a duty to\n“correct the error” established in those precedents, Gamble\nv. United States, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (THOMAS, J., con-\ncurring) (slip op., at 9). After overruling these demonstra-\nbly erroneous decisions, the question would remain\nwhether other constitutional provisions guarantee the myr-\niad rights that our substantive due process cases have gen-\nerated. For example, we could consider whether any of the\nrights announced in this Court’s substantive due process\ncases are “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United\nStates” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Amdt.\n——————\n *Griswold v. Connecticut purported not to rely on the Due Process\nClause, but rather reasoned “that specific guarantees in the Bill of\nRights”—including rights enumerated in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,\nand Ninth Amendments—“have penumbras, formed by emanations,”\nthat create “zones of privacy.” 381 U. S., at 484. Since Griswold, the\nCourt, perhaps recognizing the facial absurdity of Griswold’s penumbral\nargument, has characterized the decision as one rooted in substantive\ndue process. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644, 663 (2015);\nWashington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720 (1997).\n"
[120] "4 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n THOMAS, J., concurring\n\n14, §1; see McDonald, 561 U. S., at 806 (opinion of THOMAS,\nJ.). To answer that question, we would need to decide im-\nportant antecedent questions, including whether the Privi-\nleges or Immunities Clause protects any rights that are not\nenumerated in the Constitution and, if so, how to identify\nthose rights. See id., at 854. That said, even if the Clause\ndoes protect unenumerated rights, the Court conclusively\ndemonstrates that abortion is not one of them under any\nplausible interpretive approach. See ante, at 15, n. 22.\n Moreover, apart from being a demonstrably incorrect\nreading of the Due Process Clause, the “legal fiction” of sub-\nstantive due process is “particularly dangerous.” McDon-\nald, 561 U. S., at 811 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); accord, Ober-\ngefell, 576 U. S., at 722 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). At least\nthree dangers favor jettisoning the doctrine entirely.\n First, “substantive due process exalts judges at the ex-\npense of the People from whom they derive their authority.”\nIbid. Because the Due Process Clause “speaks only to ‘pro-\ncess,’ the Court has long struggled to define what substan-\ntive rights it protects.” Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U. S. ___, ___\n(2019) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 2)\n(internal quotation marks omitted). In practice, the Court’s\napproach for identifying those “fundamental” rights “un-\nquestionably involves policymaking rather than neutral le-\ngal analysis.” Carlton, 512 U. S., at 41–42 (opinion of\nScalia, J.); see also McDonald, 561 U. S., at 812 (opinion of\nTHOMAS, J.) (substantive due process is “a jurisprudence\ndevoid of a guiding principle”). The Court divines new\nrights in line with “its own, extraconstitutional value pref-\nerences” and nullifies state laws that do not align with the\njudicially created guarantees. Thornburgh v. American\nCollege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747,\n794 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).\n Nowhere is this exaltation of judicial policymaking\nclearer than this Court’s abortion jurisprudence. In Roe v.\nWade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court divined a right to\n"
[121] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 5\n\n THOMAS, J., concurring\n\nabortion because it “fe[lt]” that “the Fourteenth Amend-\nment’s concept of personal liberty” included a “right of pri-\nvacy” that “is broad enough to encompass a woman’s deci-\nsion whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” Id., at\n153. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,\n505 U. S. 833 (1992), the Court likewise identified an abor-\ntion guarantee in “the liberty protected by the Fourteenth\nAmendment,” but, rather than a “right of privacy,” it in-\nvoked an ethereal “right to define one’s own concept of ex-\nistence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of\nhuman life.” Id., at 851. As the Court’s preferred manifes-\ntation of “liberty” changed, so, too, did the test used to pro-\ntect it, as Roe’s author lamented. See Casey, 505 U. S., at\n930 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in\npart) (“[T]he Roe framework is far more administrable, and\nfar less manipulable, than the ‘undue burden’ standard”).\n Now, in this case, the nature of the purported “liberty”\nsupporting the abortion right has shifted yet again. Re-\nspondents and the United States propose no fewer than\nthree different interests that supposedly spring from the\nDue Process Clause. They include “bodily integrity,” “per-\nsonal autonomy in matters of family, medical care, and\nfaith,” Brief for Respondents 21, and “women’s equal citi-\nzenship,” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24. That\n50 years have passed since Roe and abortion advocates still\ncannot coherently articulate the right (or rights) at stake\nproves the obvious: The right to abortion is ultimately a pol-\nicy goal in desperate search of a constitutional justification.\n Second, substantive due process distorts other areas of\nconstitutional law. For example, once this Court identifies\na “fundamental” right for one class of individuals, it invokes\nthe Equal Protection Clause to demand exacting scrutiny of\nstatutes that deny the right to others. See, e.g., Eisenstadt\nv. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453–454 (1972) (relying on Gris-\nwold to invalidate a state statute prohibiting distribution\n"
[122] "6 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n THOMAS, J., concurring\n\nof contraceptives to unmarried persons). Statutory classifi-\ncations implicating certain “nonfundamental” rights, mean-\nwhile, receive only cursory review. See, e.g., Armour v. In-\ndianapolis, 566 U. S. 673, 680 (2012). Similarly, this Court\ndeems unconstitutionally “vague” or “overbroad” those laws\nthat impinge on its preferred rights, while letting slide\nthose laws that implicate supposedly lesser values. See,\ne.g., Johnson, 576 U. S., at 618–621 (opinion of THOMAS, J.);\nUnited States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U. S. ___, ___–___\n(2020) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at 3–5). “In fact,\nour vagueness doctrine served as the basis for the first draft\nof the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade,” and it since has\nbeen “deployed . . . to nullify even mild regulations of the\nabortion industry.” Johnson, 576 U. S., at 620–621 (opinion\nof THOMAS, J.). Therefore, regardless of the doctrinal con-\ntext, the Court often “demand[s] extra justifications for en-\ncroachments” on “preferred rights” while “relax[ing] pur-\nportedly higher standards of review for less-\npreferred rights.” Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,\n579 U. S. 582, 640–642 (2016) (THOMAS, J., dissenting).\nSubstantive due process is the core inspiration for many of\nthe Court’s constitutionally unmoored policy judgments.\n Third, substantive due process is often wielded to “disas-\ntrous ends.” Gamble, 587 U. S., at ___ (THOMAS, J., concur-\nring) (slip op., at 16). For instance, in Dred Scott v. Sand-\nford, 19 How. 393 (1857), the Court invoked a species of\nsubstantive due process to announce that Congress was\npowerless to emancipate slaves brought into the federal ter-\nritories. See id., at 452. While Dred Scott “was overruled\non the battlefields of the Civil War and by constitutional\namendment after Appomattox,” Obergefell, 576 U. S., at\n696 (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting), that overruling was\n“[p]urchased at the price of immeasurable human suffer-\ning,” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 240\n(1995) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in\njudgment). Now today, the Court rightly overrules Roe and\n"
[123] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 7\n\n THOMAS, J., concurring\n\nCasey—two of this Court’s “most notoriously incorrect” sub-\nstantive due process decisions, Timbs, 586 U. S., at ___\n(opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 2)—after more than 63\nmillion abortions have been performed, see National Right\nto Life Committee, Abortion Statistics (Jan. 2022), https://\nwww.nrlc.org/uploads/factsheets/FS01AbortionintheUS.pdf.\nThe harm caused by this Court’s forays into substantive\ndue process remains immeasurable.\n * * *\n Because the Court properly applies our substantive due\nprocess precedents to reject the fabrication of a constitu-\ntional right to abortion, and because this case does not pre-\nsent the opportunity to reject substantive due process en-\ntirely, I join the Court’s opinion. But, in future cases, we\nshould “follow the text of the Constitution, which sets forth\ncertain substantive rights that cannot be taken away, and\nadds, beyond that, a right to due process when life, liberty,\nor property is to be taken away.” Carlton, 512 U. S., at 42\n(opinion of Scalia, J.). Substantive due process conflicts\nwith that textual command and has harmed our country in\nmany ways. Accordingly, we should eliminate it from our\njurisprudence at the earliest opportunity.\n"
[124] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 1\n\n KAVANAUGH, J., concurring\n\nSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES\n _________________\n\n No. 19–1392\n _________________\n\n\n THOMAS E. DOBBS, STATE HEALTH OFFICER OF\n THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,\n ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S\n HEALTH ORGANIZATION, ET AL.\n ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF\n APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n [June 24, 2022]\n\n JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring.\n I write separately to explain my additional views about\nwhy Roe was wrongly decided, why Roe should be overruled\nat this time, and the future implications of today’s decision.\n I\n Abortion is a profoundly difficult and contentious issue\nbecause it presents an irreconcilable conflict between the\ninterests of a pregnant woman who seeks an abortion and\nthe interests in protecting fetal life. The interests on both\nsides of the abortion issue are extraordinarily weighty.\n On the one side, many pro-choice advocates forcefully ar-\ngue that the ability to obtain an abortion is critically im-\nportant for women’s personal and professional lives, and for\nwomen’s health. They contend that the widespread availa-\nbility of abortion has been essential for women to advance\nin society and to achieve greater equality over the last 50\nyears. And they maintain that women must have the free-\ndom to choose for themselves whether to have an abortion.\n On the other side, many pro-life advocates forcefully ar-\ngue that a fetus is a human life. They contend that all hu-\nman life should be protected as a matter of human dignity\n"
[125] "2 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n KAVANAUGH, J., concurring\n\nand fundamental morality. And they stress that a signifi-\ncant percentage of Americans with pro-life views are\nwomen.\n When it comes to abortion, one interest must prevail over\nthe other at any given point in a pregnancy. Many Ameri-\ncans of good faith would prioritize the interests of the preg-\nnant woman. Many other Americans of good faith instead\nwould prioritize the interests in protecting fetal life—at\nleast unless, for example, an abortion is necessary to save\nthe life of the mother. Of course, many Americans are con-\nflicted or have nuanced views that may vary depending on\nthe particular time in pregnancy, or the particular circum-\nstances of a pregnancy.\n The issue before this Court, however, is not the policy or\nmorality of abortion. The issue before this Court is what\nthe Constitution says about abortion. The Constitution\ndoes not take sides on the issue of abortion. The text of the\nConstitution does not refer to or encompass abortion. To be\nsure, this Court has held that the Constitution protects un-\nenumerated rights that are deeply rooted in this Nation’s\nhistory and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered\nliberty. But a right to abortion is not deeply rooted in Amer-\nican history and tradition, as the Court today thoroughly\nexplains.1\n On the question of abortion, the Constitution is therefore\nneither pro-life nor pro-choice. The Constitution is neutral\nand leaves the issue for the people and their elected repre-\nsentatives to resolve through the democratic process in the\n\n——————\n 1 The Court’s opinion today also recounts the pre-constitutional\n\ncommon-law history in England. That English history supplies back-\nground information on the issue of abortion. As I see it, the dispositive\npoint in analyzing American history and tradition for purposes of the\nFourteenth Amendment inquiry is that abortion was largely prohibited\nin most American States as of 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment\nwas ratified, and that abortion remained largely prohibited in most\nAmerican States until Roe was decided in 1973.\n"
[126] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 3\n\n KAVANAUGH, J., concurring\n\nStates or Congress—like the numerous other difficult ques-\ntions of American social and economic policy that the Con-\nstitution does not address.\n Because the Constitution is neutral on the issue of abor-\ntion, this Court also must be scrupulously neutral. The\nnine unelected Members of this Court do not possess the\nconstitutional authority to override the democratic process\nand to decree either a pro-life or a pro-choice abortion policy\nfor all 330 million people in the United States.\n Instead of adhering to the Constitution’s neutrality, the\nCourt in Roe took sides on the issue and unilaterally de-\ncreed that abortion was legal throughout the United States\nup to the point of viability (about 24 weeks of pregnancy).\nThe Court’s decision today properly returns the Court to a\nposition of neutrality and restores the people’s authority to\naddress the issue of abortion through the processes of dem-\nocratic self-government established by the Constitution.\n Some amicus briefs argue that the Court today should not\nonly overrule Roe and return to a position of judicial neu-\ntrality on abortion, but should go further and hold that the\nConstitution outlaws abortion throughout the United\nStates. No Justice of this Court has ever advanced that po-\nsition. I respect those who advocate for that position, just\nas I respect those who argue that this Court should hold\nthat the Constitution legalizes pre-viability abortion\nthroughout the United States. But both positions are\nwrong as a constitutional matter, in my view. The Consti-\ntution neither outlaws abortion nor legalizes abortion.\n To be clear, then, the Court’s decision today does not out-\nlaw abortion throughout the United States. On the con-\ntrary, the Court’s decision properly leaves the question of\nabortion for the people and their elected representatives in\nthe democratic process. Through that democratic process,\nthe people and their representatives may decide to allow or\nlimit abortion. As Justice Scalia stated, the “States may, if\nthey wish, permit abortion on demand, but the Constitution\n"
[127] "4 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n KAVANAUGH, J., concurring\n\ndoes not require them to do so.” Planned Parenthood of\nSoutheastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 979 (1992) (opin-\nion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).\n Today’s decision therefore does not prevent the numerous\nStates that readily allow abortion from continuing to read-\nily allow abortion. That includes, if they choose, the amici\nStates supporting the plaintiff in this Court: New York,\nCalifornia, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,\nVermont, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela-\nware, Maryland, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, New\nMexico, Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Ha-\nwaii. By contrast, other States may maintain laws that\nmore strictly limit abortion. After today’s decision, all of\nthe States may evaluate the competing interests and decide\nhow to address this consequential issue.2\n In arguing for a constitutional right to abortion that\nwould override the people’s choices in the democratic pro-\ncess, the plaintiff Jackson Women’s Health Organization\nand its amici emphasize that the Constitution does not\nfreeze the American people’s rights as of 1791 or 1868. I\nfully agree. To begin, I agree that constitutional rights ap-\nply to situations that were unforeseen in 1791 or 1868—\nsuch as applying the First Amendment to the Internet or\nthe Fourth Amendment to cars. Moreover, the Constitution\nauthorizes the creation of new rights—state and federal,\nstatutory and constitutional. But when it comes to creating\nnew rights, the Constitution directs the people to the vari-\nous processes of democratic self-government contemplated\nby the Constitution—state legislation, state constitutional\namendments, federal legislation, and federal constitutional\n——————\n 2 In his dissent in Roe, Justice Rehnquist indicated that an exception\n\nto a State’s restriction on abortion would be constitutionally required\nwhen an abortion is necessary to save the life of the mother. See Roe v.\nWade, 410 U. S. 113, 173 (1973). Abortion statutes traditionally and cur-\nrently provide for an exception when an abortion is necessary to protect\nthe life of the mother. Some statutes also provide other exceptions.\n"
[128] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 5\n\n KAVANAUGH, J., concurring\n\namendments. See generally Amdt. 9; Amdt. 10; Art. I, §8;\nArt. V; J. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the\nMaking of American Constitutional Law 7−21, 203−216\n(2018); A. Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography\n285−291, 315−347 (2005).\n The Constitution does not grant the nine unelected Mem-\nbers of this Court the unilateral authority to rewrite the\nConstitution to create new rights and liberties based on our\nown moral or policy views. As Justice Rehnquist stated,\nthis Court has not “been granted a roving commission, ei-\nther by the Founding Fathers or by the framers of the Four-\nteenth Amendment, to strike down laws that are based\nupon notions of policy or morality suddenly found unac-\nceptable by a majority of this Court.” Furman v. Georgia,\n408 U. S. 238, 467 (1972) (dissenting opinion); see Washing-\nton v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720–721 (1997); Cruzan v.\nDirector, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U. S. 261, 292–293 (1990)\n(Scalia, J., concurring).\n This Court therefore does not possess the authority either\nto declare a constitutional right to abortion or to declare a\nconstitutional prohibition of abortion. See Casey, 505 U. S.,\nat 953 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment in part and\ndissenting in part); id., at 980 (opinion of Scalia, J.); Roe v.\nWade, 410 U. S. 113, 177 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);\nDoe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissent-\ning).\n In sum, the Constitution is neutral on the issue of abor-\ntion and allows the people and their elected representatives\nto address the issue through the democratic process. In my\nrespectful view, the Court in Roe therefore erred by taking\nsides on the issue of abortion.\n II\n The more difficult question in this case is stare decisis—\nthat is, whether to overrule the Roe decision.\n The principle of stare decisis requires respect for the\n"
[129] "6 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n KAVANAUGH, J., concurring\n\nCourt’s precedents and for the accumulated wisdom of the\njudges who have previously addressed the same issue.\nStare decisis is rooted in Article III of the Constitution and\nis fundamental to the American judicial system and to the\nstability of American law.\n Adherence to precedent is the norm, and stare decisis im-\nposes a high bar before this Court may overrule a prece-\ndent. This Court’s history shows, however, that stare deci-\nsis is not absolute, and indeed cannot be absolute.\nOtherwise, as the Court today explains, many long-since-\noverruled cases such as Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537\n(1896); Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905); Miners-\nville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940); and Bow-\ners v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986), would never have\nbeen overruled and would still be the law.\n In his canonical Burnet opinion in 1932, Justice Brandeis\nstated that in “cases involving the Federal Constitution,\nwhere correction through legislative action is practically\nimpossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier deci-\nsions.” Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393,\n406−407 (1932) (dissenting opinion). That description of\nthe Court’s practice remains accurate today. Every current\nMember of this Court has voted to overrule precedent. And\nover the last 100 years beginning with Chief Justice Taft’s\nappointment in 1921, every one of the 48 Justices appointed\nto this Court has voted to overrule precedent. Many of\nthose Justices have voted to overrule a substantial number\nof very significant and longstanding precedents. See, e.g.,\nObergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015) (overruling Baker\nv. Nelson); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483\n(1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson); West Coast Hotel Co.\nv. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Chil-\ndren’s Hospital of D. C. and in effect Lochner v. New York).\n But that history alone does not answer the critical ques-\ntion: When precisely should the Court overrule an errone-\nous constitutional precedent? The history of stare decisis in\n"
[130] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 7\n\n KAVANAUGH, J., concurring\n\nthis Court establishes that a constitutional precedent may\nbe overruled only when (i) the prior decision is not just\nwrong, but is egregiously wrong, (ii) the prior decision has\ncaused significant negative jurisprudential or real-world\nconsequences, and (iii) overruling the prior decision would\nnot unduly upset legitimate reliance interests. See Ramos\nv. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___, ___−___ (2020) (KAVANAUGH, J.,\nconcurring in part) (slip op., at 7−8).\n Applying those factors, I agree with the Court today that\nRoe should be overruled. The Court in Roe erroneously as-\nsigned itself the authority to decide a critically important\nmoral and policy issue that the Constitution does not grant\nthis Court the authority to decide. As Justice Byron White\nsuccinctly explained, Roe was “an improvident and extrav-\nagant exercise of the power of judicial review” because\n“nothing in the language or history of the Constitution” sup-\nports a constitutional right to abortion. Bolton, 410 U. S.,\nat 221−222 (dissenting opinion).\n Of course, the fact that a precedent is wrong, even egre-\ngiously wrong, does not alone mean that the precedent\nshould be overruled. But as the Court today explains, Roe\nhas caused significant negative jurisprudential and real-\nworld consequences. By taking sides on a difficult and con-\ntentious issue on which the Constitution is neutral, Roe\noverreached and exceeded this Court’s constitutional au-\nthority; gravely distorted the Nation’s understanding of\nthis Court’s proper constitutional role; and caused signifi-\ncant harm to what Roe itself recognized as the State’s “im-\nportant and legitimate interest” in protecting fetal life. 410\nU. S., at 162. All of that explains why tens of millions of\nAmericans—and the 26 States that explicitly ask the Court\nto overrule Roe—do not accept Roe even 49 years later.\nUnder the Court’s longstanding stare decisis principles, Roe\n"
[131] "8 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n KAVANAUGH, J., concurring\n\nshould be overruled.3\n But the stare decisis analysis here is somewhat more\ncomplicated because of Casey. In 1992, 19 years after Roe,\nCasey acknowledged the continuing dispute over Roe. The\nCourt sought to find common ground that would resolve the\nabortion debate and end the national controversy. After\ncareful and thoughtful consideration, the Casey plurality\nreaffirmed a right to abortion through viability (about 24\nweeks), while also allowing somewhat more regulation of\nabortion than Roe had allowed.4\n I have deep and unyielding respect for the Justices who\nwrote the Casey plurality opinion. And I respect the Casey\nplurality’s good-faith effort to locate some middle ground or\ncompromise that could resolve this controversy for America.\n But as has become increasingly evident over time, Casey’s\n——————\n 3 I also agree with the Court’s conclusion today with respect to reliance.\n\nBroad notions of societal reliance have been invoked in support of Roe,\nbut the Court has not analyzed reliance in that way in the past. For\nexample, American businesses and workers relied on Lochner v. New\nYork, 198 U. S. 45 (1905), and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D. C., 261\nU. S. 525 (1923), to construct a laissez-faire economy that was free of\nsubstantial regulation. In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379\n(1937), the Court nonetheless overruled Adkins and in effect Lochner.\nAn entire region of the country relied on Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S.\n537 (1896), to enforce a system of racial segregation. In Brown v. Board\nof Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), the Court overruled Plessy. Much of\nAmerican society was built around the traditional view of marriage that\nwas upheld in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810 (1972), and that was re-\nflected in laws ranging from tax laws to estate laws to family laws. In\nObergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015), the Court nonetheless over-\nruled Baker.\n 4 As the Court today notes, Casey’s approach to stare decisis pointed in\n\ntwo directions. Casey reaffirmed Roe’s viability line, but it expressly\noverruled the Roe trimester framework and also expressly overruled two\nlandmark post-Roe abortion cases—Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-\ntive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. American Col-\nlege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747 (1986). See Casey,\n505 U. S., at 870, 872−873, 878−879, 882. Casey itself thus directly con-\ntradicts any notion of absolute stare decisis in abortion cases.\n"
[132] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 9\n\n KAVANAUGH, J., concurring\n\nwell-intentioned effort did not resolve the abortion debate.\nThe national division has not ended. In recent years, a sig-\nnificant number of States have enacted abortion re-\nstrictions that directly conflict with Roe. Those laws cannot\nbe dismissed as political stunts or as outlier laws. Those\nnumerous state laws collectively represent the sincere and\ndeeply held views of tens of millions of Americans who con-\ntinue to fervently believe that allowing abortions up to 24\nweeks is far too radical and far too extreme, and does not\nsufficiently account for what Roe itself recognized as the\nState’s “important and legitimate interest” in protecting fe-\ntal life. 410 U. S., at 162. In this case, moreover, a majority\nof the States—26 in all—ask the Court to overrule Roe and\nreturn the abortion issue to the States.\n In short, Casey’s stare decisis analysis rested in part on a\npredictive judgment about the future development of state\nlaws and of the people’s views on the abortion issue. But\nthat predictive judgment has not borne out. As the Court\ntoday explains, the experience over the last 30 years con-\nflicts with Casey’s predictive judgment and therefore under-\nmines Casey’s precedential force.5\n In any event, although Casey is relevant to the stare de-\ncisis analysis, the question of whether to overrule Roe can-\nnot be dictated by Casey alone. To illustrate that stare de-\ncisis point, consider an example. Suppose that in 1924 this\nCourt had expressly reaffirmed Plessy v. Ferguson and up-\nheld the States’ authority to segregate people on the basis\nof race. Would the Court in Brown some 30 years later in\n——————\n 5 To be clear, public opposition to a prior decision is not a basis for over-\n\nruling (or reaffirming) that decision. Rather, the question of whether to\noverrule a precedent must be analyzed under this Court’s traditional\nstare decisis factors. The only point here is that Casey adopted a special\nstare decisis principle with respect to Roe based on the idea of resolving\nthe national controversy and ending the national division over abortion.\nThe continued and significant opposition to Roe, as reflected in the laws\nand positions of numerous States, is relevant to assessing Casey on its\nown terms.\n"
[133] "10 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n KAVANAUGH, J., concurring\n\n1954 have reaffirmed Plessy and upheld racially segregated\nschools simply because of that intervening 1924 precedent?\nSurely the answer is no.\n In sum, I agree with the Court’s application today of the\nprinciples of stare decisis and its conclusion that Roe should\nbe overruled.\n III\n After today’s decision, the nine Members of this Court\nwill no longer decide the basic legality of pre-viability abor-\ntion for all 330 million Americans. That issue will be re-\nsolved by the people and their representatives in the demo-\ncratic process in the States or Congress. But the parties’\narguments have raised other related questions, and I ad-\ndress some of them here.\n First is the question of how this decision will affect other\nprecedents involving issues such as contraception and mar-\nriage—in particular, the decisions in Griswold v. Connecti-\ncut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438\n(1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); and Oberge-\nfell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015). I emphasize what the\nCourt today states: Overruling Roe does not mean the over-\nruling of those precedents, and does not threaten or cast\ndoubt on those precedents.\n Second, as I see it, some of the other abortion-related le-\ngal questions raised by today’s decision are not especially\ndifficult as a constitutional matter. For example, may a\nState bar a resident of that State from traveling to another\nState to obtain an abortion? In my view, the answer is no\nbased on the constitutional right to interstate travel. May\na State retroactively impose liability or punishment for an\nabortion that occurred before today’s decision takes effect?\nIn my view, the answer is no based on the Due Process\nClause or the Ex Post Facto Clause. Cf. Bouie v. City of\nColumbia, 378 U. S. 347 (1964).\n Other abortion-related legal questions may emerge in the\n"
[134] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 11\n\n KAVANAUGH, J., concurring\n\nfuture. But this Court will no longer decide the fundamen-\ntal question of whether abortion must be allowed through-\nout the United States through 6 weeks, or 12 weeks, or 15\nweeks, or 24 weeks, or some other line. The Court will no\nlonger decide how to evaluate the interests of the pregnant\nwoman and the interests in protecting fetal life throughout\npregnancy. Instead, those difficult moral and policy ques-\ntions will be decided, as the Constitution dictates, by the\npeople and their elected representatives through the consti-\ntutional processes of democratic self-government.\n * * *\n The Roe Court took sides on a consequential moral and\npolicy issue that this Court had no constitutional authority\nto decide. By taking sides, the Roe Court distorted the Na-\ntion’s understanding of this Court’s proper role in the Amer-\nican constitutional system and thereby damaged the Court\nas an institution. As Justice Scalia explained, Roe “de-\nstroyed the compromises of the past, rendered compromise\nimpossible for the future, and required the entire issue to\nbe resolved uniformly, at the national level.” Casey, 505\nU. S., at 995 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and\ndissenting in part).\n The Court’s decision today properly returns the Court to\na position of judicial neutrality on the issue of abortion, and\nproperly restores the people’s authority to resolve the issue\nof abortion through the processes of democratic self-\ngovernment established by the Constitution.\n To be sure, many Americans will disagree with the\nCourt’s decision today. That would be true no matter how\nthe Court decided this case. Both sides on the abortion is-\nsue believe sincerely and passionately in the rightness of\ntheir cause. Especially in those difficult and fraught cir-\ncumstances, the Court must scrupulously adhere to the\nConstitution’s neutral position on the issue of abortion.\n Since 1973, more than 20 Justices of this Court have now\n"
[135] "12 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n KAVANAUGH, J., concurring\n\ngrappled with the divisive issue of abortion. I greatly re-\nspect all of the Justices, past and present, who have done\nso. Amidst extraordinary controversy and challenges, all of\nthem have addressed the abortion issue in good faith after\ncareful deliberation, and based on their sincere understand-\nings of the Constitution and of precedent. I have endeav-\nored to do the same.\n In my judgment, on the issue of abortion, the Constitu-\ntion is neither pro-life nor pro-choice. The Constitution is\nneutral, and this Court likewise must be scrupulously neu-\ntral. The Court today properly heeds the constitutional\nprinciple of judicial neutrality and returns the issue of abor-\ntion to the people and their elected representatives in the\ndemocratic process.\n"
[136] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 1\n\n , C. J., ,concurring\n ROBERTS\n ROBERTS C. J., concurring\n in judgment\n\nSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES\n _________________\n\n No. 19–1392\n _________________\n\n\n THOMAS E. DOBBS, STATE HEALTH OFFICER OF\n THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,\n ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S\n HEALTH ORGANIZATION, ET AL.\n ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF\n APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n [June 24, 2022]\n\n CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, concurring in the judgment.\n We granted certiorari to decide one question: “Whether\nall pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortions are un-\nconstitutional.” Pet. for Cert. i. That question is directly\nimplicated here: Mississippi’s Gestational Age Act, Miss.\nCode Ann. §41–41–191 (2018), generally prohibits abortion\nafter the fifteenth week of pregnancy—several weeks before\na fetus is regarded as “viable” outside the womb. In urging\nour review, Mississippi stated that its case was “an ideal\nvehicle” to “reconsider the bright-line viability rule,” and\nthat a judgment in its favor would “not require the Court to\noverturn” Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Planned\nParenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833\n(1992). Pet. for Cert. 5.\n Today, the Court nonetheless rules for Mississippi by do-\ning just that. I would take a more measured course. I agree\nwith the Court that the viability line established by Roe and\nCasey should be discarded under a straightforward stare de-\ncisis analysis. That line never made any sense. Our abor-\ntion precedents describe the right at issue as a woman’s\nright to choose to terminate her pregnancy. That right\nshould therefore extend far enough to ensure a reasonable\nopportunity to choose, but need not extend any further—\n"
[137] "2 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment\n\ncertainly not all the way to viability. Mississippi’s law al-\nlows a woman three months to obtain an abortion, well be-\nyond the point at which it is considered “late” to discover a\npregnancy. See A. Ayoola, Late Recognition of Unintended\nPregnancies, 32 Pub. Health Nursing 462 (2015) (preg-\nnancy is discoverable and ordinarily discovered by six\nweeks of gestation). I see no sound basis for questioning\nthe adequacy of that opportunity.\n But that is all I would say, out of adherence to a simple\nyet fundamental principle of judicial restraint: If it is not\nnecessary to decide more to dispose of a case, then it is nec-\nessary not to decide more. Perhaps we are not always per-\nfect in following that command, and certainly there are\ncases that warrant an exception. But this is not one of\nthem. Surely we should adhere closely to principles of judi-\ncial restraint here, where the broader path the Court\nchooses entails repudiating a constitutional right we have\nnot only previously recognized, but also expressly reaf-\nfirmed applying the doctrine of stare decisis. The Court’s\nopinion is thoughtful and thorough, but those virtues can-\nnot compensate for the fact that its dramatic and conse-\nquential ruling is unnecessary to decide the case before us.\n I\n Let me begin with my agreement with the Court, on the\nonly question we need decide here: whether to retain the\nrule from Roe and Casey that a woman’s right to terminate\nher pregnancy extends up to the point that the fetus is re-\ngarded as “viable” outside the womb. I agree that this rule\nshould be discarded.\n First, this Court seriously erred in Roe in adopting via-\nbility as the earliest point at which a State may legislate to\nadvance its substantial interests in the area of abortion.\nSee ante, at 50–53. Roe set forth a rigid three-part frame-\nwork anchored to viability, which more closely resembled a\nregulatory code than a body of constitutional law. That\n"
[138] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 3\n\n ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment\n\nframework, moreover, came out of thin air. Neither the\nTexas statute challenged in Roe nor the Georgia statute at\nissue in its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179\n(1973), included any gestational age limit. No party or ami-\ncus asked the Court to adopt a bright line viability rule.\nAnd as for Casey, arguments for or against the viability rule\nplayed only a de minimis role in the parties’ briefing and in\nthe oral argument. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 17–18, 51 (fleeting\ndiscussion of the viability rule).\n It is thus hardly surprising that neither Roe nor Casey\nmade a persuasive or even colorable argument for why the\ntime for terminating a pregnancy must extend to viability.\nThe Court’s jurisprudence on this issue is a textbook illus-\ntration of the perils of deciding a question neither presented\nnor briefed. As has been often noted, Roe’s defense of the\nline boiled down to the circular assertion that the State’s\ninterest is compelling only when an unborn child can live\noutside the womb, because that is when the unborn child\ncan live outside the womb. See 410 U. S., at 163–164; see\nalso J. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe\nv. Wade, 82 Yale L. J. 920, 924 (1973) (Roe’s reasoning “mis-\ntake[s] a definition for a syllogism”).\n Twenty years later, the best defense of the viability line\nthe Casey plurality could conjure up was workability. See\n505 U. S., at 870. But see ante, at 53 (opinion of the Court)\n(discussing the difficulties in applying the viability stand-\nard). Although the plurality attempted to add more content\nby opining that “it might be said that a woman who fails to\nact before viability has consented to the State’s intervention\non behalf of the developing child,” Casey, 505 U. S., at 870,\nthat mere suggestion provides no basis for choosing viabil-\nity as the critical tipping point. A similar implied consent\nargument could be made with respect to a law banning\nabortions after fifteen weeks, well beyond the point at\nwhich nearly all women are aware that they are pregnant,\nA. Ayoola, M. Nettleman, M. Stommel, & R. Canady, Time\n"
[139] "4 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment\n\nof Pregnancy Recognition and Prenatal Care Use: A Popu-\nlation-based Study in the United States 39 (2010) (Preg-\nnancy Recognition). The dissent, which would retain the\nviability line, offers no justification for it either.\n This Court’s jurisprudence since Casey, moreover, has\n“eroded” the “underpinnings” of the viability line, such as\nthey were. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 521\n(1995). The viability line is a relic of a time when we recog-\nnized only two state interests warranting regulation of\nabortion: maternal health and protection of “potential life.”\nRoe, 410 U. S., at 162–163. That changed with Gonzales v.\nCarhart, 550 U. S. 124 (2007). There, we recognized a\nbroader array of interests, such as drawing “a bright line\nthat clearly distinguishes abortion and infanticide,” main-\ntaining societal ethics, and preserving the integrity of the\nmedical profession. Id., at 157–160. The viability line has\nnothing to do with advancing such permissible goals. Cf.\nid., at 171 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (Gonzales “blur[red]\nthe line, firmly drawn in Casey, between previability and\npostviability abortions”); see also R. Beck, Gonzales, Casey,\nand the Viability Rule, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 249, 276–279\n(2009).\n Consider, for example, statutes passed in a number of ju-\nrisdictions that forbid abortions after twenty weeks of preg-\nnancy, premised on the theory that a fetus can feel pain at\nthat stage of development. See, e.g., Ala. Code §26–23B–2\n(2018). Assuming that prevention of fetal pain is a legiti-\nmate state interest after Gonzales, there seems to be no rea-\nson why viability would be relevant to the permissibility of\nsuch laws. The same is true of laws designed to “protect[ ]\nthe integrity and ethics of the medical profession” and re-\nstrict procedures likely to “coarsen society” to the “dignity\nof human life.” Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 157. Mississippi’s\nlaw, for instance, was premised in part on the legislature’s\nfinding that the “dilation and evacuation” procedure is a\n“barbaric practice, dangerous for the maternal patient, and\n"
[140] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 5\n\n ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment\n\ndemeaning to the medical profession.” Miss. Code Ann.\n§41–41–191(2)(b)(i)(8). That procedure accounts for most\nabortions performed after the first trimester—two weeks\nbefore the period at issue in this case—and “involve[s] the\nuse of surgical instruments to crush and tear the unborn\nchild apart.” Ibid.; see also Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 135.\nAgain, it would make little sense to focus on viability when\nevaluating a law based on these permissible goals.\n In short, the viability rule was created outside the ordi-\nnary course of litigation, is and always has been completely\nunreasoned, and fails to take account of state interests\nsince recognized as legitimate. It is indeed “telling that\nother countries almost uniformly eschew” a viability line.\nAnte, at 53 (opinion of the Court). Only a handful of coun-\ntries, among them China and North Korea, permit elective\nabortions after twenty weeks; the rest have coalesced\naround a 12–week line. See The World’s Abortion Laws,\nCenter for Reproductive Rights (Feb. 23, 2021) (online\nsource archived at www.supremecourt.gov) (Canada,\nChina, Iceland, Guinea-Bissau, the Netherlands, North Ko-\nrea, Singapore, and Vietnam permit elective abortions after\ntwenty weeks). The Court rightly rejects the arbitrary via-\nbility rule today.\n II\n None of this, however, requires that we also take the dra-\nmatic step of altogether eliminating the abortion right first\nrecognized in Roe. Mississippi itself previously argued as\nmuch to this Court in this litigation.\n When the State petitioned for our review, its basic re-\nquest was straightforward: “clarify whether abortion prohi-\nbitions before viability are always unconstitutional.” Pet.\nfor Cert. 14. The State made a number of strong arguments\nthat the answer is no, id., at 15–26—arguments that, as\ndiscussed, I find persuasive. And it went out of its way to\nmake clear that it was not asking the Court to repudiate\n"
[141] "6 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment\n\nentirely the right to choose whether to terminate a preg-\nnancy: “To be clear, the questions presented in this petition\ndo not require the Court to overturn Roe or Casey.” Id., at\n5. Mississippi tempered that statement with an oblique\none-sentence footnote intimating that, if the Court could\nnot reconcile Roe and Casey with current facts or other\ncases, it “should not retain erroneous precedent.” Pet. for\nCert. 5–6, n. 1. But the State never argued that we should\ngrant review for that purpose.\n After we granted certiorari, however, Mississippi\nchanged course. In its principal brief, the State bluntly an-\nnounced that the Court should overrule Roe and Casey. The\nConstitution does not protect a right to an abortion, it ar-\ngued, and a State should be able to prohibit elective abor-\ntions if a rational basis supports doing so. See Brief for Pe-\ntitioners 12–13.\n The Court now rewards that gambit, noting three times\nthat the parties presented “no half-measures” and argued\nthat “we must either reaffirm or overrule Roe and Casey.”\nAnte, at 5, 8, 72. Given those two options, the majority picks\nthe latter.\n This framing is not accurate. In its brief on the merits,\nMississippi in fact argued at length that a decision simply\nrejecting the viability rule would result in a judgment in its\nfavor. See Brief for Petitioners 5, 38–48. But even if the\nState had not argued as much, it would not matter. There\nis no rule that parties can confine this Court to disposing of\ntheir case on a particular ground—let alone when review\nwas sought and granted on a different one. Our established\npractice is instead not to “formulate a rule of constitutional\nlaw broader than is required by the precise facts to which it\nis to be applied.” Washington State Grange v. Washington\nState Republican Party, 552 U. S. 442, 450 (2008) (quoting\nAshwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,\nconcurring)); see also United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17,\n21 (1960).\n"
[142] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 7\n\n ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment\n\n Following that “fundamental principle of judicial re-\nstraint,” Washington State Grange, 552 U. S., at 450, we\nshould begin with the narrowest basis for disposition, pro-\nceeding to consider a broader one only if necessary to re-\nsolve the case at hand. See, e.g., Office of Personnel Man-\nagement v. Richmond, 496 U. S. 414, 423 (1990). It is only\nwhere there is no valid narrower ground of decision that we\nshould go on to address a broader issue, such as whether a\nconstitutional decision should be overturned. See Federal\nElection Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S.\n449, 482 (2007) (declining to address the claim that a con-\nstitutional decision should be overruled when the appellant\nprevailed on its narrower constitutional argument).\n Here, there is a clear path to deciding this case correctly\nwithout overruling Roe all the way down to the studs: rec-\nognize that the viability line must be discarded, as the ma-\njority rightly does, and leave for another day whether to re-\nject any right to an abortion at all. See Webster v.\nReproductive Health Services, 492 U. S. 490, 518, 521\n(1989) (plurality opinion) (rejecting Roe’s viability line as\n“rigid” and “indeterminate,” while also finding “no occasion\nto revisit the holding of Roe” that, under the Constitution,\na State must provide an opportunity to choose to terminate\na pregnancy).\n Of course, such an approach would not be available if the\nrationale of Roe and Casey was inextricably entangled with\nand dependent upon the viability standard. It is not. Our\nprecedents in this area ground the abortion right in a\nwoman’s “right to choose.” See Carey v. Population Services\nInt’l, 431 U. S. 678, 688–689 (1977) (“underlying foundation\nof the holdings” in Roe and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381\nU. S. 479 (1965), was the “right of decision in matters of\nchildbearing”); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 473 (1977) (Roe\nand other cases “recognize a constitutionally protected in-\nterest in making certain kinds of important decisions free\nfrom governmental compulsion” (internal quotation marks\n"
[143] "8 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment\n\nomitted)); id., at 473–474 (Roe “did not declare an unquali-\nfied constitutional right to an abortion,” but instead pro-\ntected “the woman from unduly burdensome interference\nwith her freedom to decide whether to terminate her preg-\nnancy” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Webster, 492\nU. S., at 520 (plurality opinion) (Roe protects “the claims of\na woman to decide for herself whether or not to abort a fetus\nshe [is] carrying”); Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 146 (a State may\nnot “prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision\nto terminate her pregnancy”). If that is the basis for Roe,\nRoe’s viability line should be scrutinized from the same per-\nspective. And there is nothing inherent in the right to\nchoose that requires it to extend to viability or any other\npoint, so long as a real choice is provided. See Webster, 492\nU. S., at 519 (plurality opinion) (finding no reason “why the\nState’s interest in protecting potential human life should\ncome into existence only at the point of viability”).\n To be sure, in reaffirming the right to an abortion, Casey\ntermed the viability rule Roe’s “central holding.” 505 U. S.,\nat 860. Other cases of ours have repeated that language.\nSee, e.g., Gonzales, 550 U. S., at 145–146. But simply de-\nclaring it does not make it so. The question in Roe was\nwhether there was any right to abortion in the Constitu-\ntion. See Brief for Appellants and Brief for Appellees, in\nRoe v. Wade, O. T. 1971, No. 70–18. How far the right ex-\ntended was a concern that was separate and subsidiary,\nand—not surprisingly—entirely unbriefed.\n The Court in Roe just chose to address both issues in one\nopinion: It first recognized a right to “choose to terminate\n[a] pregnancy” under the Constitution, see 410 U. S., at\n129–159, and then, having done so, explained that a line\nshould be drawn at viability such that a State could not pro-\nscribe abortion before that period, see id., at 163. The via-\nbility line is a separate rule fleshing out the metes and\nbounds of Roe’s core holding. Applying principles of stare\ndecisis, I would excise that additional rule—and only that\n"
[144] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 9\n\n ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment\n\nrule—from our jurisprudence.\n The majority lists a number of cases that have stressed\nthe importance of the viability rule to our abortion prece-\ndents. See ante, at 73–74. I agree that—whether it was\noriginally holding or dictum—the viability line is clearly\npart of our “past precedent,” and the Court has applied it as\nsuch in several cases since Roe. Ante, at 73. My point is\nthat Roe adopted two distinct rules of constitutional law:\none, that a woman has the right to choose to terminate a\npregnancy; two, that such right may be overridden by the\nState’s legitimate interests when the fetus is viable outside\nthe womb. The latter is obviously distinct from the former.\nI would abandon that timing rule, but see no need in this\ncase to consider the basic right.\n The Court contends that it is impossible to address Roe’s\nconclusion that the Constitution protects the woman’s right\nto abortion, without also addressing Roe’s rule that the\nState’s interests are not constitutionally adequate to justify\na ban on abortion until viability. See ibid. But we have\npartially overruled precedents before, see, e.g., United\nStates v. Miller, 471 U. S. 130, 142–144 (1985); Daniels v.\nWilliams, 474 U. S. 327, 328–331 (1986); Batson v. Ken-\ntucky, 476 U. S. 79, 90–93 (1986), and certainly have never\nheld that a distinct holding defining the contours of a con-\nstitutional right must be treated as part and parcel of the\nright itself.\n Overruling the subsidiary rule is sufficient to resolve this\ncase in Mississippi’s favor. The law at issue allows abor-\ntions up through fifteen weeks, providing an adequate op-\nportunity to exercise the right Roe protects. By the time a\npregnant woman has reached that point, her pregnancy is\nwell into the second trimester. Pregnancy tests are now in-\nexpensive and accurate, and a woman ordinarily discovers\nshe is pregnant by six weeks of gestation. See A. Branum\n& K. Ahrens, Trends in Timing of Pregnancy Awareness\nAmong US Women, 21 Maternal & Child Health J. 715, 722\n"
[145] "10 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment\n\n(2017). Almost all know by the end of the first trimester.\nPregnancy Recognition 39. Safe and effective abortifa-\ncients, moreover, are now readily available, particularly\nduring those early stages. See I. Adibi et al., Abortion, 22\nGeo. J. Gender & L. 279, 303 (2021). Given all this, it is no\nsurprise that the vast majority of abortions happen in the\nfirst trimester. See Centers for Disease Control and Pre-\nvention, Abortion Surveillance—United States 1 (2020).\nPresumably most of the remainder would also take place\nearlier if later abortions were not a legal option. Ample ev-\nidence thus suggests that a 15-week ban provides sufficient\ntime, absent rare circumstances, for a woman “to decide for\nherself ” whether to terminate her pregnancy. Webster, 492\nU. S., at 520 (plurality opinion).*\n III\n Whether a precedent should be overruled is a question\n“entirely within the discretion of the court.” Hertz v. Wood-\nman, 218 U. S. 205, 212 (1910); see also Payne v. Tennessee,\n501 U. S. 808, 828 (1991) (stare decisis is a “principle of pol-\nicy”). In my respectful view, the sound exercise of that dis-\ncretion should have led the Court to resolve the case on the\nnarrower grounds set forth above, rather than overruling\nRoe and Casey entirely. The Court says there is no “princi-\npled basis” for this approach, ante, at 73, but in fact it is\nfirmly grounded in basic principles of stare decisis and judi-\ncial restraint.\n\n——————\n *The majority contends that “nothing like [my approach] was recom-\nmended by either party.” Ante, at 72. But as explained, Mississippi in\nfact pressed a similar argument in its filings before this Court. See Pet.\nfor Cert. 15–26; Brief for Petitioners 5, 38–48 (urging the Court to reject\nthe viability rule and reverse); Reply Brief 20–22 (same). The approach\nalso finds support in prior opinions. See Webster, 492 U. S., at 518–521\n(plurality opinion) (abandoning “key elements” of the Roe framework un-\nder stare decisis while declining to reconsider Roe’s holding that the Con-\nstitution protects the right to an abortion).\n"
[146] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 11\n\n ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment\n\n The Court’s decision to overrule Roe and Casey is a seri-\nous jolt to the legal system—regardless of how you view\nthose cases. A narrower decision rejecting the misguided\nviability line would be markedly less unsettling, and noth-\ning more is needed to decide this case.\n Our cases say that the effect of overruling a precedent on\nreliance interests is a factor to consider in deciding whether\nto take such a step, and respondents argue that generations\nof women have relied on the right to an abortion in organ-\nizing their relationships and planning their futures. Brief\nfor Respondents 36–41; see also Casey, 505 U. S., at 856\n(making the same point). The Court questions whether\nthese concerns are pertinent under our precedents, see\nante, at 64–65, but the issue would not even arise with a\ndecision rejecting only the viability line: It cannot reasona-\nbly be argued that women have shaped their lives in part\non the assumption that they would be able to abort up to\nviability, as opposed to fifteen weeks.\n In support of its holding, the Court cites three seminal\nconstitutional decisions that involved overruling prior prec-\nedents: Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954),\nWest Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943),\nand West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937).\nSee ante, at 40–41. The opinion in Brown was unanimous\nand eleven pages long; this one is neither. Barnette was\ndecided only three years after the decision it overruled,\nthree Justices having had second thoughts. And West Coast\nHotel was issued against a backdrop of unprecedented eco-\nnomic despair that focused attention on the fundamental\nflaws of existing precedent. It also was part of a sea change\nin this Court’s interpretation of the Constitution, “sig-\nnal[ing] the demise of an entire line of important prece-\ndents,” ante, at 40—a feature the Court expressly disclaims\nin today’s decision, see ante, at 32, 66. None of these lead-\ning cases, in short, provides a template for what the Court\ndoes today.\n"
[147] "12 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment\n\n The Court says we should consider whether to overrule\nRoe and Casey now, because if we delay we would be forced\nto consider the issue again in short order. See ante, at 76–\n77. There would be “turmoil” until we did so, according to\nthe Court, because of existing state laws with “shorter\ndeadlines or no deadline at all.” Ante, at 76. But under the\nnarrower approach proposed here, state laws outlawing\nabortion altogether would still violate binding precedent.\nAnd to the extent States have laws that set the cutoff date\nearlier than fifteen weeks, any litigation over that\ntimeframe would proceed free of the distorting effect that\nthe viability rule has had on our constitutional debate. The\nsame could be true, for that matter, with respect to legisla-\ntive consideration in the States. We would then be free to\nexercise our discretion in deciding whether and when to\ntake up the issue, from a more informed perspective.\n * * *\n Both the Court’s opinion and the dissent display a relent-\nless freedom from doubt on the legal issue that I cannot\nshare. I am not sure, for example, that a ban on terminat-\ning a pregnancy from the moment of conception must be\ntreated the same under the Constitution as a ban after fif-\nteen weeks. A thoughtful Member of this Court once coun-\nseled that the difficulty of a question “admonishes us to ob-\nserve the wise limitations on our function and to confine\nourselves to deciding only what is necessary to the disposi-\ntion of the immediate case.” Whitehouse v. Illinois Central\nR. Co., 349 U. S. 366, 372–373 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., for\nthe Court). I would decide the question we granted review\nto answer—whether the previously recognized abortion\nright bars all abortion restrictions prior to viability, such\nthat a ban on abortions after fifteen weeks of pregnancy is\nnecessarily unlawful. The answer to that question is no,\nand there is no need to go further to decide this case.\n I therefore concur only in the judgment.\n"
[148] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 1\n\n anddissenting\n KAGAN, J.,\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES\n _________________\n\n No. 19–1392\n _________________\n\n\n THOMAS E. DOBBS, STATE HEALTH OFFICER OF\n THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,\n ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S\n HEALTH ORGANIZATION, ET AL.\n ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF\n APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n [June 24, 2022]\n\n JUSTICE BREYER, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE\nKAGAN, dissenting.\n For half a century, Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and\nPlanned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S.\n833 (1992), have protected the liberty and equality of\nwomen. Roe held, and Casey reaffirmed, that the Constitu-\ntion safeguards a woman’s right to decide for herself\nwhether to bear a child. Roe held, and Casey reaffirmed,\nthat in the first stages of pregnancy, the government could\nnot make that choice for women. The government could not\ncontrol a woman’s body or the course of a woman’s life: It\ncould not determine what the woman’s future would be. See\nCasey, 505 U. S., at 853; Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U. S. 124,\n171–172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Respecting a\nwoman as an autonomous being, and granting her full\nequality, meant giving her substantial choice over this most\npersonal and most consequential of all life decisions.\n Roe and Casey well understood the difficulty and divisive-\nness of the abortion issue. The Court knew that Americans\nhold profoundly different views about the “moral[ity]” of\n“terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage.” Ca-\nsey, 505 U. S., at 850. And the Court recognized that “the\n"
[149] "2 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nState has legitimate interests from the outset of the preg-\nnancy in protecting” the “life of the fetus that may become\na child.” Id., at 846. So the Court struck a balance, as it\noften does when values and goals compete. It held that the\nState could prohibit abortions after fetal viability, so long\nas the ban contained exceptions to safeguard a woman’s life\nor health. It held that even before viability, the State could\nregulate the abortion procedure in multiple and meaningful\nways. But until the viability line was crossed, the Court\nheld, a State could not impose a “substantial obstacle” on a\nwoman’s “right to elect the procedure” as she (not the gov-\nernment) thought proper, in light of all the circumstances\nand complexities of her own life. Ibid.\n Today, the Court discards that balance. It says that from\nthe very moment of fertilization, a woman has no rights to\nspeak of. A State can force her to bring a pregnancy to term,\neven at the steepest personal and familial costs. An abor-\ntion restriction, the majority holds, is permissible whenever\nrational, the lowest level of scrutiny known to the law. And\nbecause, as the Court has often stated, protecting fetal life\nis rational, States will feel free to enact all manner of re-\nstrictions. The Mississippi law at issue here bars abortions\nafter the 15th week of pregnancy. Under the majority’s rul-\ning, though, another State’s law could do so after ten weeks,\nor five or three or one—or, again, from the moment of ferti-\nlization. States have already passed such laws, in anticipa-\ntion of today’s ruling. More will follow. Some States have\nenacted laws extending to all forms of abortion procedure,\nincluding taking medication in one’s own home. They have\npassed laws without any exceptions for when the woman is\nthe victim of rape or incest. Under those laws, a woman\nwill have to bear her rapist’s child or a young girl her fa-\nther’s—no matter if doing so will destroy her life. So too,\nafter today’s ruling, some States may compel women to\ncarry to term a fetus with severe physical anomalies—for\nexample, one afflicted with Tay-Sachs disease, sure to die\n"
[150] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 3\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nwithin a few years of birth. States may even argue that a\nprohibition on abortion need make no provision for protect-\ning a woman from risk of death or physical harm. Across a\nvast array of circumstances, a State will be able to impose\nits moral choice on a woman and coerce her to give birth to\na child.\n Enforcement of all these draconian restrictions will also\nbe left largely to the States’ devices. A State can of course\nimpose criminal penalties on abortion providers, including\nlengthy prison sentences. But some States will not stop\nthere. Perhaps, in the wake of today’s decision, a state law\nwill criminalize the woman’s conduct too, incarcerating or\nfining her for daring to seek or obtain an abortion. And as\nTexas has recently shown, a State can turn neighbor\nagainst neighbor, enlisting fellow citizens in the effort to\nroot out anyone who tries to get an abortion, or to assist\nanother in doing so.\n The majority tries to hide the geographically expansive\neffects of its holding. Today’s decision, the majority says,\npermits “each State” to address abortion as it pleases. Ante,\nat 79. That is cold comfort, of course, for the poor woman\nwho cannot get the money to fly to a distant State for a pro-\ncedure. Above all others, women lacking financial re-\nsources will suffer from today’s decision. In any event, in-\nterstate restrictions will also soon be in the offing. After\nthis decision, some States may block women from traveling\nout of State to obtain abortions, or even from receiving abor-\ntion medications from out of State. Some may criminalize\nefforts, including the provision of information or funding, to\nhelp women gain access to other States’ abortion services.\nMost threatening of all, no language in today’s decision\nstops the Federal Government from prohibiting abortions\nnationwide, once again from the moment of conception and\nwithout exceptions for rape or incest. If that happens, “the\nviews of [an individual State’s] citizens” will not matter.\nAnte, at 1. The challenge for a woman will be to finance a\n"
[151] "4 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\ntrip not to “New York [or] California” but to Toronto. Ante,\nat 4 (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring).\n Whatever the exact scope of the coming laws, one result\nof today’s decision is certain: the curtailment of women’s\nrights, and of their status as free and equal citizens. Yes-\nterday, the Constitution guaranteed that a woman con-\nfronted with an unplanned pregnancy could (within reason-\nable limits) make her own decision about whether to bear a\nchild, with all the life-transforming consequences that act\ninvolves. And in thus safeguarding each woman’s reproduc-\ntive freedom, the Constitution also protected “[t]he ability\nof women to participate equally in [this Nation’s] economic\nand social life.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 856. But no longer. As\nof today, this Court holds, a State can always force a woman\nto give birth, prohibiting even the earliest abortions. A\nState can thus transform what, when freely undertaken, is\na wonder into what, when forced, may be a nightmare.\nSome women, especially women of means, will find ways\naround the State’s assertion of power. Others—those with-\nout money or childcare or the ability to take time off from\nwork—will not be so fortunate. Maybe they will try an un-\nsafe method of abortion, and come to physical harm, or even\ndie. Maybe they will undergo pregnancy and have a child,\nbut at significant personal or familial cost. At the least,\nthey will incur the cost of losing control of their lives. The\nConstitution will, today’s majority holds, provide no shield,\ndespite its guarantees of liberty and equality for all.\n And no one should be confident that this majority is done\nwith its work. The right Roe and Casey recognized does not\nstand alone. To the contrary, the Court has linked it for\ndecades to other settled freedoms involving bodily integrity,\nfamilial relationships, and procreation. Most obviously, the\nright to terminate a pregnancy arose straight out of the\nright to purchase and use contraception. See Griswold v.\nConnecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405\nU. S. 438 (1972). In turn, those rights led, more recently,\n"
[152] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 5\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nto rights of same-sex intimacy and marriage. See Lawrence\nv. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576\nU. S. 644 (2015). They are all part of the same constitu-\ntional fabric, protecting autonomous decisionmaking over\nthe most personal of life decisions. The majority (or to be\nmore accurate, most of it) is eager to tell us today that noth-\ning it does “cast[s] doubt on precedents that do not concern\nabortion.” Ante, at 66; cf. ante, at 3 (THOMAS, J., concurring)\n(advocating the overruling of Griswold, Lawrence, and\nObergefell). But how could that be? The lone rationale for\nwhat the majority does today is that the right to elect an\nabortion is not “deeply rooted in history”: Not until Roe, the\nmajority argues, did people think abortion fell within the\nConstitution’s guarantee of liberty. Ante, at 32. The same\ncould be said, though, of most of the rights the majority\nclaims it is not tampering with. The majority could write\njust as long an opinion showing, for example, that until the\nmid-20th century, “there was no support in American law\nfor a constitutional right to obtain [contraceptives].” Ante,\nat 15. So one of two things must be true. Either the major-\nity does not really believe in its own reasoning. Or if it does,\nall rights that have no history stretching back to the mid-\n19th century are insecure. Either the mass of the majority’s\nopinion is hypocrisy, or additional constitutional rights are\nunder threat. It is one or the other.\n One piece of evidence on that score seems especially sa-\nlient: The majority’s cavalier approach to overturning this\nCourt’s precedents. Stare decisis is the Latin phrase for a\nfoundation stone of the rule of law: that things decided\nshould stay decided unless there is a very good reason for\nchange. It is a doctrine of judicial modesty and humility.\nThose qualities are not evident in today’s opinion. The ma-\njority has no good reason for the upheaval in law and society\nit sets off. Roe and Casey have been the law of the land for\ndecades, shaping women’s expectations of their choices\nwhen an unplanned pregnancy occurs. Women have relied\n"
[153] "6 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\non the availability of abortion both in structuring their re-\nlationships and in planning their lives. The legal frame-\nwork Roe and Casey developed to balance the competing in-\nterests in this sphere has proved workable in courts across\nthe country. No recent developments, in either law or fact,\nhave eroded or cast doubt on those precedents. Nothing, in\nshort, has changed. Indeed, the Court in Casey already\nfound all of that to be true. Casey is a precedent about prec-\nedent. It reviewed the same arguments made here in sup-\nport of overruling Roe, and it found that doing so was not\nwarranted. The Court reverses course today for one reason\nand one reason only: because the composition of this Court\nhas changed. Stare decisis, this Court has often said, “con-\ntributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial\nprocess” by ensuring that decisions are “founded in the law\nrather than in the proclivities of individuals.” Payne v. Ten-\nnessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474\nU. S. 254, 265 (1986). Today, the proclivities of individuals\nrule. The Court departs from its obligation to faithfully and\nimpartially apply the law. We dissent.\n I\n We start with Roe and Casey, and with their deep connec-\ntions to a broad swath of this Court’s precedents. To hear\nthe majority tell the tale, Roe and Casey are aberrations:\nThey came from nowhere, went nowhere—and so are easy\nto excise from this Nation’s constitutional law. That is not\ntrue. After describing the decisions themselves, we explain\nhow they are rooted in—and themselves led to—other\nrights giving individuals control over their bodies and their\nmost personal and intimate associations. The majority does\nnot wish to talk about these matters for obvious reasons; to\ndo so would both ground Roe and Casey in this Court’s prec-\nedents and reveal the broad implications of today’s decision.\nBut the facts will not so handily disappear. Roe and Casey\nwere from the beginning, and are even more now, embedded\n"
[154] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 7\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nin core constitutional concepts of individual freedom, and of\nthe equal rights of citizens to decide on the shape of their\nlives. Those legal concepts, one might even say, have gone\nfar toward defining what it means to be an American. For\nin this Nation, we do not believe that a government control-\nling all private choices is compatible with a free people. So\nwe do not (as the majority insists today) place everything\nwithin “the reach of majorities and [government] officials.”\nWest Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 638\n(1943). We believe in a Constitution that puts some issues\noff limits to majority rule. Even in the face of public oppo-\nsition, we uphold the right of individuals—yes, including\nwomen—to make their own choices and chart their own fu-\ntures. Or at least, we did once.\n A\n Some half-century ago, Roe struck down a state law mak-\ning it a crime to perform an abortion unless its purpose was\nto save a woman’s life. The Roe Court knew it was treading\non difficult and disputed ground. It understood that differ-\nent people’s “experiences,” “values,” and “religious training”\nand beliefs led to “opposing views” about abortion. 410\nU. S., at 116. But by a 7-to-2 vote, the Court held that in\nthe earlier stages of pregnancy, that contested and contest-\nable choice must belong to a woman, in consultation with\nher family and doctor. The Court explained that a long line\nof precedents, “founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s\nconcept of personal liberty,” protected individual deci-\nsionmaking related to “marriage, procreation, contracep-\ntion, family relationships, and child rearing and education.”\nId., at 152–153 (citations omitted). For the same reasons,\nthe Court held, the Constitution must protect “a woman’s\ndecision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” Id.,\nat 153. The Court recognized the myriad ways bearing a\nchild can alter the “life and future” of a woman and other\n"
[155] "8 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nmembers of her family. Ibid. A State could not, “by adopt-\ning one theory of life,” override all “rights of the pregnant\nwoman.” Id., at 162.\n At the same time, though, the Court recognized “valid in-\nterest[s]” of the State “in regulating the abortion decision.”\nId., at 153. The Court noted in particular “important inter-\nests” in “protecting potential life,” “maintaining medical\nstandards,” and “safeguarding [the] health” of the woman.\nId., at 154. No “absolut[ist]” account of the woman’s right\ncould wipe away those significant state claims. Ibid.\n The Court therefore struck a balance, turning on the\nstage of the pregnancy at which the abortion would occur.\nThe Court explained that early on, a woman’s choice must\nprevail, but that “at some point the state interests” become\n“dominant.” Id., at 155. It then set some guideposts. In\nthe first trimester of pregnancy, the State could not inter-\nfere at all with the decision to terminate a pregnancy. At\nany time after that point, the State could regulate to protect\nthe pregnant woman’s health, such as by insisting that\nabortion providers and facilities meet safety requirements.\nAnd after the fetus’s viability—the point when the fetus\n“has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s\nwomb”—the State could ban abortions, except when neces-\nsary to preserve the woman’s life or health. Id., at 163–164.\n In the 20 years between Roe and Casey, the Court ex-\npressly reaffirmed Roe on two occasions, and applied it on\nmany more. Recognizing that “arguments [against Roe]\ncontinue to be made,” we responded that the doctrine of\nstare decisis “demands respect in a society governed by the\nrule of law.” Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive\nHealth, Inc., 462 U. S. 416, 419–420 (1983). And we avowed\nthat the “vitality” of “constitutional principles cannot be al-\nlowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.”\nThornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-\ncologists, 476 U. S. 747, 759 (1986). So the Court, over and\n"
[156] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 9\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nover, enforced the constitutional principles Roe had de-\nclared. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive\nHealth, 497 U. S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497\nU. S. 417 (1990); Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U. S. 506\n(1983); Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc.\nv. Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 476 (1983); H. L. v. Matheson, 450\nU. S. 398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979);\nPlanned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S.\n52 (1976).\n Then, in Casey, the Court considered the matter anew,\nand again upheld Roe’s core precepts. Casey is in signifi-\ncant measure a precedent about the doctrine of precedent—\nuntil today, one of the Court’s most important. But we\nleave for later that aspect of the Court’s decision. The key\nthing now is the substantive aspect of the Court’s consid-\nered conclusion that “the essential holding of Roe v. Wade\nshould be retained and once again reaffirmed.” 505 U. S.,\nat 846.\n Central to that conclusion was a full-throated restate-\nment of a woman’s right to choose. Like Roe, Casey\ngrounded that right in the Fourteenth Amendment’s guar-\nantee of “liberty.” That guarantee encompasses realms of\nconduct not specifically referenced in the Constitution:\n“Marriage is mentioned nowhere” in that document, yet the\nCourt was “no doubt correct” to protect the freedom to\nmarry “against state interference.” 505 U. S., at 847–848.\nAnd the guarantee of liberty encompasses conduct today\nthat was not protected at the time of the Fourteenth\nAmendment. See id., at 848. “It is settled now,” the Court\nsaid—though it was not always so—that “the Constitution\nplaces limits on a State’s right to interfere with a person’s\nmost basic decisions about family and parenthood, as well\nas bodily integrity.” Id., at 849 (citations omitted); see id.,\nat 851 (similarly describing the constitutional protection\ngiven to “personal decisions relating to marriage, procrea-\ntion, contraception, [and] family relationships”). Especially\n"
[157] "10 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nimportant in this web of precedents protecting an individ-\nual’s most “personal choices” were those guaranteeing the\nright to contraception. Ibid.; see id., at 852–853. In those\ncases, the Court had recognized “the right of the individual”\nto make the vastly consequential “decision whether to bear”\na child. Id., at 851 (emphasis deleted). So too, Casey rea-\nsoned, the liberty clause protects the decision of a woman\nconfronting an unplanned pregnancy. Her decision about\nabortion was central, in the same way, to her capacity to\nchart her life’s course. See id., at 853.\n In reaffirming the right Roe recognized, the Court took\nfull account of the diversity of views on abortion, and the\nimportance of various competing state interests. Some\nAmericans, the Court stated, “deem [abortion] nothing\nshort of an act of violence against innocent human life.” 505\nU. S., at 852. And each State has an interest in “the protec-\ntion of potential life”—as Roe itself had recognized. 505\nU. S., at 871 (plurality opinion). On the one hand, that in-\nterest was not conclusive. The State could not “resolve” the\n“moral and spiritual” questions raised by abortion in “such\na definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in the mat-\nter.” Id., at 850 (majority opinion). It could not force her to\nbear the “pain” and “physical constraints” of “carr[ying] a\nchild to full term” when she would have chosen an early\nabortion. Id., at 852. But on the other hand, the State had,\nas Roe had held, an exceptionally significant interest in dis-\nallowing abortions in the later phase of a pregnancy. And\nit had an ever-present interest in “ensur[ing] that the\nwoman’s choice is informed” and in presenting the case for\n“choos[ing] childbirth over abortion.” 505 U. S., at 878 (plu-\nrality opinion).\n So Casey again struck a balance, differing from Roe’s in\nonly incremental ways. It retained Roe’s “central holding”\nthat the State could bar abortion only after viability. 505\nU. S., at 860 (majority opinion). The viability line, Casey\nthought, was “more workable” than any other in marking\n"
[158] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 11\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nthe place where the woman’s liberty interest gave way to a\nState’s efforts to preserve potential life. Id., at 870 (plural-\nity opinion). At that point, a “second life” was capable of\n“independent existence.” Ibid. If the woman even by then\nhad not acted, she lacked adequate grounds to object to “the\nState’s intervention on [the developing child’s] behalf.”\nIbid. At the same time, Casey decided, based on two dec-\nades of experience, that the Roe framework did not give\nStates sufficient ability to regulate abortion prior to viabil-\nity. In that period, Casey now made clear, the State could\nregulate not only to protect the woman’s health but also to\n“promot[e] prenatal life.” 505 U. S., at 873 (plurality opin-\nion). In particular, the State could ensure informed choice\nand could try to promote childbirth. See id., at 877–878.\nBut the State still could not place an “undue burden”—or\n“substantial obstacle”—“in the path of a woman seeking an\nabortion.” Id., at 878. Prior to viability, the woman, con-\nsistent with the constitutional “meaning of liberty,” must\n“retain the ultimate control over her destiny and her body.”\nId., at 869.\n We make one initial point about this analysis in light of\nthe majority’s insistence that Roe and Casey, and we in de-\nfending them, are dismissive of a “State’s interest in pro-\ntecting prenatal life.” Ante, at 38. Nothing could get those\ndecisions more wrong. As just described, Roe and Casey in-\nvoked powerful state interests in that protection, operative\nat every stage of the pregnancy and overriding the woman’s\nliberty after viability. The strength of those state interests\nis exactly why the Court allowed greater restrictions on the\nabortion right than on other rights deriving from the Four-\nteenth Amendment.1 But what Roe and Casey also recog-\nnized—which today’s majority does not—is that a woman’s\n——————\n 1 For this reason, we do not understand the majority’s view that our\n\nanalogy between the right to an abortion and the rights to contraception\nand same-sex marriage shows that we think “[t]he Constitution does not\npermit the States to regard the destruction of a ‘potential life’ as a matter\n"
[159] "12 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nfreedom and equality are likewise involved. That fact—the\npresence of countervailing interests—is what made the\nabortion question hard, and what necessitated balancing.\nThe majority scoffs at that idea, castigating us for “repeat-\nedly prais[ing] the ‘balance’ ” the two cases arrived at (with\nthe word “balance” in scare quotes). Ante, at 38. To the\nmajority “balance” is a dirty word, as moderation is a for-\neign concept. The majority would allow States to ban abor-\ntion from conception onward because it does not think\nforced childbirth at all implicates a woman’s rights to equal-\nity and freedom. Today’s Court, that is, does not think\nthere is anything of constitutional significance attached to\na woman’s control of her body and the path of her life. Roe\nand Casey thought that one-sided view misguided. In some\nsense, that is the difference in a nutshell between our prec-\nedents and the majority opinion. The constitutional regime\nwe have lived in for the last 50 years recognized competing\ninterests, and sought a balance between them. The consti-\ntutional regime we enter today erases the woman’s interest\nand recognizes only the State’s (or the Federal Govern-\nment’s).\n B\n The majority makes this change based on a single ques-\ntion: Did the reproductive right recognized in Roe and Casey\n\n——————\nof any significance.” Ante, at 38. To the contrary. The liberty interests\nunderlying those rights are, as we will describe, quite similar. See infra,\nat 22–24. But only in the sphere of abortion is the state interest in pro-\ntecting potential life involved. So only in that sphere, as both Roe and\nCasey recognized, may a State impinge so far on the liberty interest (bar-\nring abortion after viability and discouraging it before). The majority’s\nfailure to understand this fairly obvious point stems from its rejection of\nthe idea of balancing interests in this (or maybe in any) constitutional\ncontext. Cf. New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S.\n___, ___, ___–___ (2022) (slip op., at 8, 15–17). The majority thinks that\na woman has no liberty or equality interest in the decision to bear a child,\nso a State’s interest in protecting fetal life necessarily prevails.\n"
[160] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 13\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nexist in “1868, the year when the Fourteenth Amendment\nwas ratified”? Ante, at 23. The majority says (and with this\nmuch we agree) that the answer to this question is no: In\n1868, there was no nationwide right to end a pregnancy,\nand no thought that the Fourteenth Amendment provided\none.\n Of course, the majority opinion refers as well to some\nlater and earlier history. On the one side of 1868, it goes\nback as far as the 13th (the 13th!) century. See ante, at 17.\nBut that turns out to be wheel-spinning. First, it is not\nclear what relevance such early history should have, even\nto the majority. See New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn.,\nInc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 26) (“His-\ntorical evidence that long predates [ratification] may not il-\nluminate the scope of the right”). If the early history obvi-\nously supported abortion rights, the majority would no\ndoubt say that only the views of the Fourteenth Amend-\nment’s ratifiers are germane. See ibid. (It is “better not to\ngo too far back into antiquity,” except if olden “law survived\nto become our Founders’ law”). Second—and embarrass-\ningly for the majority—early law in fact does provide some\nsupport for abortion rights. Common-law authorities did\nnot treat abortion as a crime before “quickening”—the point\nwhen the fetus moved in the womb.2 And early American\nlaw followed the common-law rule.3 So the criminal law of\nthat early time might be taken as roughly consonant with\n\n——————\n 2 See, e.g., 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England\n\n129–130 (7th ed. 1775) (Blackstone); E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws of\nEngland 50 (1644).\n 3 See J. Mohr, Abortion in America: The Origins and Evolution of Na-\n\ntional Policy, 1800–1900, pp. 3–4 (1978). The majority offers no evidence\nto the contrary—no example of a founding-era law making pre-\nquickening abortion a crime (except when a woman died). See ante, at\n20–21. And even in the mid-19th century, more than 10 States continued\nto allow pre-quickening abortions. See Brief for American Historical As-\nsociation et al. as Amici Curiae 27, and n. 14.\n"
[161] "14 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nRoe’s and Casey’s different treatment of early and late abor-\ntions. Better, then, to move forward in time. On the other\nside of 1868, the majority occasionally notes that many\nStates barred abortion up to the time of Roe. See ante, at\n24, 36. That is convenient for the majority, but it is window\ndressing. As the same majority (plus one) just informed us,\n“post-ratification adoption or acceptance of laws that are in-\nconsistent with the original meaning of the constitutional\ntext obviously cannot overcome or alter that text.” New\nYork State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc., 597 U. S., at ___–___\n(slip op., at 27–28). Had the pre-Roe liberalization of abor-\ntion laws occurred more quickly and more widely in the\n20th century, the majority would say (once again) that only\nthe ratifiers’ views are germane.\n The majority’s core legal postulate, then, is that we in the\n21st century must read the Fourteenth Amendment just as\nits ratifiers did. And that is indeed what the majority em-\nphasizes over and over again. See ante, at 47 (“[T]he most\nimportant historical fact [is] how the States regulated abor-\ntion when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted”); see\nalso ante, at 5, 16, and n. 24, 23, 25, 28. If the ratifiers did\nnot understand something as central to freedom, then nei-\nther can we. Or said more particularly: If those people did\nnot understand reproductive rights as part of the guarantee\nof liberty conferred in the Fourteenth Amendment, then\nthose rights do not exist.\n As an initial matter, note a mistake in the just preceding\nsentence. We referred there to the “people” who ratified the\nFourteenth Amendment: What rights did those “people”\nhave in their heads at the time? But, of course, “people” did\nnot ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. Men did. So it is\nperhaps not so surprising that the ratifiers were not per-\nfectly attuned to the importance of reproductive rights for\nwomen’s liberty, or for their capacity to participate as equal\nmembers of our Nation. Indeed, the ratifiers—both in 1868\nand when the original Constitution was approved in 1788—\n"
[162] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 15\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\ndid not understand women as full members of the commu-\nnity embraced by the phrase “We the People.” In 1868, the\nfirst wave of American feminists were explicitly told—of\ncourse by men—that it was not their time to seek constitu-\ntional protections. (Women would not get even the vote for\nanother half-century.) To be sure, most women in 1868 also\nhad a foreshortened view of their rights: If most men could\nnot then imagine giving women control over their bodies,\nmost women could not imagine having that kind of auton-\nomy. But that takes away nothing from the core point.\nThose responsible for the original Constitution, including\nthe Fourteenth Amendment, did not perceive women as\nequals, and did not recognize women’s rights. When the\nmajority says that we must read our foundational charter\nas viewed at the time of ratification (except that we may\nalso check it against the Dark Ages), it consigns women to\nsecond-class citizenship.\n Casey itself understood this point, as will become clear.\nSee infra, at 23–24. It recollected with dismay a decision\nthis Court issued just five years after the Fourteenth\nAmendment’s ratification, approving a State’s decision to\ndeny a law license to a woman and suggesting as well that\na woman had no legal status apart from her husband. See\n505 U. S., at 896–897 (majority opinion) (citing Bradwell v.\nState, 16 Wall. 130 (1873)). “There was a time,” Casey ex-\nplained, when the Constitution did not protect “men and\nwomen alike.” 505 U. S., at 896. But times had changed.\nA woman’s place in society had changed, and constitutional\nlaw had changed along with it. The relegation of women to\ninferior status in either the public sphere or the family was\n“no longer consistent with our understanding” of the Con-\nstitution. Id., at 897. Now, “[t]he Constitution protects all\nindividuals, male or female,” from “the abuse of governmen-\ntal power” or “unjustified state interference.” Id., at 896,\n898.\n So how is it that, as Casey said, our Constitution, read\n"
[163] "16 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nnow, grants rights to women, though it did not in 1868?\nHow is it that our Constitution subjects discrimination\nagainst them to heightened judicial scrutiny? How is it that\nour Constitution, through the Fourteenth Amendment’s lib-\nerty clause, guarantees access to contraception (also not le-\ngally protected in 1868) so that women can decide for them-\nselves whether and when to bear a child? How is it that\nuntil today, that same constitutional clause protected a\nwoman’s right, in the event contraception failed, to end a\npregnancy in its earlier stages?\n The answer is that this Court has rejected the majority’s\npinched view of how to read our Constitution. “The Found-\ners,” we recently wrote, “knew they were writing a docu-\nment designed to apply to ever-changing circumstances\nover centuries.” NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S. 513,\n533–534 (2014). Or in the words of the great Chief Justice\nJohn Marshall, our Constitution is “intended to endure for\nages to come,” and must adapt itself to a future “seen\ndimly,” if at all. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 415\n(1819). That is indeed why our Constitution is written as it\nis. The Framers (both in 1788 and 1868) understood that\nthe world changes. So they did not define rights by refer-\nence to the specific practices existing at the time. Instead,\nthe Framers defined rights in general terms, to permit fu-\nture evolution in their scope and meaning. And over the\ncourse of our history, this Court has taken up the Framers’\ninvitation. It has kept true to the Framers’ principles by\napplying them in new ways, responsive to new societal un-\nderstandings and conditions.\n Nowhere has that approach been more prevalent than in\nconstruing the majestic but open-ended words of the Four-\nteenth Amendment—the guarantees of “liberty” and\n“equality” for all. And nowhere has that approach produced\nprouder moments, for this country and the Court. Consider\nan example Obergefell used a few years ago. The Court\n"
[164] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 17\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nthere confronted a claim, based on Washington v. Glucks-\nberg, 521 U. S. 702 (1997), that the Fourteenth Amendment\n“must be defined in a most circumscribed manner, with cen-\ntral reference to specific historical practices”—exactly the\nview today’s majority follows. Obergefell, 576 U. S., at 671.\nAnd the Court specifically rejected that view.4 In doing so,\nthe Court reflected on what the proposed, historically cir-\ncumscribed approach would have meant for interracial\nmarriage. See ibid. The Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiers\ndid not think it gave black and white people a right to marry\neach other. To the contrary, contemporaneous practice\ndeemed that act quite as unprotected as abortion. Yet the\nCourt in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967), read the\nFourteenth Amendment to embrace the Lovings’ union. If,\nObergefell explained, “rights were defined by who exercised\nthem in the past, then received practices could serve as\ntheir own continued justification”—even when they conflict\nwith “liberty” and “equality” as later and more broadly un-\nderstood. 576 U. S., at 671. The Constitution does not\nfreeze for all time the original view of what those rights\nguarantee, or how they apply.\n That does not mean anything goes. The majority wishes\npeople to think there are but two alternatives: (1) accept the\noriginal applications of the Fourteenth Amendment and no\nothers, or (2) surrender to judges’ “own ardent views,” un-\ngrounded in law, about the “liberty that Americans should\nenjoy.” Ante, at 14. At least, that idea is what the majority\nsometimes tries to convey. At other times, the majority (or,\nrather, most of it) tries to assure the public that it has no\ndesigns on rights (for example, to contraception) that arose\nonly in the back half of the 20th century—in other words,\n——————\n 4 The majority ignores that rejection. See ante, at 5, 13, 36. But it is\n\nunequivocal: The Glucksberg test, Obergefell said, “may have been ap-\npropriate” in considering physician-assisted suicide, but “is inconsistent\nwith the approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamental\nrights, including marriage and intimacy.” 576 U. S., at 671.\n"
[165] "18 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nthat it is happy to pick and choose, in accord with individual\npreferences. See ante, at 32, 66, 71–72; ante, at 10\n(KAVANAUGH, J., concurring); but see ante, at 3 (THOMAS,\nJ., concurring). But that is a matter we discuss later. See\ninfra, at 24–29. For now, our point is different: It is that\napplications of liberty and equality can evolve while re-\nmaining grounded in constitutional principles, constitu-\ntional history, and constitutional precedents. The second\nJustice Harlan discussed how to strike the right balance\nwhen he explained why he would have invalidated a State’s\nban on contraceptive use. Judges, he said, are not “free to\nroam where unguided speculation might take them.” Poe v.\nUllman, 367 U. S. 497, 542 (1961) (dissenting opinion). Yet\nthey also must recognize that the constitutional “tradition”\nof this country is not captured whole at a single moment.\nIbid. Rather, its meaning gains content from the long\nsweep of our history and from successive judicial prece-\ndents—each looking to the last and each seeking to apply\nthe Constitution’s most fundamental commitments to new\nconditions. That is why Americans, to go back to Oberge-\nfell’s example, have a right to marry across racial lines.\nAnd it is why, to go back to Justice Harlan’s case, Ameri-\ncans have a right to use contraceptives so they can choose\nfor themselves whether to have children.\n All that is what Casey understood. Casey explicitly re-\njected the present majority’s method. “[T]he specific prac-\ntices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth\nAmendment,” Casey stated, do not “mark[ ] the outer limits\nof the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth\nAmendment protects.” 505 U. S., at 848.5 To hold other-\nwise—as the majority does today—“would be inconsistent\n\n——————\n 5 In a perplexing paragraph in its opinion, the majority declares that it\n\nneed not say whether that statement from Casey is true. See ante, at 32–\n33. But how could that be? Has not the majority insisted for the prior\n30 or so pages that the “specific practice[ ]” respecting abortion at the\n"
[166] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 19\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nwith our law.” Id., at 847. Why? Because the Court has\n“vindicated [the] principle” over and over that (no matter\nthe sentiment in 1868) “there is a realm of personal liberty\nwhich the government may not enter”—especially relating\nto “bodily integrity” and “family life.” Id., at 847, 849, 851.\nCasey described in detail the Court’s contraception cases.\nSee id., at 848–849, 851–853. It noted decisions protecting\nthe right to marry, including to someone of another race.\nSee id., at 847–848 (“[I]nterracial marriage was illegal in\nmost States in the 19th century, but the Court was no doubt\ncorrect in finding it to be an aspect of liberty protected\nagainst state interference”). In reviewing decades and dec-\nades of constitutional law, Casey could draw but one conclu-\nsion: Whatever was true in 1868, “[i]t is settled now, as it\nwas when the Court heard arguments in Roe v. Wade, that\nthe Constitution places limits on a State’s right to interfere\nwith a person’s most basic decisions about family and\nparenthood.” Id., at 849.\n And that conclusion still held good, until the Court’s in-\ntervention here. It was settled at the time of Roe, settled at\nthe time of Casey, and settled yesterday that the Constitu-\ntion places limits on a State’s power to assert control over\nan individual’s body and most personal decisionmaking. A\nmultitude of decisions supporting that principle led to Roe’s\nrecognition and Casey’s reaffirmation of the right to choose;\nand Roe and Casey in turn supported additional protections\nfor intimate and familial relations. The majority has em-\n\n——————\ntime of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes its recognition as a consti-\ntutional right? Ante, at 33. It has. And indeed, it has given no other\nreason for overruling Roe and Casey. Ante, at 15–16. We are not min-\ndreaders, but here is our best guess as to what the majority means. It\nsays next that “[a]bortion is nothing new.” Ante, at 33. So apparently,\nthe Fourteenth Amendment might provide protection for things wholly\nunknown in the 19th century; maybe one day there could be constitu-\ntional protection for, oh, time travel. But as to anything that was known\nback then (such as abortion or contraception), no such luck.\n"
[167] "20 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nbarrassingly little to say about those precedents. It (liter-\nally) rattles them off in a single paragraph; and it implies\nthat they have nothing to do with each other, or with the\nright to terminate an early pregnancy. See ante, at 31–32\n(asserting that recognizing a relationship among them, as\naddressing aspects of personal autonomy, would inelucta-\nbly “license fundamental rights” to illegal “drug use [and]\nprostitution”). But that is flat wrong. The Court’s prece-\ndents about bodily autonomy, sexual and familial relations,\nand procreation are all interwoven—all part of the fabric of\nour constitutional law, and because that is so, of our lives.\nEspecially women’s lives, where they safeguard a right to\nself-determination.\n And eliminating that right, we need to say before further\ndescribing our precedents, is not taking a “neutral” posi-\ntion, as JUSTICE KAVANAUGH tries to argue. Ante, at 2–3,\n5, 7, 11–12 (concurring opinion). His idea is that neutrality\nlies in giving the abortion issue to the States, where some\ncan go one way and some another. But would he say that\nthe Court is being “scrupulously neutral” if it allowed New\nYork and California to ban all the guns they want? Ante, at\n3. If the Court allowed some States to use unanimous juries\nand others not? If the Court told the States: Decide for\nyourselves whether to put restrictions on church attend-\nance? We could go on—and in fact we will. Suppose\nJUSTICE KAVANAUGH were to say (in line with the majority\nopinion) that the rights we just listed are more textually or\nhistorically grounded than the right to choose. What, then,\nof the right to contraception or same-sex marriage? Would\nit be “scrupulously neutral” for the Court to eliminate those\nrights too? The point of all these examples is that when it\ncomes to rights, the Court does not act “neutrally” when it\nleaves everything up to the States. Rather, the Court acts\nneutrally when it protects the right against all comers. And\nto apply that point to the case here: When the Court deci-\nmates a right women have held for 50 years, the Court is\n"
[168] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 21\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nnot being “scrupulously neutral.” It is instead taking sides:\nagainst women who wish to exercise the right, and for\nStates (like Mississippi) that want to bar them from doing\nso. JUSTICE KAVANAUGH cannot obscure that point by ap-\npropriating the rhetoric of even-handedness. His position\njust is what it is: A brook-no-compromise refusal to recog-\nnize a woman’s right to choose, from the first day of a preg-\nnancy. And that position, as we will now show, cannot be\nsquared with this Court’s longstanding view that women\nindeed have rights (whatever the state of the world in 1868)\nto make the most personal and consequential decisions\nabout their bodies and their lives.\n Consider first, then, the line of this Court’s cases protect-\ning “bodily integrity.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 849. “No right,”\nin this Court’s time-honored view, “is held more sacred, or\nis more carefully guarded,” than “the right of every individ-\nual to the possession and control of his own person.” Union\nPacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, 251 (1891); see\nCruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U. S. 261, 269\n(1990) (Every adult “has a right to determine what shall be\ndone with his own body”). Or to put it more simply: Every-\none, including women, owns their own bodies. So the Court\nhas restricted the power of government to interfere with a\nperson’s medical decisions or compel her to undergo medical\nprocedures or treatments. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470\nU. S. 753, 766–767 (1985) (forced surgery); Rochin v. Cali-\nfornia, 342 U. S. 165, 166, 173–174 (1952) (forced stomach\npumping); Washington v. Harper, 494 U. S. 210, 229, 236\n(1990) (forced administration of antipsychotic drugs).\n Casey recognized the “doctrinal affinity” between those\nprecedents and Roe. 505 U. S., at 857. And that doctrinal\naffinity is born of a factual likeness. There are few greater\nincursions on a body than forcing a woman to complete a\npregnancy and give birth. For every woman, those experi-\nences involve all manner of physical changes, medical treat-\nments (including the possibility of a cesarean section), and\n"
[169] "22 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nmedical risk. Just as one example, an American woman is\n14 times more likely to die by carrying a pregnancy to term\nthan by having an abortion. See Whole Woman’s Health v.\nHellerstedt, 579 U. S. 582, 618 (2016). That women happily\nundergo those burdens and hazards of their own accord\ndoes not lessen how far a State impinges on a woman’s body\nwhen it compels her to bring a pregnancy to term. And for\nsome women, as Roe recognized, abortions are medically\nnecessary to prevent harm. See 410 U. S., at 153. The ma-\njority does not say—which is itself ominous—whether a\nState may prevent a woman from obtaining an abortion\nwhen she and her doctor have determined it is a needed\nmedical treatment.\n So too, Roe and Casey fit neatly into a long line of deci-\nsions protecting from government intrusion a wealth of pri-\nvate choices about family matters, child rearing, intimate\nrelationships, and procreation. See Casey, 505 U. S., at 851,\n857; Roe, 410 U. S., at 152–153; see also ante, at 31–32 (list-\ning the myriad decisions of this kind that Casey relied on).\nThose cases safeguard particular choices about whom to\nmarry; whom to have sex with; what family members to live\nwith; how to raise children—and crucially, whether and\nwhen to have children. In varied cases, the Court explained\nthat those choices—“the most intimate and personal” a per-\nson can make—reflect fundamental aspects of personal\nidentity; they define the very “attributes of personhood.”\nCasey, 505 U. S., at 851. And they inevitably shape the na-\nture and future course of a person’s life (and often the lives\nof those closest to her). So, the Court held, those choices\nbelong to the individual, and not the government. That is\nthe essence of what liberty requires.\n And liberty may require it, this Court has repeatedly\nsaid, even when those living in 1868 would not have recog-\nnized the claim—because they would not have seen the per-\nson making it as a full-fledged member of the community.\nThroughout our history, the sphere of protected liberty has\n"
[170] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 23\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nexpanded, bringing in individuals formerly excluded. In\nthat way, the constitutional values of liberty and equality\ngo hand in hand; they do not inhabit the hermetically sealed\ncontainers the majority portrays. Compare Obergefell, 576\nU. S., at 672–675, with ante, at 10–11. So before Roe and\nCasey, the Court expanded in successive cases those who\ncould claim the right to marry—though their relationships\nwould have been outside the law’s protection in the mid-\n19th century. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U. S. 1 (interracial cou-\nples); Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78 (1987) (prisoners); see\nalso, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651–652 (1972)\n(offering constitutional protection to untraditional “family\nunit[s]”). And after Roe and Casey, of course, the Court con-\ntinued in that vein. With a critical stop to hold that the\nFourteenth Amendment protected same-sex intimacy, the\nCourt resolved that the Amendment also conferred on\nsame-sex couples the right to marry. See Lawrence, 539\nU. S. 558; Obergefell, 576 U. S. 644. In considering that\nquestion, the Court held, “[h]istory and tradition,” espe-\ncially as reflected in the course of our precedent, “guide and\ndiscipline [the] inquiry.” Id., at 664. But the sentiments of\n1868 alone do not and cannot “rule the present.” Ibid.\n Casey similarly recognized the need to extend the consti-\ntutional sphere of liberty to a previously excluded group.\nThe Court then understood, as the majority today does not,\nthat the men who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and\nwrote the state laws of the time did not view women as full\nand equal citizens. See supra, at 15. A woman then, Casey\nwrote, “had no legal existence separate from her husband.”\n505 U. S., at 897. Women were seen only “as the center of\nhome and family life,” without “full and independent legal\nstatus under the Constitution.” Ibid. But that could not be\ntrue any longer: The State could not now insist on the his-\ntorically dominant “vision of the woman’s role.” Id., at 852.\nAnd equal citizenship, Casey realized, was inescapably con-\n"
[171] "24 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nnected to reproductive rights. “The ability of women to par-\nticipate equally” in the “life of the Nation”—in all its eco-\nnomic, social, political, and legal aspects—“has been facili-\ntated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.”\nId., at 856. Without the ability to decide whether and when\nto have children, women could not—in the way men took for\ngranted—determine how they would live their lives, and\nhow they would contribute to the society around them.\n For much that reason, Casey made clear that the prece-\ndents Roe most closely tracked were those involving contra-\nception. Over the course of three cases, the Court had held\nthat a right to use and gain access to contraception was part\nof the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of liberty. See\nGriswold, 381 U. S. 479; Eisenstadt, 405 U. S. 438; Carey v.\nPopulation Services Int’l, 431 U. S. 678 (1977). That clause,\nwe explained, necessarily conferred a right “to be free from\nunwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fun-\ndamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to\nbear or beget a child.” Eisenstadt, 405 U. S., at 453; see\nCarey, 431 U. S., at 684–685. Casey saw Roe as of a piece:\nIn “critical respects the abortion decision is of the same\ncharacter.” 505 U. S., at 852. “[R]easonable people,” the\nCourt noted, could also oppose contraception; and indeed,\nthey could believe that “some forms of contraception” simi-\nlarly implicate a concern with “potential life.” Id., at 853,\n859. Yet the views of others could not automatically prevail\nagainst a woman’s right to control her own body and make\nher own choice about whether to bear, and probably to\nraise, a child. When an unplanned pregnancy is involved—\nbecause either contraception or abortion is outlawed—“the\nliberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the\nhuman condition.” Id., at 852. No State could undertake to\nresolve the moral questions raised “in such a definitive\nway” as to deprive a woman of all choice. Id., at 850.\n Faced with all these connections between Roe/Casey and\njudicial decisions recognizing other constitutional rights,\n"
[172] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 25\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nthe majority tells everyone not to worry. It can (so it says)\nneatly extract the right to choose from the constitutional\nedifice without affecting any associated rights. (Think of\nsomeone telling you that the Jenga tower simply will not\ncollapse.) Today’s decision, the majority first says, “does\nnot undermine” the decisions cited by Roe and Casey—the\nones involving “marriage, procreation, contraception, [and]\nfamily relationships”—“in any way.” Ante, at 32; Casey, 505\nU. S., at 851. Note that this first assurance does not extend\nto rights recognized after Roe and Casey, and partly based\non them—in particular, rights to same-sex intimacy and\nmarriage. See supra, at 23.6 On its later tries, though, the\nmajority includes those too: “Nothing in this opinion should\nbe understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not con-\ncern abortion.” Ante, at 66; see ante, at 71–72. That right\nis unique, the majority asserts, “because [abortion] termi-\nnates life or potential life.” Ante, at 66 (internal quotation\nmarks omitted); see ante, at 32, 71–72. So the majority de-\npicts today’s decision as “a restricted railroad ticket, good\nfor this day and train only.” Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S.\n649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting). Should the audi-\nence for these too-much-repeated protestations be duly sat-\nisfied? We think not.\n The first problem with the majority’s account comes from\nJUSTICE THOMAS’s concurrence—which makes clear he is\nnot with the program. In saying that nothing in today’s\nopinion casts doubt on non-abortion precedents, JUSTICE\nTHOMAS explains, he means only that they are not at issue\n——————\n 6 And note, too, that the author of the majority opinion recently joined\n\na statement, written by another member of the majority, lamenting that\nObergefell deprived States of the ability “to resolve th[e] question [of\nsame-sex marriage] through legislation.” Davis v. Ermold, 592 U. S. ___,\n___ (2020) (statement of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 1). That might sound\nfamiliar. Cf. ante, at 44 (lamenting that Roe “short-circuited the demo-\ncratic process”). And those two Justices hardly seemed content to let the\nmatter rest: The Court, they said, had “created a problem that only it can\nfix.” Davis, 592 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4).\n"
[173] "26 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nin this very case. See ante, at 7 (“[T]his case does not pre-\nsent the opportunity to reject” those precedents). But he\nlets us know what he wants to do when they are. “[I]n fu-\nture cases,” he says, “we should reconsider all of this Court’s\nsubstantive due process precedents, including Griswold,\nLawrence, and Obergefell.” Ante, at 3; see also supra, at 25,\nand n. 6. And when we reconsider them? Then “we have a\nduty” to “overrul[e] these demonstrably erroneous deci-\nsions.” Ante, at 3. So at least one Justice is planning to use\nthe ticket of today’s decision again and again and again.\n Even placing the concurrence to the side, the assurance\nin today’s opinion still does not work. Or at least that is so\nif the majority is serious about its sole reason for overturn-\ning Roe and Casey: the legal status of abortion in the 19th\ncentury. Except in the places quoted above, the state inter-\nest in protecting fetal life plays no part in the majority’s\nanalysis. To the contrary, the majority takes pride in not\nexpressing a view “about the status of the fetus.” Ante, at\n65; see ante, at 32 (aligning itself with Roe’s and Casey’s\nstance of not deciding whether life or potential life is in-\nvolved); ante, at 38–39 (similar). The majority’s departure\nfrom Roe and Casey rests instead—and only—on whether a\nwoman’s decision to end a pregnancy involves any Four-\nteenth Amendment liberty interest (against which Roe and\nCasey balanced the state interest in preserving fetal life).7\n——————\n 7 Indulge a few more words about this point. The majority had a choice\n\nof two different ways to overrule Roe and Casey. It could claim that those\ncases underrated the State’s interest in fetal life. Or it could claim that\nthey overrated a woman’s constitutional liberty interest in choosing an\nabortion. (Or both.) The majority here rejects the first path, and we can\nsee why. Taking that route would have prevented the majority from\nclaiming that it means only to leave this issue to the democratic pro-\ncess—that it does not have a dog in the fight. See ante, at 38–39, 65.\nAnd indeed, doing so might have suggested a revolutionary proposition:\nthat the fetus is itself a constitutionally protected “person,” such that an\nabortion ban is constitutionally mandated. The majority therefore\nchooses the second path, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment does\n"
[174] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 27\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nAccording to the majority, no liberty interest is present—\nbecause (and only because) the law offered no protection to\nthe woman’s choice in the 19th century. But here is the rub.\nThe law also did not then (and would not for ages) protect a\nwealth of other things. It did not protect the rights recog-\nnized in Lawrence and Obergefell to same-sex intimacy and\nmarriage. It did not protect the right recognized in Loving\nto marry across racial lines. It did not protect the right rec-\nognized in Griswold to contraceptive use. For that matter,\nit did not protect the right recognized in Skinner v. Okla-\nhoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942), not to be ster-\nilized without consent. So if the majority is right in its legal\nanalysis, all those decisions were wrong, and all those mat-\nters properly belong to the States too—whatever the partic-\nular state interests involved. And if that is true, it is im-\npossible to understand (as a matter of logic and principle)\nhow the majority can say that its opinion today does not\nthreaten—does not even “undermine”—any number of\nother constitutional rights. Ante, at 32.8\n Nor does it even help just to take the majority at its word.\nAssume the majority is sincere in saying, for whatever rea-\nson, that it will go so far and no further. Scout’s honor.\nStill, the future significance of today’s opinion will be de-\ncided in the future. And law often has a way of evolving\n\n——————\nnot conceive of the abortion decision as implicating liberty, because the\nlaw in the 19th century gave that choice no protection. The trouble is\nthat the chosen path—which is, again, the solitary rationale for the\nCourt’s decision—provides no way to distinguish between the right to\nchoose an abortion and a range of other rights, including contraception.\n 8 The majority briefly (very briefly) gestures at the idea that some stare\n\ndecisis factors might play out differently with respect to these other con-\nstitutional rights. But the majority gives no hint as to why. And the\nmajority’s (mis)treatment of stare decisis in this case provides little rea-\nson to think that the doctrine would stand as a barrier to the majority’s\nredoing any other decision it considered egregiously wrong. See infra, at\n30–57.\n"
[175] "28 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nwithout regard to original intentions—a way of actually fol-\nlowing where logic leads, rather than tolerating hard-to-\nexplain lines. Rights can expand in that way. Dissenting\nin Lawrence, Justice Scalia explained why he took no com-\nfort in the Court’s statement that a decision recognizing the\nright to same-sex intimacy did “not involve” same-sex mar-\nriage. 539 U. S., at 604. That could be true, he wrote, “only\nif one entertains the belief that principle and logic have\nnothing to do with the decisions of this Court.” Id., at 605.\nScore one for the dissent, as a matter of prophecy. And logic\nand principle are not one-way ratchets. Rights can contract\nin the same way and for the same reason—because what-\never today’s majority might say, one thing really does lead\nto another. We fervently hope that does not happen be-\ncause of today’s decision. We hope that we will not join Jus-\ntice Scalia in the book of prophets. But we cannot under-\nstand how anyone can be confident that today’s opinion will\nbe the last of its kind.\n Consider, as our last word on this issue, contraception.\nThe Constitution, of course, does not mention that word.\nAnd there is no historical right to contraception, of the kind\nthe majority insists on. To the contrary, the American legal\nlandscape in the decades after the Civil War was littered\nwith bans on the sale of contraceptive devices. So again,\nthere seem to be two choices. See supra, at 5, 26–27. If the\nmajority is serious about its historical approach, then Gris-\nwold and its progeny are in the line of fire too. Or if it is\nnot serious, then . . . what is the basis of today’s decision?\nIf we had to guess, we suspect the prospects of this Court\napproving bans on contraception are low. But once again,\nthe future significance of today’s opinion will be decided in\nthe future. At the least, today’s opinion will fuel the fight\nto get contraception, and any other issues with a moral di-\nmension, out of the Fourteenth Amendment and into state\n"
[176] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 29\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nlegislatures.9\n Anyway, today’s decision, taken on its own, is cata-\nstrophic enough. As a matter of constitutional method, the\nmajority’s commitment to replicate in 2022 every view\nabout the meaning of liberty held in 1868 has precious little\nto recommend it. Our law in this constitutional sphere, as\nin most, has for decades upon decades proceeded differ-\nently. It has considered fundamental constitutional princi-\nples, the whole course of the Nation’s history and traditions,\nand the step-by-step evolution of the Court’s precedents. It\nis disciplined but not static. It relies on accumulated judg-\nments, not just the sentiments of one long-ago generation\nof men (who themselves believed, and drafted the Constitu-\ntion to reflect, that the world progresses). And by doing so,\nit includes those excluded from that olden conversation, ra-\nther than perpetuating its bounds.\n As a matter of constitutional substance, the majority’s\nopinion has all the flaws its method would suggest. Be-\ncause laws in 1868 deprived women of any control over their\nbodies, the majority approves States doing so today. Be-\ncause those laws prevented women from charting the\ncourse of their own lives, the majority says States can do\nthe same again. Because in 1868, the government could tell\na pregnant woman—even in the first days of her preg-\nnancy—that she could do nothing but bear a child, it can\nonce more impose that command. Today’s decision strips\nwomen of agency over what even the majority agrees is a\n——————\n 9 As this Court has considered this case, some state legislators have\n\nbegun to call for restrictions on certain forms of contraception. See\nI. Stevenson, After Roe Decision, Idaho Lawmakers May Consider\nRestricting Some Contraception, Idaho Statesman (May 10, 2022),\nhttps://www.idahostatesman.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/\narticle261207007.html; T. Weinberg, “Anything’s on the Table”: Missouri\nLegislature May Revisit Contraceptive Limits Post-Roe, Missouri Inde-\npendent (May 20, 2022), https://www.missouriindependent.com/2022/05/\n20/anythings-on-the-table-missouri-legislature-may-revisit-contraceptive-\nlimits-post-roe/.\n"
[177] "30 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\ncontested and contestable moral issue. It forces her to carry\nout the State’s will, whatever the circumstances and what-\never the harm it will wreak on her and her family. In the\nFourteenth Amendment’s terms, it takes away her liberty.\nEven before we get to stare decisis, we dissent.\n II\n By overruling Roe, Casey, and more than 20 cases reaf-\nfirming or applying the constitutional right to abortion, the\nmajority abandons stare decisis, a principle central to the\nrule of law. “Stare decisis” means “to stand by things de-\ncided.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1696 (11th ed. 2019). Black-\nstone called it the “established rule to abide by former prec-\nedents.” 1 Blackstone 69. Stare decisis “promotes the\nevenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of le-\ngal principles.” Payne, 501 U. S., at 827. It maintains a\nstability that allows people to order their lives under the\nlaw. See H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic\nProblems in the Making and Application of Law 568–569\n(1994).\n Stare decisis also “contributes to the integrity of our con-\nstitutional system of government” by ensuring that deci-\nsions “are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities\nof individuals.” Vasquez, 474 U. S., at 265. As Hamilton\nwrote: It “avoid[s] an arbitrary discretion in the courts.”\nThe Federalist No. 78, p. 529 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Ham-\nilton). And as Blackstone said before him: It “keep[s] the\nscale of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with\nevery new judge’s opinion.” 1 Blackstone 69. The “glory” of\nour legal system is that it “gives preference to precedent ra-\nther than . . . jurists.” H. Humble, Departure From Prece-\ndent, 19 Mich. L. Rev. 608, 614 (1921). That is why, the\nstory goes, Chief Justice John Marshall donned a plain\nblack robe when he swore the oath of office. That act per-\nsonified an American tradition. Judges’ personal prefer-\nences do not make law; rather, the law speaks through\n"
[178] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 31\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nthem.\n That means the Court may not overrule a decision, even\na constitutional one, without a “special justification.” Gam-\nble v. United States, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at\n11). Stare decisis is, of course, not an “inexorable com-\nmand”; it is sometimes appropriate to overrule an earlier\ndecision. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 233 (2009).\nBut the Court must have a good reason to do so over and\nabove the belief “that the precedent was wrongly decided.”\nHalliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U. S. 258,\n266 (2014). “[I]t is not alone sufficient that we would decide\na case differently now than we did then.” Kimble v. Marvel\nEntertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 455 (2015).\n The majority today lists some 30 of our cases as overrul-\ning precedent, and argues that they support overruling Roe\nand Casey. But none does, as further described below and\nin the Appendix. See infra, at 61–66. In some, the Court\nonly partially modified or clarified a precedent. And in the\nrest, the Court relied on one or more of the traditional stare\ndecisis factors in reaching its conclusion. The Court found,\nfor example, (1) a change in legal doctrine that undermined\nor made obsolete the earlier decision; (2) a factual change\nthat had the same effect; or (3) an absence of reliance be-\ncause the earlier decision was less than a decade old. (The\nmajority is wrong when it says that we insist on a test of\nchanged law or fact alone, although that is present in most\nof the cases. See ante, at 69.) None of those factors apply\nhere: Nothing—and in particular, no significant legal or fac-\ntual change—supports overturning a half-century of settled\nlaw giving women control over their reproductive lives.\n First, for all the reasons we have given, Roe and Casey\nwere correct. In holding that a State could not “resolve” the\ndebate about abortion “in such a definitive way that a\nwoman lacks all choice in the matter,” the Court protected\nwomen’s liberty and women’s equality in a way comporting\nwith our Fourteenth Amendment precedents. Casey, 505\n"
[179] "32 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nU. S., at 850. Contrary to the majority’s view, the legal sta-\ntus of abortion in the 19th century does not weaken those\ndecisions. And the majority’s repeated refrain about\n“usurp[ing]” state legislatures’ “power to address” a pub-\nlicly contested question does not help it on the key issue\nhere. Ante, at 44; see ante, at 1. To repeat: The point of a\nright is to shield individual actions and decisions “from the\nvicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond\nthe reach of majorities and officials and to establish them\nas legal principles to be applied by the courts.” Barnette,\n319 U. S., at 638; supra, at 7. However divisive, a right is\nnot at the people’s mercy.\n In any event “[w]hether or not we . . . agree” with a prior\nprecedent is the beginning, not the end, of our analysis—\nand the remaining “principles of stare decisis weigh heavily\nagainst overruling” Roe and Casey. Dickerson v. United\nStates, 530 U. S. 428, 443 (2000). Casey itself applied those\nprinciples, in one of this Court’s most important precedents\nabout precedent. After assessing the traditional stare deci-\nsis factors, Casey reached the only conclusion possible—\nthat stare decisis operates powerfully here. It still does.\nThe standards Roe and Casey set out are perfectly worka-\nble. No changes in either law or fact have eroded the two\ndecisions. And tens of millions of American women have\nrelied, and continue to rely, on the right to choose. So under\ntraditional stare decisis principles, the majority has no spe-\ncial justification for the harm it causes.\n And indeed, the majority comes close to conceding that\npoint. The majority barely mentions any legal or factual\nchanges that have occurred since Roe and Casey. It sug-\ngests that the two decisions are hard for courts to imple-\nment, but cannot prove its case. In the end, the majority\nsays, all it must say to override stare decisis is one thing:\nthat it believes Roe and Casey “egregiously wrong.” Ante,\nat 70. That rule could equally spell the end of any precedent\nwith which a bare majority of the present Court disagrees.\n"
[180] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 33\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nSo how does that approach prevent the “scale of justice”\nfrom “waver[ing] with every new judge’s opinion”? 1 Black-\nstone 69. It does not. It makes radical change too easy and\ntoo fast, based on nothing more than the new views of new\njudges. The majority has overruled Roe and Casey for one\nand only one reason: because it has always despised them,\nand now it has the votes to discard them. The majority\nthereby substitutes a rule by judges for the rule of law.\n A\n Contrary to the majority’s view, there is nothing unwork-\nable about Casey’s “undue burden” standard. Its primary\nfocus on whether a State has placed a “substantial obstacle”\non a woman seeking an abortion is “the sort of inquiry fa-\nmiliar to judges across a variety of contexts.” June Medical\nServices L. L. C. v. Russo, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op.,\nat 6) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). And it has\ngiven rise to no more conflict in application than many\nstandards this Court and others unhesitatingly apply every\nday.\n General standards, like the undue burden standard, are\nubiquitous in the law, and particularly in constitutional ad-\njudication. When called on to give effect to the Constitu-\ntion’s broad principles, this Court often crafts flexible\nstandards that can be applied case-by-case to a myriad of\nunforeseeable circumstances. See Dickerson, 530 U. S., at\n441 (“No court laying down a general rule can possibly fore-\nsee the various circumstances” in which it must apply). So,\nfor example, the Court asks about undue or substantial bur-\ndens on speech, on voting, and on interstate commerce. See,\ne.g., Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.\nBennett, 564 U. S. 721, 748 (2011); Burdick v. Takushi, 504\nU. S. 428, 433–434 (1992); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397\nU. S. 137, 142 (1970). The Casey undue burden standard is\nthe same. It also resembles general standards that courts\n"
[181] "34 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nwork with daily in other legal spheres—like the “rule of rea-\nson” in antitrust law or the “arbitrary and capricious”\nstandard for agency decisionmaking. See Standard Oil Co.\nof N. J. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 62 (1911); Motor Vehi-\ncle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Au-\ntomobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 42–43 (1983). Applying gen-\neral standards to particular cases is, in many contexts, just\nwhat it means to do law.\n And the undue burden standard has given rise to no un-\nusual difficulties. Of course, it has provoked some disagree-\nment among judges. Casey knew it would: That much “is to\nbe expected in the application of any legal standard which\nmust accommodate life’s complexity.” 505 U. S., at 878\n(plurality opinion). Which is to say: That much is to be ex-\npected in the application of any legal standard. But the ma-\njority vastly overstates the divisions among judges applying\nthe standard. We count essentially two. THE CHIEF\nJUSTICE disagreed with other Justices in the June Medical\nmajority about whether Casey called for weighing the ben-\nefits of an abortion regulation against its burdens. See 591\nU. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 6–7); ante, at 59, 60, and\nn. 53.10 We agree that the June Medical difference is a dif-\nference—but not one that would actually make a difference\nin the result of most cases (it did not in June Medical), and\nnot one incapable of resolution were it ever to matter. As\nfor lower courts, there is now a one-year-old, one-to-one Cir-\ncuit split about how the undue burden standard applies to\nstate laws that ban abortions for certain reasons, like fetal\nabnormality. See ante, at 61, and n. 57. That is about it,\nas far as we can see.11 And that is not much. This Court\n\n——————\n 10 Some lower courts then differed over which opinion in June Medical\n\nwas controlling—but that is a dispute not about the undue burden stand-\nard, but about the “Marks rule,” which tells courts how to determine the\nprecedential effects of a divided decision.\n 11 The rest of the majority’s supposed splits are, shall we say, unim-\n"
[182] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 35\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nmostly does not even grant certiorari on one-year-old, one-\nto-one Circuit splits, because we know that a bit of disagree-\nment is an inevitable part of our legal system. To borrow\nan old saying that might apply here: Not one or even a cou-\nple of swallows can make the majority’s summer.\n Anyone concerned about workability should consider the\nmajority’s substitute standard. The majority says a law\nregulating or banning abortion “must be sustained if there\nis a rational basis on which the legislature could have\nthought that it would serve legitimate state interests.”\nAnte, at 77. And the majority lists interests like “respect\nfor and preservation of prenatal life,” “protection of mater-\nnal health,” elimination of certain “medical procedures,”\n“mitigation of fetal pain,” and others. Ante, at 78. This\nCourt will surely face critical questions about how that test\napplies. Must a state law allow abortions when necessary\nto protect a woman’s life and health? And if so, exactly\nwhen? How much risk to a woman’s life can a State force\n——————\npressive. The majority says that lower courts have split over how to ap-\nply the undue burden standard to parental notification laws. See ante,\nat 60, and n. 54. But that is not so. The state law upheld had an exemp-\ntion for minors demonstrating adequate maturity, whereas the ones\nstruck down did not. Compare Planned Parenthood of Blue Ridge v.\nCamblos, 155 F. 3d 352, 383–384 (CA4 1998), with Planned Parenthood\nof Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Adams, 937 F. 3d 973, 981 (CA7 2019), cert. granted,\njudgment vacated, 591 U. S. ___ (2020), and Planned Parenthood, Sioux\nFalls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F. 3d 1452, 1460 (CA8 1995). The majority says\nthere is a split about bans on certain types of abortion procedures. See\nante, at 61, and n. 55. But the one court to have separated itself on that\nissue did so based on a set of factual findings significantly different from\nthose in other cases. Compare Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 10\nF. 4th 430, 447–453 (CA5 2021), with EMW Women’s Surgical Center,\nP.S.C. v. Friedlander, 960 F. 3d 785, 798–806 (CA6 2020), and West Ala.\nWomen’s Center v. Williamson, 900 F. 3d 1310, 1322–1324 (CA11 2018).\nFinally, the majority says there is a split about whether an increase in\ntravel time to reach a clinic is an undue burden. See ante, at 61, and\nn. 56. But the cases to which the majority refers predate this Court’s\ndecision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U. S. 582 (2016),\nwhich clarified how to apply the undue burden standard to that context.\n"
[183] "36 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nher to incur, before the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection\nof life kicks in? Suppose a patient with pulmonary hyper-\ntension has a 30-to-50 percent risk of dying with ongoing\npregnancy; is that enough? And short of death, how much\nillness or injury can the State require her to accept, con-\nsistent with the Amendment’s protection of liberty and\nequality? Further, the Court may face questions about the\napplication of abortion regulations to medical care most\npeople view as quite different from abortion. What about\nthe morning-after pill? IUDs? In vitro fertilization? And\nhow about the use of dilation and evacuation or medication\nfor miscarriage management? See generally L. Harris,\nNavigating Loss of Abortion Services—A Large Academic\nMedical Center Prepares for the Overturn of Roe v. Wade,\n386 New England J. Med. 2061 (2022).12\n Finally, the majority’s ruling today invites a host of ques-\ntions about interstate conflicts. See supra, at 3; see gener-\nally D. Cohen, G. Donley, & R. Rebouché, The New Abortion\nBattleground, 123 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2023),\nhttps://ssrn.com/abstract=4032931. Can a State bar women\nfrom traveling to another State to obtain an abortion? Can\na State prohibit advertising out-of-state abortions or help-\ning women get to out-of-state providers? Can a State inter-\n\n\n——————\n 12 To take just the last, most medical treatments for miscarriage are\n\nidentical to those used in abortions. See Kaiser Family Foundation (Kai-\nser), G. Weigel, L. Sobel, & A. Salganicoff, Understanding Pregnancy\nLoss in the Context of Abortion Restrictions and Fetal Harm Laws\n(Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/\nunderstanding-pregnancy-loss-in-the-context-of-abortion-restrictions-and-\nfetal-harm-laws/. Blanket restrictions on “abortion” procedures and\nmedications therefore may be understood to deprive women of effective\ntreatment for miscarriages, which occur in about 10 to 30 percent of preg-\nnancies. See Health Affairs, J. Strasser, C. Chen, S. Rosenbaum, E.\nSchenk, & E. Dewhurst, Penalizing Abortion Providers Will Have Ripple\nEffects Across Pregnancy Care (May 3, 2022), https://www.healthaffairs.\norg/do/10.1377/forefront.20220503.129912/.\n"
[184] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 37\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nfere with the mailing of drugs used for medication abor-\ntions? The Constitution protects travel and speech and in-\nterstate commerce, so today’s ruling will give rise to a host\nof new constitutional questions. Far from removing the\nCourt from the abortion issue, the majority puts the Court\nat the center of the coming “interjurisdictional abortion\nwars.” Id., at ___ (draft, at 1).\n In short, the majority does not save judges from unwieldy\ntests or extricate them from the sphere of controversy. To\nthe contrary, it discards a known, workable, and predicta-\nble standard in favor of something novel and probably far\nmore complicated. It forces the Court to wade further into\nhotly contested issues, including moral and philosophical\nones, that the majority criticizes Roe and Casey for address-\ning.\n B\n When overruling constitutional precedent, the Court has\nalmost always pointed to major legal or factual changes un-\ndermining a decision’s original basis. A review of the Ap-\npendix to this dissent proves the point. See infra, at 61–66.\nMost “successful proponent[s] of overruling precedent,” this\nCourt once said, have carried “the heavy burden of persuad-\ning the Court that changes in society or in the law dictate\nthat the values served by stare decisis yield in favor of a\ngreater objective.” Vasquez, 474 U. S., at 266. Certainly,\nthat was so of the main examples the majority cites: Brown\nv. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), and West Coast\nHotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937). But it is not so\ntoday. Although nodding to some arguments others have\nmade about “modern developments,” the majority does not\nreally rely on them, no doubt seeing their slimness. Ante,\nat 33; see ante, at 34. The majority briefly invokes the cur-\nrent controversy over abortion. See ante, at 70–71. But it\nhas to acknowledge that the same dispute has existed for\n"
[185] "38 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\ndecades: Conflict over abortion is not a change but a con-\nstant. (And as we will later discuss, the presence of that\ncontinuing division provides more of a reason to stick with,\nthan to jettison, existing precedent. See infra, at 55–57.)\nIn the end, the majority throws longstanding precedent to\nthe winds without showing that anything significant has\nchanged to justify its radical reshaping of the law. See ante,\nat 43.\n 1\n Subsequent legal developments have only reinforced Roe\nand Casey. The Court has continued to embrace all the de-\ncisions Roe and Casey cited, decisions which recognize a\nconstitutional right for an individual to make her own\nchoices about “intimate relationships, the family,” and con-\ntraception. Casey, 505 U. S., at 857. Roe and Casey have\nthemselves formed the legal foundation for subsequent de-\ncisions protecting these profoundly personal choices. As\ndiscussed earlier, the Court relied on Casey to hold that the\nFourteenth Amendment protects same-sex intimate rela-\ntionships. See Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 578; supra, at 23.\nThe Court later invoked the same set of precedents to ac-\ncord constitutional recognition to same-sex marriage. See\nObergefell, 576 U. S., at 665–666; supra, at 23. In sum, Roe\nand Casey are inextricably interwoven with decades of prec-\nedent about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nSee supra, at 21–24. While the majority might wish it oth-\nerwise, Roe and Casey are the very opposite of “ ‘obsolete\nconstitutional thinking.’ ” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203,\n236 (1997) (quoting Casey, 505 U. S., at 857).\n Moreover, no subsequent factual developments have un-\ndermined Roe and Casey. Women continue to experience\nunplanned pregnancies and unexpected developments in\npregnancies. Pregnancies continue to have enormous phys-\nical, social, and economic consequences. Even an uncompli-\n"
[186] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 39\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\ncated pregnancy imposes significant strain on the body, un-\navoidably involving significant physiological change and ex-\ncruciating pain. For some women, pregnancy and child-\nbirth can mean life-altering physical ailments or even\ndeath. Today, as noted earlier, the risks of carrying a preg-\nnancy to term dwarf those of having an abortion. See supra,\nat 22. Experts estimate that a ban on abortions increases\nmaternal mortality by 21 percent, with white women facing\na 13 percent increase in maternal mortality while black\nwomen face a 33 percent increase.13 Pregnancy and child-\nbirth may also impose large-scale financial costs. The ma-\njority briefly refers to arguments about changes in laws re-\nlating to healthcare coverage, pregnancy discrimination,\nand family leave. See ante, at 33–34. Many women, how-\never, still do not have adequate healthcare coverage before\nand after pregnancy; and, even when insurance coverage is\navailable, healthcare services may be far away.14 Women\nalso continue to face pregnancy discrimination that inter-\nferes with their ability to earn a living. Paid family leave\nremains inaccessible to many who need it most. Only 20\npercent of private-sector workers have access to paid family\nleave, including a mere 8 percent of workers in the bottom\n——————\n 13 See L. Harris, Navigating Loss of Abortion Services—A Large Aca-\n\ndemic Medical Center Prepares for the Overturn of Roe v. Wade, 386 New\nEngland J. Med. 2061, 2063 (2022). This projected racial disparity re-\nflects existing differences in maternal mortality rates for black and white\nwomen. Black women are now three to four times more likely to die dur-\ning or after childbirth than white women, often from preventable causes.\nSee Brief for Howard University School of Law Human and Civil Rights\nClinic as Amicus Curiae 18.\n 14 See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Issue Brief: Im-\n\nproving Access to Maternal Health Care in Rural Communities 4, 8, 11\n(Sept. 2019), https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/\nOMH/equity-initiatives/rural-health/09032019-Maternal-Health-Care-in-\nRural-Communities.pdf. In Mississippi, for instance, 19 percent of\nwomen of reproductive age are uninsured and 60 percent of counties lack\na single obstetrician-gynecologist. Brief for Lawyers’ Committee for Civil\nRights Under Law et al. as Amici Curiae 12–13.\n"
[187] "40 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nquartile of wage earners.15\n The majority briefly notes the growing prevalence of safe\nhaven laws and demand for adoption, see ante, at 34, and\nnn. 45–46, but, to the degree that these are changes at all,\nthey too are irrelevant.16 Neither reduces the health risks\nor financial costs of going through pregnancy and child-\nbirth. Moreover, the choice to give up parental rights after\ngiving birth is altogether different from the choice not to\ncarry a pregnancy to term. The reality is that few women\ndenied an abortion will choose adoption.17 The vast major-\nity will continue, just as in Roe and Casey’s time, to shoul-\nder the costs of childrearing. Whether or not they choose to\nparent, they will experience the profound loss of autonomy\nand dignity that coerced pregnancy and birth always im-\npose.18\n\n——————\n 15 Dept. of Labor, National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits\n\nin the United States, Table 31 (Sept. 2020), https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/\nbenefits/2020/employee-benefits-in-the-united-states-march-2020.pdf#\npage=299.\n 16 Safe haven laws, which allow parents to leave newborn babies in des-\n\nignated safe spaces without threat of prosecution, were not enacted as\nan alternative to abortion, but in response to rare situations in which\nbirthing mothers in crisis would kill their newborns or leave them to die.\nSee Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), R. Wilson, J.\nKlevens, D. Williams, & L. Xu, Infant Homicides Within the Context of\nSafe Haven Laws—United States, 2008–2017, 69 Morbidity and Mortal-\nity Weekly Report 1385 (2020).\n 17 A study of women who sought an abortion but were denied one be-\n\ncause of gestational limits found that only 9 percent put the child up for\nadoption, rather than parenting themselves. See G. Sisson, L. Ralph, H.\nGould, & D. Foster, Adoption Decision Making Among Women Seeking\nAbortion, 27 Women’s Health Issues 136, 139 (2017).\n 18 The majority finally notes the claim that “people now have a new\n\nappreciation of fetal life,” partly because of viewing sonogram images.\nAnte, at 34. It is hard to know how anyone would evaluate such a claim\nand as we have described above, the majority’s reasoning does not rely\non any reevaluation of the interest in protecting fetal life. See supra, at\n26, and n. 7. It is worth noting that sonograms became widely used in\n"
[188] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 41\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\n Mississippi’s own record illustrates how little facts on the\nground have changed since Roe and Casey, notwithstanding\nthe majority’s supposed “modern developments.” Ante, at\n33. Sixty-two percent of pregnancies in Mississippi are un-\nplanned, yet Mississippi does not require insurance to cover\ncontraceptives and prohibits educators from demonstrating\nproper contraceptive use.19 The State neither bans preg-\nnancy discrimination nor requires provision of paid paren-\ntal leave. Brief for Yale Law School Information Society\nProject as Amicus Curiae 13 (Brief for Yale Law School);\nBrief for National Women’s Law Center et al. as Amici Cu-\nriae 32. It has strict eligibility requirements for Medicaid\nand nutrition assistance, leaving many women and families\nwithout basic medical care or enough food. See Brief for 547\nDeans, Chairs, Scholars and Public Health Professionals\net al. as Amici Curiae 32–34 (Brief for 547 Deans). Alt-\nhough 86 percent of pregnancy-related deaths in the State\nare due to postpartum complications, Mississippi rejected\nfederal funding to provide a year’s worth of Medicaid cover-\nage to women after giving birth. See Brief for Yale Law\nSchool 12–13. Perhaps unsurprisingly, health outcomes in\nMississippi are abysmal for both women and children. Mis-\nsissippi has the highest infant mortality rate in the country,\n\n——————\nthe 1970s, long before Casey. Today, 60 percent of women seeking abor-\ntions have at least one child, and one-third have two or more. See CDC,\nK. Kortsmit et al., Abortion Surveillance—United States, 2019, 70 Mor-\nbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 6 (2021). These women know, even\nas they choose to have an abortion, what it is to look at a sonogram image\nand to value a fetal life.\n 19 Guttmacher Institute, K. Kost, Unintended Pregnancy Rates at the\n\nState Level: Estimates for 2010 and Trends Since 2002, Table 1 (2015),\nhttps://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/stateup10.pdf;\nKaiser, State Requirements for Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives\n(May 1, 2022), https://www.kff.org/state-category/womens-health/family-\nplanning; Miss. Code Ann. §37–13–171(2)(d) (Cum. Supp. 2021) (“In no\ncase shall the instruction or program include any demonstration of how\ncondoms or other contraceptives are applied”).\n"
[189] "42 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nand some of the highest rates for preterm birth, low birth-\nweight, cesarean section, and maternal death.20 It is ap-\nproximately 75 times more dangerous for a woman in the\nState to carry a pregnancy to term than to have an abortion.\nSee Brief for 547 Deans 9–10. We do not say that every\nState is Mississippi, and we are sure some have made gains\nsince Roe and Casey in providing support for women and\nchildren. But a state-by-state analysis by public health pro-\nfessionals shows that States with the most restrictive abor-\ntion policies also continue to invest the least in women’s and\nchildren’s health. See Brief for 547 Deans 23–34.\n The only notable change we can see since Roe and Casey\ncuts in favor of adhering to precedent: It is that American\nabortion law has become more and more aligned with other\nnations. The majority, like the Mississippi Legislature,\nclaims that the United States is an extreme outlier when it\ncomes to abortion regulation. See ante, at 6, and n. 15. The\nglobal trend, however, has been toward increased provision\nof legal and safe abortion care. A number of countries, in-\ncluding New Zealand, the Netherlands, and Iceland, permit\nabortions up to a roughly similar time as Roe and Casey set.\nSee Brief for International and Comparative Legal Scholars\nas Amici Curiae 18–22. Canada has decriminalized abor-\ntion at any point in a pregnancy. See id., at 13–15. Most\nWestern European countries impose restrictions on abor-\n\n——————\n 20 See CDC, Infant Mortality Rates by State (Mar. 3, 2022),\n\nhttps://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/sosmap/infant_mortality_rates/infant\n_mortality.htm; Mississippi State Dept. of Health, Infant Mortality Re-\nport 2019 & 2020, pp. 18–19 (2021), https://www.msdh.ms.gov/\nmsdhsite/_static/resources/18752.pdf; CDC, Percentage of Babies Born\nLow Birthweight by State (Feb. 25, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/\nnchs/pressroom/sosmap/lbw_births/lbw.htm; CDC, Cesarean Delivery\nRate by State (Feb. 25, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/\nsosmap/cesarean_births/cesareans.htm; Mississippi State Dept. of\nHealth, Mississippi Maternal Mortality Report 2013–2016, pp. 5, 25\n(Mar. 2021), https://www.msdh.ms.gov/msdhsite/_static/resources/8127.pdf.\n"
[190] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 43\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\ntion after 12 to 14 weeks, but they often have liberal excep-\ntions to those time limits, including to prevent harm to a\nwoman’s physical or mental health. See id., at 24–27; Brief\nfor European Law Professors as Amici Curiae 16–17, Ap-\npendix. They also typically make access to early abortion\neasier, for example, by helping cover its cost.21 Perhaps\nmost notable, more than 50 countries around the world—in\nAsia, Latin America, Africa, and Europe—have expanded\naccess to abortion in the past 25 years. See Brief for Inter-\nnational and Comparative Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae\n28–29. In light of that worldwide liberalization of abortion\nlaws, it is American States that will become international\noutliers after today.\n In sum, the majority can point to neither legal nor factual\ndevelopments in support of its decision. Nothing that has\nhappened in this country or the world in recent decades un-\ndermines the core insight of Roe and Casey. It continues to\nbe true that, within the constraints those decisions estab-\nlished, a woman, not the government, should choose\nwhether she will bear the burdens of pregnancy, childbirth,\nand parenting.\n 2\n In support of its holding, see ante, at 40, the majority in-\nvokes two watershed cases overruling prior constitutional\nprecedents: West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish and Brown v.\nBoard of Education. But those decisions, unlike today’s, re-\nsponded to changed law and to changed facts and attitudes\nthat had taken hold throughout society. As Casey recog-\nnized, the two cases are relevant only to show—by stark\ncontrast—how unjustified overturning the right to choose\nis. See 505 U. S., at 861–864.\n West Coast Hotel overruled Adkins v. Children’s Hospital\n——————\n 21 See D. Grossman, K. Grindlay, & B. Burns, Public Funding for Abor-\n\ntion Where Broadly Legal, 94 Contraception 451, 458 (2016) (discussing\nfunding of abortion in European countries).\n"
[191] "44 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nof D. C., 261 U. S. 525 (1923), and a whole line of cases be-\nginning with Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905). Ad-\nkins had found a state minimum-wage law unconstitutional\nbecause, in the Court’s view, the law interfered with a con-\nstitutional right to contract. 261 U. S., at 554–555. But\nthen the Great Depression hit, bringing with it unparal-\nleled economic despair. The experience undermined—in\nfact, it disproved—Adkins’s assumption that a wholly un-\nregulated market could meet basic human needs. As Jus-\ntice Jackson (before becoming a Justice) wrote of that time:\n“The older world of laissez faire was recognized everywhere\noutside the Court to be dead.” The Struggle for Judicial Su-\npremacy 85 (1941). In West Coast Hotel, the Court caught\nup, recognizing through the lens of experience the flaws of\nexisting legal doctrine. See also ante, at 11 (ROBERTS, C. J.,\nconcurring in judgment). The havoc the Depression had\nworked on ordinary Americans, the Court noted, was “com-\nmon knowledge through the length and breadth of the\nland.” 300 U. S., at 399. The laissez-faire approach had led\nto “the exploiting of workers at wages so low as to be insuf-\nficient to meet the bare cost of living.” Ibid. And since Ad-\nkins was decided, the law had also changed. In several de-\ncisions, the Court had started to recognize the power of\nStates to implement economic policies designed to enhance\ntheir citizens’ economic well-being. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New\nYork, 291 U. S. 502 (1934); O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v.\nHartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251 (1931). The state-\nments in those decisions, West Coast Hotel explained, were\n“impossible to reconcile” with Adkins. 300 U. S., at 398.\nThere was no escaping the need for Adkins to go.\n Brown v. Board of Education overruled Plessy v. Fergu-\nson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), along with its doctrine of “sepa-\nrate but equal.” By 1954, decades of Jim Crow had made\nclear what Plessy’s turn of phrase actually meant: “inher-\nent[ ] [in]equal[ity].” Brown, 347 U. S., at 495. Segregation\n"
[192] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 45\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nwas not, and could not ever be, consistent with the Recon-\nstruction Amendments, ratified to give the former slaves\nfull citizenship. Whatever might have been thought in\nPlessy’s time, the Brown Court explained, both experience\nand “modern authority” showed the “detrimental effect[s]”\nof state-sanctioned segregation: It “affect[ed] [children’s]\nhearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.” 347\nU. S., at 494. By that point, too, the law had begun to re-\nflect that understanding. In a series of decisions, the Court\nhad held unconstitutional public graduate schools’ exclu-\nsion of black students. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S.\n629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332\nU. S. 631 (1948) (per curiam); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.\nCanada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938). The logic of those cases,\nBrown held, “appl[ied] with added force to children in grade\nand high schools.” 347 U. S., at 494. Changed facts and\nchanged law required Plessy’s end.\n The majority says that in recognizing those changes, we\nare implicitly supporting the half-century interlude be-\ntween Plessy and Brown. See ante, at 70. That is not so.\nFirst, if the Brown Court had used the majority’s method of\nconstitutional construction, it might not ever have over-\nruled Plessy, whether 5 or 50 or 500 years later. Brown\nthought that whether the ratification-era history supported\ndesegregation was “[a]t best . . . inconclusive.” 347 U. S., at\n489. But even setting that aside, we are not saying that a\ndecision can never be overruled just because it is terribly\nwrong. Take West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S.\n624, which the majority also relies on. See ante, at 40–41,\n70. That overruling took place just three years after the\ninitial decision, before any notable reliance interests had\ndeveloped. It happened as well because individual Justices\nchanged their minds, not because a new majority wanted to\nundo the decisions of their predecessors. Both Barnette and\nBrown, moreover, share another feature setting them apart\nfrom the Court’s ruling today. They protected individual\n"
[193] "46 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nrights with a strong basis in the Constitution’s most funda-\nmental commitments; they did not, as the majority does\nhere, take away a right that individuals have held, and re-\nlied on, for 50 years. To take that action based on a new\nand bare majority’s declaration that two Courts got the re-\nsult egregiously wrong? And to justify that action by refer-\nence to Barnette? Or to Brown—a case in which the Chief\nJustice also wrote an (11-page) opinion in which the entire\nCourt could speak with one voice? These questions answer\nthemselves.\n Casey itself addressed both West Coast Hotel and Brown,\nand found that neither supported Roe’s overruling. In West\nCoast Hotel, Casey explained, “the facts of economic life”\nhad proved “different from those previously assumed.” 505\nU. S., at 862. And even though “Plessy was wrong the day\nit was decided,” the passage of time had made that ever\nmore clear to ever more citizens: “Society’s understanding\nof the facts” in 1954 was “fundamentally different” than in\n1896. Id., at 863. So the Court needed to reverse course.\n“In constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed\ncircumstances may impose new obligations.” Id., at 864.\nAnd because such dramatic change had occurred, the public\ncould understand why the Court was acting. “[T]he Nation\ncould accept each decision” as a “response to the Court’s\nconstitutional duty.” Ibid. But that would not be true of a\nreversal of Roe—“[b]ecause neither the factual underpin-\nnings of Roe’s central holding nor our understanding of it\nhas changed.” 505 U. S., at 864.\n That is just as much so today, because Roe and Casey con-\ntinue to reflect, not diverge from, broad trends in American\nsociety. It is, of course, true that many Americans, includ-\ning many women, opposed those decisions when issued and\ndo so now as well. Yet the fact remains: Roe and Casey were\nthe product of a profound and ongoing change in women’s\nroles in the latter part of the 20th century. Only a dozen\nyears before Roe, the Court described women as “the center\n"
[194] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 47\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nof home and family life,” with “special responsibilities” that\nprecluded their full legal status under the Constitution.\nHoyt v. Florida, 368 U. S. 57, 62 (1961). By 1973, when the\nCourt decided Roe, fundamental social change was under-\nway regarding the place of women—and the law had begun\nto follow. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 76 (1971) (recog-\nnizing that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits sex-based\ndiscrimination). By 1992, when the Court decided Casey,\nthe traditional view of a woman’s role as only a wife and\nmother was “no longer consistent with our understanding\nof the family, the individual, or the Constitution.” 505\nU. S., at 897; see supra, at 15, 23–24. Under that charter,\nCasey understood, women must take their place as full and\nequal citizens. And for that to happen, women must have\ncontrol over their reproductive decisions. Nothing since Ca-\nsey—no changed law, no changed fact—has undermined\nthat promise.\n C\n The reasons for retaining Roe and Casey gain further\nstrength from the overwhelming reliance interests those\ndecisions have created. The Court adheres to precedent not\njust for institutional reasons, but because it recognizes that\nstability in the law is “an essential thread in the mantle of\nprotection that the law affords the individual.” Florida\nDept. of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nurs-\ning Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 154 (1981) (Stevens, J., con-\ncurring). So when overruling precedent “would dislodge [in-\ndividuals’] settled rights and expectations,” stare decisis\nhas “added force.” Hilton v. South Carolina Public Rail-\nways Comm’n, 502 U. S. 197, 202 (1991). Casey understood\nthat to deny individuals’ reliance on Roe was to “refuse to\nface the fact[s].” 505 U. S., at 856. Today the majority re-\nfuses to face the facts. “The most striking feature of the\n[majority] is the absence of any serious discussion” of how\n"
[195] "48 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nits ruling will affect women. Ante, at 37. By characteriz-\ning Casey’s reliance arguments as “generalized assertions\nabout the national psyche,” ante, at 64, it reveals how little\nit knows or cares about women’s lives or about the suffering\nits decision will cause.\n In Casey, the Court observed that for two decades indi-\nviduals “have organized intimate relationships and made”\nsignificant life choices “in reliance on the availability of\nabortion in the event that contraception should fail.” 505\nU. S., at 856. Over another 30 years, that reliance has so-\nlidified. For half a century now, in Casey’s words, “[t]he\nability of women to participate equally in the economic and\nsocial life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability\nto control their reproductive lives.” Ibid.; see supra, at 23–\n24. Indeed, all women now of childbearing age have grown\nup expecting that they would be able to avail themselves of\nRoe’s and Casey’s protections.\n The disruption of overturning Roe and Casey will there-\nfore be profound. Abortion is a common medical procedure\nand a familiar experience in women’s lives. About 18 per-\ncent of pregnancies in this country end in abortion, and\nabout one quarter of American women will have an abortion\nbefore the age of 45.22 Those numbers reflect the predicta-\nble and life-changing effects of carrying a pregnancy, giving\nbirth, and becoming a parent. As Casey understood, people\ntoday rely on their ability to control and time pregnancies\nwhen making countless life decisions: where to live,\nwhether and how to invest in education or careers, how to\nallocate financial resources, and how to approach intimate\nand family relationships. Women may count on abortion\naccess for when contraception fails. They may count on\nabortion access for when contraception cannot be used, for\n——————\n 22 See CDC, K. Kortsmit et al., Abortion Surveillance—United States,\n\n2019, 70 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 7 (2021); Brief for\nAmerican College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al. as Amici Cu-\nriae 9.\n"
[196] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 49\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nexample, if they were raped. They may count on abortion\nfor when something changes in the midst of a pregnancy,\nwhether it involves family or financial circumstances, un-\nanticipated medical complications, or heartbreaking fetal\ndiagnoses. Taking away the right to abortion, as the ma-\njority does today, destroys all those individual plans and ex-\npectations. In so doing, it diminishes women’s opportuni-\nties to participate fully and equally in the Nation’s political,\nsocial, and economic life. See Brief for Economists as Amici\nCuriae 13 (showing that abortion availability has “large ef-\nfects on women’s education, labor force participation, occu-\npations, and earnings” (footnotes omitted)).\n The majority’s response to these obvious points exists far\nfrom the reality American women actually live. The major-\nity proclaims that “ ‘reproductive planning could take virtu-\nally immediate account of any sudden restoration of state\nauthority to ban abortions.’ ” Ante, at 64 (quoting Casey,\n505 U. S., at 856).23 The facts are: 45 percent of pregnancies\nin the United States are unplanned. See Brief for 547\nDeans 5. Even the most effective contraceptives fail, and\neffective contraceptives are not universally accessible.24\nNot all sexual activity is consensual and not all contracep-\ntive choices are made by the party who risks pregnancy.\nSee Brief for Legal Voice et al. as Amici Curiae 18–19. The\nMississippi law at issue here, for example, has no exception\nfor rape or incest, even for underage women. Finally, the\n\n——————\n 23 Astoundingly, the majority casts this statement as a “conce[ssion]”\n\nfrom Casey with which it “agree[s].” Ante, at 64. In fact, Casey used this\nlanguage as part of describing an argument that it rejected. See 505\nU. S., at 856. It is only today’s Court that endorses this profoundly mis-\ntaken view.\n 24 See Brief for 547 Deans 6–7 (noting that 51 percent of women who\n\nterminated their pregnancies reported using contraceptives during the\nmonth in which they conceived); Brief for Lawyers’ Committee for Civil\nRights Under Law et al. as Amici Curiae 12–14 (explaining financial and\ngeographic barriers to access to effective contraceptives).\n"
[197] "50 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nmajority ignores, as explained above, that some women de-\ncide to have an abortion because their circumstances\nchange during a pregnancy. See supra, at 49. Human bod-\nies care little for hopes and plans. Events can occur after\nconception, from unexpected medical risks to changes in\nfamily circumstances, which profoundly alter what it\nmeans to carry a pregnancy to term. In all these situations,\nwomen have expected that they will get to decide, perhaps\nin consultation with their families or doctors but free from\nstate interference, whether to continue a pregnancy. For\nthose who will now have to undergo that pregnancy, the loss\nof Roe and Casey could be disastrous.\n That is especially so for women without money. When we\n“count[ ] the cost of [Roe’s] repudiation” on women who once\nrelied on that decision, it is not hard to see where the great-\nest burden will fall. Casey, 505 U. S., at 855. In States that\nbar abortion, women of means will still be able to travel to\nobtain the services they need.25 It is women who cannot\nafford to do so who will suffer most. These are the women\nmost likely to seek abortion care in the first place. Women\nliving below the federal poverty line experience unintended\npregnancies at rates five times higher than higher income\nwomen do, and nearly half of women who seek abortion care\nlive in households below the poverty line. See Brief for 547\nDeans 7; Brief for Abortion Funds and Practical Support\nOrganizations as Amici Curiae 8 (Brief for Abortion Funds).\n\n——————\n 25 This statement of course assumes that States are not successful in\n\npreventing interstate travel to obtain an abortion. See supra, at 3, 36–\n37. Even assuming that is so, increased out-of-state demand will lead to\nlonger wait times and decreased availability of service in States still\nproviding abortions. See Brief for State of California et al. as Amici Cu-\nriae 25–27. This is what happened in Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado, New\nMexico, and Nevada last fall after Texas effectively banned abortions\npast six weeks of gestation. See United States v. Texas, 595 U. S. ___,\n___ (2021) (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)\n(slip op., at 6).\n"
[198] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 51\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nEven with Roe’s protection, these women face immense ob-\nstacles to raising the money needed to obtain abortion care\nearly in their pregnancy. See Brief for Abortion Funds 7–\n12.26 After today, in States where legal abortions are not\navailable, they will lose any ability to obtain safe, legal\nabortion care. They will not have the money to make the\ntrip necessary; or to obtain childcare for that time; or to\ntake time off work. Many will endure the costs and risks of\npregnancy and giving birth against their wishes. Others\nwill turn in desperation to illegal and unsafe abortions.\nThey may lose not just their freedom, but their lives.27\n Finally, the expectation of reproductive control is integral\nto many women’s identity and their place in the Nation.\nSee Casey, 505 U. S., at 856. That expectation helps define\n\n\n——————\n 26 The average cost of a first-trimester abortion is about $500. See Brief\n\nfor Abortion Funds 7. Federal insurance generally does not cover the\ncost of abortion, and 35 percent of American adults do not have cash on\nhand to cover an unexpected expense that high. Guttmacher Institute,\nM. Donovan, In Real Life: Federal Restrictions on Abortion Coverage and\nthe Women They Impact (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.\nguttmacher.org/gpr/2017/01/real-life-federal-restrictions-abortion-coverage-\nand-women-they-impact#:~:text=Although%20the%20Hyde%20Amendment%\n20bars,provide%20abortion%20coverage%20to%20enrollees; Brief for\nAbortion Funds 11.\n 27 Mississippi is likely to be one of the States where these costs are\n\nhighest, though history shows that it will have company. As described\nabove, Mississippi provides only the barest financial support to pregnant\nwomen. See supra, at 41–42. The State will greatly restrict abortion\ncare without addressing any of the financial, health, and family needs\nthat motivate many women to seek it. The effects will be felt most se-\nverely, as they always have been, on the bodies of the poor. The history\nof state abortion restrictions is a history of heavy costs exacted from the\nmost vulnerable women. It is a history of women seeking illegal abor-\ntions in hotel rooms and home kitchens; of women trying to self-induce\nabortions by douching with bleach, injecting lye, and penetrating them-\nselves with knitting needles, scissors, and coat hangers. See L. Reagan,\nWhen Abortion Was a Crime 42–43, 198–199, 208–209 (1997). It is a\nhistory of women dying.\n"
[199] "52 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\na woman as an “equal citizen[ ],” with all the rights, privi-\nleges, and obligations that status entails. Gonzales, 550\nU. S., at 172 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see supra, at 23–24.\nIt reflects that she is an autonomous person, and that soci-\nety and the law recognize her as such. Like many constitu-\ntional rights, the right to choose situates a woman in rela-\ntionship to others and to the government. It helps define a\nsphere of freedom, in which a person has the capacity to\nmake choices free of government control. As Casey recog-\nnized, the right “order[s]” her “thinking” as well as her “liv-\ning.” 505 U. S., at 856. Beyond any individual choice about\nresidence, or education, or career, her whole life reflects the\ncontrol and authority that the right grants.\n Withdrawing a woman’s right to choose whether to con-\ntinue a pregnancy does not mean that no choice is being\nmade. It means that a majority of today’s Court has\nwrenched this choice from women and given it to the States.\nTo allow a State to exert control over one of “the most inti-\nmate and personal choices” a woman may make is not only\nto affect the course of her life, monumental as those effects\nmight be. Id., at 851. It is to alter her “views of [herself]”\nand her understanding of her “place[ ] in society” as some-\none with the recognized dignity and authority to make\nthese choices. Id., at 856. Women have relied on Roe and\nCasey in this way for 50 years. Many have never known\nanything else. When Roe and Casey disappear, the loss of\npower, control, and dignity will be immense.\n The Court’s failure to perceive the whole swath of expec-\ntations Roe and Casey created reflects an impoverished\nview of reliance. According to the majority, a reliance in-\nterest must be “very concrete,” like those involving “prop-\nerty” or “contract.” Ante, at 64. While many of this Court’s\ncases addressing reliance have been in the “commercial con-\ntext,” Casey, 505 U. S., at 855, none holds that interests\nmust be analogous to commercial ones to warrant stare de-\n"
[200] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 53\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\ncisis protection.28 This unprecedented assertion is, at bot-\ntom, a radical claim to power. By disclaiming any need to\nconsider broad swaths of individuals’ interests, the Court\narrogates to itself the authority to overrule established le-\ngal principles without even acknowledging the costs of its\ndecisions for the individuals who live under the law, costs\nthat this Court’s stare decisis doctrine instructs us to privi-\nlege when deciding whether to change course.\n The majority claims that the reliance interests women\nhave in Roe and Casey are too “intangible” for the Court to\nconsider, even if it were inclined to do so. Ante, at 65. This\nis to ignore as judges what we know as men and women.\nThe interests women have in Roe and Casey are perfectly,\nviscerally concrete. Countless women will now make differ-\nent decisions about careers, education, relationships, and\nwhether to try to become pregnant than they would have\nwhen Roe served as a backstop. Other women will carry\npregnancies to term, with all the costs and risk of harm that\ninvolves, when they would previously have chosen to obtain\nan abortion. For millions of women, Roe and Casey have\nbeen critical in giving them control of their bodies and their\nlives. Closing our eyes to the suffering today’s decision will\nimpose will not make that suffering disappear. The major-\nity cannot escape its obligation to “count[ ] the cost[s]” of its\ndecision by invoking the “conflicting arguments” of “con-\ntending sides.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 855; ante, at 65. Stare\ndecisis requires that the Court calculate the costs of a deci-\nsion’s repudiation on those who have relied on the decision,\n\n——————\n 28 The majority’s sole citation for its “concreteness” requirement is\n\nPayne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808 (1991). But Payne merely discounted\nreliance interests in cases involving “procedural and evidentiary rules.”\nId., at 828. Unlike the individual right at stake here, those rules do “not\nalter primary conduct.” Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236, 252 (1998).\nAccordingly, they generally “do not implicate the reliance interests of pri-\nvate parties” at all. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U. S. 99, 119 (2013)\n(SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring).\n"
[201] "54 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nnot on those who have disavowed it. See Casey, 505 U. S.,\nat 855.\n More broadly, the majority’s approach to reliance cannot\nbe reconciled with our Nation’s understanding of constitu-\ntional rights. The majority’s insistence on a “concrete,” eco-\nnomic showing would preclude a finding of reliance on a\nwide variety of decisions recognizing constitutional rights—\nsuch as the right to express opinions, or choose whom to\nmarry, or decide how to educate children. The Court, on the\nmajority’s logic, could transfer those choices to the State\nwithout having to consider a person’s settled understanding\nthat the law makes them hers. That must be wrong. All\nthose rights, like the right to obtain an abortion, profoundly\naffect and, indeed, anchor individual lives. To recognize\nthat people have relied on these rights is not to dabble in\nabstractions, but to acknowledge some of the most “con-\ncrete” and familiar aspects of human life and liberty. Ante,\nat 64.\n All those rights, like the one here, also have a societal di-\nmension, because of the role constitutional liberties play in\nour structure of government. See, e.g., Dickerson, 530 U. S.,\nat 443 (recognizing that Miranda “warnings have become\npart of our national culture” in declining to overrule Mi-\nranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966)). Rescinding an in-\ndividual right in its entirety and conferring it on the State,\nan action the Court takes today for the first time in history,\naffects all who have relied on our constitutional system of\ngovernment and its structure of individual liberties pro-\ntected from state oversight. Roe and Casey have of course\naroused controversy and provoked disagreement. But the\nright those decisions conferred and reaffirmed is part of so-\nciety’s understanding of constitutional law and of how the\nCourt has defined the liberty and equality that women are\nentitled to claim.\n After today, young women will come of age with fewer\n"
[202] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 55\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nrights than their mothers and grandmothers had. The ma-\njority accomplishes that result without so much as consid-\nering how women have relied on the right to choose or what\nit means to take that right away. The majority’s refusal\neven to consider the life-altering consequences of reversing\nRoe and Casey is a stunning indictment of its decision.\n D\n One last consideration counsels against the majority’s\nruling: the very controversy surrounding Roe and Casey.\nThe majority accuses Casey of acting outside the bounds of\nthe law to quell the conflict over abortion—of imposing an\nunprincipled “settlement” of the issue in an effort to end\n“national division.” Ante, at 67. But that is not what Casey\ndid. As shown above, Casey applied traditional principles\nof stare decisis—which the majority today ignores—in reaf-\nfirming Roe. Casey carefully assessed changed circum-\nstances (none) and reliance interests (profound). It consid-\nered every aspect of how Roe’s framework operated. It\nadhered to the law in its analysis, and it reached the con-\nclusion that the law required. True enough that Casey took\nnotice of the “national controversy” about abortion: The\nCourt knew in 1992, as it did in 1973, that abortion was a\n“divisive issue.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 867–868; see Roe, 410\nU. S., at 116. But Casey’s reason for acknowledging public\nconflict was the exact opposite of what the majority insinu-\nates. Casey addressed the national controversy in order to\nemphasize how important it was, in that case of all cases,\nfor the Court to stick to the law. Would that today’s major-\nity had done likewise.\n Consider how the majority itself summarizes this aspect\nof Casey:\n “The American people’s belief in the rule of law would\n be shaken if they lost respect for this Court as an insti-\n tution that decides important cases based on principle,\n not ‘social and political pressures.’ There is a special\n"
[203] "56 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\n danger that the public will perceive a decision as hav-\n ing been made for unprincipled reasons when the Court\n overrules a controversial ‘watershed’ decision, such as\n Roe. A decision overruling Roe would be perceived as\n having been made ‘under fire’ and as a ‘surrender to\n political pressure.’ ” Ante, at 66–67 (citations omitted).\nThat seems to us a good description. And it seems to us\nright. The majority responds (if we understand it correctly):\nwell, yes, but we have to apply the law. See ante, at 67. To\nwhich Casey would have said: That is exactly the point.\nHere, more than anywhere, the Court needs to apply the\nlaw—particularly the law of stare decisis. Here, we know\nthat citizens will continue to contest the Court’s decision,\nbecause “[m]en and women of good conscience” deeply disa-\ngree about abortion. Casey, 505 U. S., at 850. When that\ncontestation takes place—but when there is no legal basis\nfor reversing course—the Court needs to be steadfast, to\nstand its ground. That is what the rule of law requires.\nAnd that is what respect for this Court depends on.\n “The promise of constancy, once given” in so charged an\nenvironment, Casey explained, “binds its maker for as long\nas” the “understanding of the issue has not changed so fun-\ndamentally as to render the commitment obsolete.” Id., at\n868. A breach of that promise is “nothing less than a breach\nof faith.” Ibid. “[A]nd no Court that broke its faith with the\npeople could sensibly expect credit for principle.” Ibid. No\nCourt breaking its faith in that way would deserve credit for\nprinciple. As one of Casey’s authors wrote in another case,\n“Our legitimacy requires, above all, that we adhere to stare\ndecisis” in “sensitive political contexts” where “partisan\ncontroversy abounds.” Bush v. Vera, 517 U. S. 952, 985\n(1996) (opinion of O’Connor, J.).\n Justice Jackson once called a decision he dissented from\na “loaded weapon,” ready to hand for improper uses. Kore-\nmatsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 246 (1944). We fear\n"
[204] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 57\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nthat today’s decision, departing from stare decisis for no le-\ngitimate reason, is its own loaded weapon. Weakening\nstare decisis threatens to upend bedrock legal doctrines, far\nbeyond any single decision. Weakening stare decisis creates\nprofound legal instability. And as Casey recognized, weak-\nening stare decisis in a hotly contested case like this one\ncalls into question this Court’s commitment to legal princi-\nple. It makes the Court appear not restrained but aggres-\nsive, not modest but grasping. In all those ways, today’s\ndecision takes aim, we fear, at the rule of law.\n III\n “Power, not reason, is the new currency of this Court’s\ndecisionmaking.” Payne, 501 U. S., at 844 (Marshall, J.,\ndissenting). Roe has stood for fifty years. Casey, a prece-\ndent about precedent specifically confirming Roe, has stood\nfor thirty. And the doctrine of stare decisis—a critical ele-\nment of the rule of law—stands foursquare behind their\ncontinued existence. The right those decisions established\nand preserved is embedded in our constitutional law, both\noriginating in and leading to other rights protecting bodily\nintegrity, personal autonomy, and family relationships.\nThe abortion right is also embedded in the lives of women—\nshaping their expectations, influencing their choices about\nrelationships and work, supporting (as all reproductive\nrights do) their social and economic equality. Since the\nright’s recognition (and affirmation), nothing has changed\nto support what the majority does today. Neither law nor\nfacts nor attitudes have provided any new reasons to reach\na different result than Roe and Casey did. All that has\nchanged is this Court.\n Mississippi—and other States too—knew exactly what\nthey were doing in ginning up new legal challenges to Roe\nand Casey. The 15-week ban at issue here was enacted in\n2018. Other States quickly followed: Between 2019 and\n2021, eight States banned abortion procedures after six to\n"
[205] "58 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\neight weeks of pregnancy, and three States enacted all-out\nbans.29 Mississippi itself decided in 2019 that it had not\ngone far enough: The year after enacting the law under re-\nview, the State passed a 6-week restriction. A state senator\nwho championed both Mississippi laws said the obvious out\nloud. “[A] lot of people thought,” he explained, that “finally,\nwe have” a conservative Court “and so now would be a good\ntime to start testing the limits of Roe.”30 In its petition for\ncertiorari, the State had exercised a smidgen of restraint.\nIt had urged the Court merely to roll back Roe and Casey,\nspecifically assuring the Court that “the questions pre-\nsented in this petition do not require the Court to overturn”\nthose precedents. Pet. for Cert. 5; see ante, at 5–6\n(ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). But as Missis-\nsippi grew ever more confident in its prospects, it resolved\nto go all in. It urged the Court to overrule Roe and Casey.\nNothing but everything would be enough.\n Earlier this Term, this Court signaled that Mississippi’s\nstratagem would succeed. Texas was one of the fistful of\nStates to have recently banned abortions after six weeks of\npregnancy. It added to that “flagrantly unconstitutional”\nrestriction an unprecedented scheme to “evade judicial\n——————\n 29 Guttmacher Institute, E. Nash, State Policy Trends 2021: The Worst\n\nYear for Abortion Rights in Almost Half a Century (Dec. 16, 2021),\nhttps://www.guttmacher.org/article/2021/12/state-policy-trends-2021-worst-\nyear-abortion-rights-almost-half-century; Guttmacher Institute, E.\nNash, L. Mohammed, O. Cappello, & S. Naide, State Policy Trends 2020:\nReproductive Health and Rights in a Year Like No Other (Dec. 15, 2020),\nhttps://www.guttmacher.org/article/2020/12/state-policy-trends-2020-\nreproductive-health-and-rights-year-no-other; Guttmacher Institute, E.\nNash, L. Mohammed, O. Cappello, & S. Naide, State Policy Trends 2019:\nA Wave of Abortion Bans, But Some States Are Fighting Back (Dec. 10,\n2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2019/12/state-policy-trends-\n2019-wave-abortion-bans-some-states-are-fighting-back.\n 30 A. Pittman, Mississippi’s Six-Week Abortion Ban at 5th Circuit Ap-\n\npeals Court Today, Jackson Free Press (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.\njacksonfreepress.com/news/2019/oct/07/mississippis-six-week-abortion-ban-\n5th-circuit-app/.\n"
[206] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 59\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nscrutiny.” Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 594 U. S. ___,\n___ (2021) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1). And\nfive Justices acceded to that cynical maneuver. They let\nTexas defy this Court’s constitutional rulings, nullifying\nRoe and Casey ahead of schedule in the Nation’s second\nlargest State.\n And now the other shoe drops, courtesy of that same five-\nperson majority. (We believe that THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s\nopinion is wrong too, but no one should think that there is\nnot a large difference between upholding a 15-week ban on\nthe grounds he does and allowing States to prohibit abor-\ntion from the time of conception.) Now a new and bare ma-\njority of this Court—acting at practically the first moment\npossible—overrules Roe and Casey. It converts a series of\ndissenting opinions expressing antipathy toward Roe and\nCasey into a decision greenlighting even total abortion\nbans. See ante, at 57, 59, 63, and nn. 61–64 (relying on for-\nmer dissents). It eliminates a 50-year-old constitutional\nright that safeguards women’s freedom and equal station.\nIt breaches a core rule-of-law principle, designed to promote\nconstancy in the law. In doing all of that, it places in jeop-\nardy other rights, from contraception to same-sex intimacy\nand marriage. And finally, it undermines the Court’s legit-\nimacy.\n Casey itself made the last point in explaining why it\nwould not overrule Roe—though some members of its ma-\njority might not have joined Roe in the first instance. Just\nas we did here, Casey explained the importance of stare de-\ncisis; the inappositeness of West Coast Hotel and Brown; the\nabsence of any “changed circumstances” (or other reason)\njustifying the reversal of precedent. 505 U. S., at 864; see\nsupra, at 30–33, 37–47. “[T]he Court,” Casey explained,\n“could not pretend” that overruling Roe had any “justifica-\ntion beyond a present doctrinal disposition to come out dif-\nferently from the Court of 1973.” 505 U. S., at 864. And to\noverrule for that reason? Quoting Justice Stewart, Casey\n"
[207] "60 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting\n\nexplained that to do so—to reverse prior law “upon a ground\nno firmer than a change in [the Court’s] membership”—\nwould invite the view that “this institution is little different\nfrom the two political branches of the Government.” Ibid.\nNo view, Casey thought, could do “more lasting injury to\nthis Court and to the system of law which it is our abiding\nmission to serve.” Ibid. For overruling Roe, Casey con-\ncluded, the Court would pay a “terrible price.” 505 U. S., at\n864.\n The Justices who wrote those words—O’Connor, Ken-\nnedy, and Souter—they were judges of wisdom. They would\nnot have won any contests for the kind of ideological purity\nsome court watchers want Justices to deliver. But if there\nwere awards for Justices who left this Court better than\nthey found it? And who for that reason left this country\nbetter? And the rule of law stronger? Sign those Justices\nup.\n They knew that “the legitimacy of the Court [is] earned\nover time.” Id., at 868. They also would have recognized\nthat it can be destroyed much more quickly. They worked\nhard to avert that outcome in Casey. The American public,\nthey thought, should never conclude that its constitutional\nprotections hung by a thread—that a new majority, adher-\ning to a new “doctrinal school,” could “by dint of numbers”\nalone expunge their rights. Id., at 864. It is hard—no, it is\nimpossible—to conclude that anything else has happened\nhere. One of us once said that “[i]t is not often in the law\nthat so few have so quickly changed so much.” S. Breyer,\nBreaking the Promise of Brown: The Resegregation of\nAmerica’s Schools 30 (2022). For all of us, in our time on\nthis Court, that has never been more true than today. In\noverruling Roe and Casey, this Court betrays its guiding\nprinciples.\n With sorrow—for this Court, but more, for the many mil-\nlions of American women who have today lost a fundamen-\ntal constitutional protection—we dissent.\n"
[208] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 61\n\n BREYER\n Appendix , SOTOMAYOR\n to opinion , and, K\n of BREYER AGAN, JJ., ,dissenting\n SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ.\n\n APPENDIX\n This Appendix analyzes in full each of the 28 cases the\nmajority says support today’s decision to overrule Roe v.\nWade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parenthood of\nSoutheastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992). As ex-\nplained herein, the Court in each case relied on traditional\nstare decisis factors in overruling.\n A great many of the overrulings the majority cites involve\na prior precedent that had been rendered out of step with\nor effectively abrogated by contemporary case law in light\nof intervening developments in the broader doctrine. See\nRamos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at\n22) (holding the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous\njury verdict in state prosecutions for serious offenses, and\noverruling Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972), be-\ncause “in the years since Apodaca, this Court ha[d] spoken\ninconsistently about its meaning” and had undercut its va-\nlidity “on at least eight occasions”); Ring v. Arizona, 536\nU. S. 584, 608–609 (2002) (recognizing a Sixth Amendment\nright to have a jury find the aggravating factors necessary\nto impose a death sentence and, in so doing, rejecting Wal-\nton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990), as overtaken by and\nirreconcilable with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466\n(2000)); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 235–236 (1997)\n(considering the Establishment Clause’s constraint on gov-\nernment aid to religious instruction, and overruling Aguilar\nv. Felton, 473 U. S. 402 (1985), in light of several related\ndoctrinal developments that had so undermined Aguilar\nand the assumption on which it rested as to render it no\nlonger good law); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, 93–96\n(1986) (recognizing that a defendant may make a prima fa-\ncie showing of purposeful racial discrimination in selection\nof a jury venire by relying solely on the facts in his case,\nand, based on subsequent developments in equal protection\nlaw, rejecting part of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202\n(1965), which had imposed a more demanding evidentiary\n"
[209] "62 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER\n Appendix , SOTOMAYOR\n to opinion , and, K\n of BREYER AGAN, JJ., ,dissenting\n SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ.\n\nburden); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447–448\n(1969) (per curiam) (holding that mere advocacy of violence\nis protected by the First Amendment, unless intended to in-\ncite it or produce imminent lawlessness, and rejecting the\ncontrary rule in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927),\nas having been “thoroughly discredited by later decisions”);\nKatz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 351, 353 (1967) (recog-\nnizing that the Fourth Amendment extends to material and\ncommunications that a person “seeks to preserve as pri-\nvate,” and rejecting the more limited construction articu-\nlated in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928),\nbecause “we have since departed from the narrow view on\nwhich that decision rested,” and “the underpinnings of\nOlmstead . . . have been so eroded by our subsequent deci-\nsions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no\nlonger be regarded as controlling”); Miranda v. Arizona,\n384 U. S. 436, 463–467, 479, n. 48 (1966) (recognizing that\nthe Fifth Amendment requires certain procedural safe-\nguards for custodial interrogation, and rejecting Crooker v.\nCalifornia, 357 U. S. 433 (1958), and Cicenia v. Lagay, 357\nU. S. 504 (1958), which had already been undermined by\nEscobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964)); Malloy v. Hogan,\n378 U. S. 1, 6–9 (1964) (explaining that the Fifth Amend-\nment privilege against “self-incrimination is also protected\nby the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the\nStates,” and rejecting Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78\n(1908), in light of a “marked shift” in Fifth Amendment\nprecedents that had “necessarily repudiated” the prior de-\ncision); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 343–345\n(1963) (acknowledging a right to counsel for indigent crim-\ninal defendants in state court under the Sixth and Four-\nteenth Amendments, and overruling the earlier precedent\nfailing to recognize such a right, Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S.\n"
[210] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 63\n\n BREYER\n Appendix , SOTOMAYOR\n to opinion , and, K\n of BREYER AGAN, JJ., ,dissenting\n SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ.\n\n455 (1942));31 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 659–662\n(1944) (recognizing all-white primaries are unconstitu-\ntional after reconsidering in light of “the unitary character\nof the electoral process” recognized in United States v. Clas-\nsic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941), and overruling Grovey v. Town-\nsend, 295 U. S. 45 (1935)); United States v. Darby, 312 U. S.\n100, 115–117 (1941) (recognizing Congress’s Commerce\nClause power to regulate employment conditions and ex-\nplaining as “inescapable” the “conclusion . . . that Hammer\nv. Dagenhart, [247 U. S. 251 (1918)],” and its contrary rule\nhad “long since been” overtaken by precedent construing\nthe Commerce Clause power more broadly); Erie R. Co. v.\nTompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78–80 (1938) (applying state sub-\nstantive law in diversity actions in federal courts and over-\nruling Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), because an interven-\ning decision had “made clear” the “fallacy underlying the\nrule”).\n Additional cases the majority cites involved fundamental\nfactual changes that had undermined the basic premise of\nthe prior precedent. See Citizens United v. Federal Election\nComm’n, 558 U. S. 310, 364 (2010) (expanding First\nAmendment protections for campaign-related speech and\nciting technological changes that undermined the distinc-\ntions of the earlier regime and made workarounds easy, and\noverruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494\nU. S. 652 (1990), and partially overruling McConnell v. Fed-\neral Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93 (2003)); Crawford v.\nWashington, 541 U. S. 36, 62–65 (2004) (expounding on the\nSixth Amendment right to confront witnesses and rejecting\nthe prior framework, based on its practical failing to keep\n\n——————\n 31 We have since come to understand Gideon as part of a larger doctri-\n\nnal shift—already underway at the time of Gideon—where “the Court\nbegan to hold that the Due Process Clause fully incorporates particular\nrights contained in the first eight Amendments.” McDonald v. Chicago,\n561 U. S. 742, 763 (2010); see also id., at 766.\n"
[211] "64 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER\n Appendix , SOTOMAYOR\n to opinion , and, K\n of BREYER AGAN, JJ., ,dissenting\n SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ.\n\nout core testimonial evidence, and overruling Ohio v. Rob-\nerts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980)); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 651–\n652 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule under the\nFourth Amendment applies to the States, and overruling\nthe contrary rule of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949),\nafter considering and rejecting “the current validity of the\nfactual grounds upon which Wolf was based”).\n Some cited overrulings involved both significant doctrinal\ndevelopments and changed facts or understandings that\nhad together undermined a basic premise of the prior deci-\nsion. See Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employ-\nees, 585 U. S. ___, ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 42, 47–49)\n(holding that requiring public-sector union dues from non-\nmembers violates the First Amendment, and overruling\nAbood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977), based on\n“both factual and legal” developments that had “eroded the\ndecision’s underpinnings and left it an outlier among our\nFirst Amendment cases” (internal quotation marks omit-\nted)); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644, 659–663 (2015)\n(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right\nof same-sex couples to marry in light of doctrinal develop-\nments, as well as fundamentally changed social under-\nstanding); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 572–578 (2003)\n(overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986), after\nfinding anti-sodomy laws to be inconsistent with the Four-\nteenth Amendment in light of developments in the legal\ndoctrine, as well as changed social understanding of sexu-\nality); United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 101 (1978) (over-\nruling United States v. Jenkins, 420 U. S. 358 (1975), three\nyears after it was decided, because of developments in the\nCourt’s double jeopardy case law, and because intervening\npractice had shown that government appeals from midtrial\ndismissals requested by the defendant were practicable, de-\nsirable, and consistent with double jeopardy values); Craig\nv. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197–199, 210, n. 23 (1976) (holding\nthat sex-based classifications are subject to intermediate\n"
[212] " Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 65\n\n BREYER\n Appendix , SOTOMAYOR\n to opinion , and, K\n of BREYER AGAN, JJ., ,dissenting\n SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ.\n\nscrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protec-\ntion Clause, including because Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71\n(1971), and other equal protection cases and social changes\nhad overtaken any “inconsistent” suggestion in Goesaert v.\nCleary, 335 U. S. 464 (1948)); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S.\n522, 535–537 (1975) (recognizing as “a foregone conclusion\nfrom the pattern of some of the Court’s cases over the past\n30 years, as well as from legislative developments at both\nfederal and state levels,” that women could not be excluded\nfrom jury service, and explaining that the prior decision ap-\nproving such practice, Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U. S. 57 (1961),\nhad been rendered inconsistent with equal protection juris-\nprudence).\n Other overrulings occurred very close in time to the orig-\ninal decision so did not engender substantial reliance and\ncould not be described as having been “embedded” as “part\nof our national culture.” Dickerson v. United States, 530\nU. S. 428, 443 (2000); see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808\n(1991) (revising procedural rules of evidence that had\nbarred admission of certain victim-impact evidence during\nthe penalty phase of capital cases, and overruling South\nCarolina v. Gathers, 490 U. S. 805 (1989), and Booth v.\nMaryland, 482 U. S. 496 (1987), which had been decided\ntwo and four years prior, respectively); Seminole Tribe of\nFla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress\ncannot abrogate state-sovereign immunity under its Article\nI commerce power, and rejecting the result in Pennsylvania\nv. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1 (1989), seven years later; the\ndecision in Union Gas never garnered a majority); Garcia\nv. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S.\n528, 531 (1985) (holding that local governments are not con-\nstitutionally immune from federal employment laws, and\noverruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833\n(1976), after “eight years” of experience under that regime\nshowed Usery’s standard was unworkable and, in practice,\nundermined the federalism principles the decision sought\n"
[213] "66 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION\n\n BREYER\n Appendix , SOTOMAYOR\n to opinion , and, K\n of BREYER AGAN, JJ., ,dissenting\n SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ.\n\nto protect).\n The rest of the cited cases were relatively minor in their\neffect, modifying part or an application of a prior prece-\ndent’s test or analysis. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U. S.\n778 (2009) (citing workability and practical concerns with\nadditional layers of prophylactic procedural safeguards for\ndefendants’ right to counsel, as had been enshrined in\nMichigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 (1986)); Illinois v. Gates,\n462 U. S. 213, 227–228 (1983) (replacing a two-pronged test\nunder Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli\nv. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969), in favor of a tradi-\ntional totality-of-the-circumstances approach to evaluate\nprobable cause for issuance of a warrant); Wesberry v.\nSanders, 376 U. S. 1, 4 (1964), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S.\n186, 202 (1962) (clarifying that the “political question” pas-\nsage of the minority opinion in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S.\n549 (1946), was not controlling law).\n In sum, none of the cases the majority cites is analogous\nto today’s decision to overrule 50- and 30-year-old water-\nshed constitutional precedents that remain unweakened by\nany changes of law or fact.\n"